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ABSTRACT
RACE FOR SANCTIONS: THE MOVEMENT AGAINST APARTHEID, 1946-1994
FEBRUARY 2002
FRANCIS NJUBI NESBITT, B.A., UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI
MA., UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME
MA., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor John H. Bracey, Jr.
This study traces the evolution of the anti-apartheid
movement from its emergence in the
radical Diaspora politics of the 1940s through the civil
rights and black power eras and its
maturation in the 1980s into a national movement that
transformed US foreign policy.
Chapter one traces the emergence of this counter-hegemonic
discourse in the radical
African Diaspora politics of the 1940s and its repression
through government
mtervention. Chapter two takes a close look at the
government's efforts to reestablish
discursive hegemony m the United States by co-opting
African-American leaders and
organizations through "enlightened paternalism" that
included covert and overt CIA
funding and the establishment of anticommunist journals.
Chapter three examines the re-
emergence of anti-apartheid sentiment during what
became known as the civil rights
movement of the 1950s and 1960s. Chapter four and
five look at the radicalization of the
IV
black freedom movement and the development of an anti-apartheid discourse and culture
in the 1970s. Chapter six examines the emergence of TransAfrica —the black lobby for
Africa and the Caribbean and its challenge to Reagan's "constructive engagement"
policies. Chapter seven examines the Free South Africa Movement and the revival of
direct action to pressure Congress to pass anti-apartheid sanctions. Chapter eight looks at
role of the Congressional Black Caucus in passing sanctions against South Africa over
President Reagan's veto. And finally chapter nine examines the impact of sanctions on
the release of Nelson Mandela and his colleagues from prison and his eventual election as
the first democratically elected president of South Africa.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
This study examines the role of African Americans in the global anti-apartheid
movement which emerged with the effort to impose economic sanctions against South
Africa at the first General Assembly of the United Nations in 1946 and ended in 1994
with after South Africa's first democratic elections. The study argues that although
African Americans of many ideological orientations were involved in trying to
influence US foreign policy toward South Africa, the majority fell into three broad
ideological camps: left, nationalist and liberal. 1 Each of these perspectives has a distinct
history and was represented in the anti-apartheid movement with varying intensity
depending on the general state of race relations in the United States. This study seeks to
show that the anti-apartheid movement emerged from the black internationalist politics
of the 1940s; survived the anti-communist crusades and the decline of white liberal
support in the 1950s and 1960s; and reemerged as a black-led interracial movement in
the 1980s.
Studies of the anti-apartheid movement fall into two broad categories: those
that focus on the anti-apartheid movement per se; and studies of black internationalism
in general. Studies of the anti-apartheid movement itself, like Love (1985), Shepherd
(1977), Massie (1997) and De Villiers (1995) tend to focus on the role of white
liberals in the movement. Studies of black internationalism like Walters (1993),
Magubane (1987), Von Eshen (1997) Plummer (1996) and biographies like Baldwin
(1995), Home (1986;, Robinson (1998) and Duberman (1989), do a better job of
covering the role of African Americans in the movement but do not focus on the anti-
apartheid movement per se thus providing a blurry and fragmented picture.
1
A major difference between the two approaches is that the black
internationalist perspective foregrounds the role of Africans and people of African
descent in the movement. Scholars like Hollis Lynch, St. Clair Drake,
Francis
Korengay, Barnard Magubane, Randall Robinson and Ronald Walters frame the
movement in the context of the long history of Pan African activity in the
African
Diaspora. They focus on organizations like the Council on African Affairs
(1937-
1955), the American Negro Leadership Conference on Africa, the
African Liberation
Day Coordinating Committee, TransAfrica, the Free South Africa
Movement and
other African American organizations that had a record of opposing racial
oppression
in South Africa since the second world war. Organizations like the
National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People, the National Negro
Congress, the
National Council ofNegro Women and the black churches were among the first
organizations in the United States to call on the U.S, the United
Nations and the
international community in general to impose sanctions on South
Africa after the
white supremacist National Party made apartheid the official policy in
1948."
While the black internationalist approach to the study of the
anti-apartheid
movement tends to be more informed, no study has attempted
a comprehensive history
of the role of African Americans in the movement from 1946
to 1994. Most of the
anti-apartheid studies in black internationalist literature
are chapters in books on other
topics or passing references in biographies and short
journal articles. This study fills
this gap in the historiography of the anti-apartheid
movement by placing it in the
context of the evolving Pan Africanist and anti-colonial
politics of African-American
leaders in the twentieth century. It shows how the movement
emerged in radical black
politics of the 1940s, was adopted by civil rights leaders
in the 1960s and the
nationalists of the 1970s before becoming a multi-racial
coalition for South Africa in
the 1980s. The study shows the continuity of
black leadership and strategies reflected
m the adoption of non-Solent direct action
tactics by the Free South Africa Movement
in the 1980s. It examines the ideological
and organizational connections between the
early anti-apartheid activists like
W.E.B. Du Bois, A. Philip Randolph, Paul and
Eslanda Robeson, Malcolm X and Martin Luther King Jr.
with the later activists like
Stokely Carmichael, Rev. Jesse Jackson,
Randall Robinson and legislators like Charles
Diggs, Walter Fauntroy and Ron Dellums.
The study also delineates the ties between the
internal struggle to destabilize
the raeist apartheid regime in South
Afinca and the external campaign for politieal,
eeonomie and eultural sanetions. At the
heart of the movement was the struggle of
b.aek Afncans m southern Afriea to end
white supremacy. Th,s internal movement
was the catalyst for actions a, the
international kvel and the critical link that
gave
coherence to the movement as a whole.
The external level can be divtded into
efforts
coordinated by the Organization of African
Umty to provde mtlitary bases, material
and diplomatic support for liberation
movements; and the Diaspora movement
which
focused on seeking international
sanctions against the regtme and providing
direct atd
to liberation movements. Th,s
Diaspora movement was closely
connected to the
continental movement through the United
Nations where the efforts of the Afftcan
Mock of nations led to the isolation and
evenhral expnlston of South AMca from
most
UN agencies.
In the United States, the trajectory
of the anti-apartheid movement
parallels
tha, of the US civil nghts movement and
the commumcations revolution that
brought
an unprecedented amount of
information abon, national and
world even, mto people's
homes. This mcreased flow of
mformation also brought a unique
opporhm.ty for
socia, movements to challenge
dominant perspectives and present
alternatives to
policy makers and the public. Both the civil rights
and anti-apartheid movements
relied on exposing the brutality of the system
in the media to change public opinion
and the policy agenda. The shocking images of
white mobs lynching, hosing, beating
and abusing black children in the South
galvanized thousands of African Americans
into action in what became known as the civil rights
movement. The equally horrific
images of the Sharpeville and Soweto massacres
in South Afnca led a new generation
of African-American activists to link their struggle
to that of the black people in South
Africa. This study uses activists' speeches,
media reports and US policy statements
and voting record at United Nations agencies
to trace the movement of anti-apartheid
discourse from the "radical" margins to the
center of the US foreign policy agenda.
This evolution is evident in the adoption
of anti-apartheid discourse: "divestment,"
"divestiture," "disinvestment," "sanctions,"
"sports boycott," "shanty towns" by the
national media in the United States and eventually
by Congress. This dissertation will
trace the process through which these concepts
became "common sense" and entered
the public sphere as a legitimate
counter discourse in US foreign policy despite the
fact that all US presidents from Truman to Bush,
Democratic and Republican, vetoed
United Nations sanctions against South
Africa.
This maturation of the movement was
marked by four key moments that
facilitated the discursive shift against
the hegemony of pro-apartheid perspectives
in
the United States: (1) the decolonization
of African and Asian countries after
world
war two that undermined the racist theory
of white supremacy (2) the civil
rights
movement of the 1960s that led to the
election of thousands of black
legislators at the
national, state and municipal levels
- these legislators then helped shift
the
Democratic Party toward an anti-apartheid
position m the 1980s, (3) the intensity of
resistance m South Africa itself, where
anti-apartheid forces steadily increased
the
pressure on the South African
government until they made the country
ungovernable,
and (4) the impact of media coverage of (a)
racist repression in Sonth Africa and (b)
the spectacnlar arrests of celebrities and
politicians staged by the Free South Afhca
Movement outside the South African embassies and
businesses around the country.
The carefully choreographed "arrests by
appointment" used media obsesston with
celebrity in a textbook case of prime time activtsm
that catapulted sanctions to the top
of the foreign policy agenda despite a
pro-apartheid administration. Th,s study will
trace the evolution of the anti-apartheid
movement from its emergence in the radical
Diaspora politics of the 1940s through the civil
rights and black power eras and its
maturation in the 1980s into a national
movement that transformed US foreign policy.
Chapter one traces the emergence of this
counter-hegemonic discourse in the
radical African Diaspora politics of the
1940s and its repression through government
intervention. Chapter two takes a close
look at the government's efforts to
reestablish
discursive hegemony in the Untied States by
co-opting African-American leaders and
organizations through "enlightened
paternalism" that included covert and overt
CIA
fundtng and the establishment of
anficommunist journals. Chapter three examines
the
re-emergence of anti-apartheid sentiment
during what became known as the civil
rights movement of the 1950s and
1960s. Chapter four and five look at the
radtcalization of the black freedom movement
and the development of an anti-
apartheid discourse and culture in the
1970s. Chapter six examines the emergence
of
TransAfrica -the black lobby for Africa
and the Caribbean and its challenge
to
Reagan's "constructive engagement"
policies. Chapter seven examines the
Free South
Afrtca Movement that revved the use
of dtiect action to pressure
Congress to pass
anfi-apartherd sanctions. Chapter eight
looks a, role of the Congressional
B.ack
Caucus in passing sanctions against
South Africa over Pres.den,
Reagan's veto. Wh.le
chapter nine examines the impact of
sanctions on the release of Nelson
Mandela and
his coheagnes from prison and fits
eventua, election as the firs,
democratically elected
president of South Africa.
'Although there were some conservatives like Max Yergan and George Shuyler, these
were apologists for apartheid and are beyond the purview of this dissertation.
"Kornegay, Francis, "Black Americans and U.S.-South African Relations" in
Mohamed El-Khawas (ed.) American South African Relations: Bibliographic Essays .
Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1975; "Free South Africa! New Life in an Old
Movement: A Freedomways Report," Freedomways 25 (Summer, 1985): 69-73.;
"U.S. Antiapartheid Upsurge" Black Scholar 16 (Nov.-Dec. 1985).
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CHAPTER 2
COLD WAR AND APARTHEID
The race is on in Africa as in every other part of the world --the race
between the forces of progress and democracy on one side and the
forces of imperialism and reaction on the other.
Paul Robeson, 1946
We have today anti-apartheid movements in many countries playing a
crucial role in the campaign against racial discrimination in South
Africa. These are all fairly new, and the first of these movements, we
must recall, was founded by Paul Robeson and the black people of the
United States.
Leslie O. Harriman (Nigeria) Chairman
the United Nations Special Committee
Against Apartheid, 10 April, 1978
In the late 1940s and the early 1950s, black radicals like Paul Robeson and
W.E.B. Du Bois were leading figures in black anti-colonial politics. Operating through
the Council on African Affairs, these black radicals tried to influence US foreign
policy through sit-ins, demonstrations, marches and petitions. They also collected
funds for victims^f^parthdd^and^cobnialism and sponsored lectures by African
nationalists. The CAA's journals, Africa News (1946-1951), Spotlight on Africa (1951-
54) and Freedom (1951-55), were relied upon by activists as sources of credible
information about Africa. Historian Hollis Lynch, who has written the best assessment
of the role of the Council on African Affairs in the Africa support movement, argues
that between 1937 and 1955:
7
There is little question that the CAA was the most important American
organization specifically concerned with Africa. Others ... did not command
the formidable leadership, the resources and the expertise of the CAA, which
received wide publicity in the black press. 1
St. Clair Drake, who wrote the introduction to Lynch's study, agreed. Drake
argued that the CAA was a "forerunner of the African Liberation Support
Committee."2 Recent studies by Penny Von Eshen (1997) and Brenda Gayle Plummer
(1996) also give credit to the black radicals associated with CAA as the founders of
the U.S. anti-apartheid movement.
At the end of the Second World War, Paul Robeson was at the height of his
popularity in the African American community. Even the liberal National Association
for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), for instance, recognized his
prominence in 1945 with its highest award, the Spingarn Medal (Von Eshen, 1997;
Duberman, 1988). This recognition from the NAACP demonstrates both the more
liberal atmosphere of the time and Robeson's own popularity in the African American
community. As the chairman of the NAACP at the time, Roy Wilkins, put it: "the
downtown audience will follow Robeson anywhere." 3 Martin Duberman, Robeson's
biographer, argues that "the Spingarn Medal marked both the apex of Robeson's public
acclaim and his fall from official grace."
4
. This fall from "official grace" was linked to
the changing political climate engendered by the emergence of the Cold War. After
World War II, Robeson's leftist perspective and ties to the Soviet Union became a
liability in his relations to the government, media and liberal African American
8
organizations like the NAACP. This fall from grace did not, however, stop Robeson
from playing an important part in the post-war emergence of both the modern civil
rights and anti-apartheid movements. Historian Sterling Stuckey argues, for instance,
that Robeson became even more active in Africa-related issues after 1949. 5 Hollis
Lynch also argues that the Africa support component of the CAA was enhanced after
the fall from grace but he also argues that the CAA "became a Harlem community
organization." Despite the persecution, therefore, Robeson's name and example
continued to inspire young African Americans. Ollie Harrington, for instance, writes
that when he was growing up in Bronx, there were few sources of inspiration and
fewer positive role models. That is until he met a Jewish storekeeper who told him
(Harrington) stories about black poets, teachers and doctors. "One day he told me of
an unbelievable Black man named Paul Robeson. He told me of this black man who
was not as good as white men. He had to be, and he was, ten times better. ... It was a
soul-splitting thought. It was a blowtorch burning out the foundations of existence.
6
Both Paul Robeson and Max Yergan, the founders of the first anti-apartheid
organization in the United States, were influenced by the internationalist tradition of
the Black church/ According to David Anthony, Max Yergan was influenced by his
grandfather, Frederick Yergan, a former slave who "shared the concerns of many of
his contemporaries who sought to play a role in the 'redemption of Africa' during the
European imperial scramble for African colonies."
8 Yergan joined the YMCA at Shaw
University where he was "influenced by a gospel-rooted brand of Christian
radicalism."
9
After graduating with a degree in theology, Yergan became a YMCA
9
secretary, serving as a missionary in India and East
Africa before settling down in
South Africa between 1921 and 1936 as the secretary
for the '•native*
1 branch of the
Student Christian Association. He cultivated friendships
with black nationalists like
Govan Mbeki, who later became a leader of the South African
Communist Party, and
Clements Kaldie, a radical trade unionist and former
Garveyite who founded the
International Commercial Union (ICU). Unable to reconcile
his Christian missionary
work with his leftist ideological orientation, Yergan
resigned from the YMCA in
1937. On his way back to the United States, Yergan met
Paul and Eslanda Robeson in
London where they formed the International Committee
on African Affairs with
Yergan as the executive secretary and Robeson
as the chairman.
Like Yergan, Robeson came from a deeply
religious background before
gravitating toward a Marxist perspective.
10 His father, Rev. William Drew Robeson
was the pastor of St. Thomas A.M.E. Zion in
the town of Somerville, New Jersey,
while Paul was growing up. Paul's elder
brother Benjamin also became an AME pastor
at Mother AME Church in Harlem that hosted many
foundational anti-apartheid
events.
11 Robeson, who was the "premier symbol, the
main fund-raiser and a major
policy maker of the Council,"
12
wrote in his autobiography that he
"discovered" Africa
after meeting African nationalists like
Jomo Kenyatta, Namadi Azikiwe and Kwame
Nkrumah in London in the 1920s and 30s
13 Robeson and his wife, Eslanda, also met
Caribbean radicals C.L.R. James and
George Padmore and became honorary
members
of the West Africa Students Union.
James, who had worked closely with
Trotsky and
other revolutionary leaders throughout
Europe and the Americas, said of
Robeson:
10
"That was an unusual man. I've met a lot of people in many
parts of the world and he
remains, in my life, the most distinguished and remarkable of them all."
14 While in
London, Paul enrolled at the University of London to study African
languages and
Eslanda at the London School of Economics to study African
anthropology.
15
This
"discovery" of Africa led to a lifelong commitment to studying his
African roots. As
he put it: "In my music, my plays, my films, I want to carry always
this central idea; to
be African. Multitudes ofmen have died for less
worthy ideals; it is even more
eminently worth living for."
16
Like Yergan, therefore, the Robesons were
radicalized by this contact with
African nationalists: "It is an African who directed my
interest in Africa to something
he had observed in the Soviet Union" Robeson
writes in his autobiography.
17
This
African (possibly Jomo Kenyatta who met Robeson in
London after a visit to the
Soviet Union) had pointed out that under socialism,
the "backward races" of Central
Asia, like the Yakuts and Uzbeks, were "leaping
ahead from tribalism to modernity,
18
illiteracy to knowledge in less than 20 years.
Far from believing in the "racial uplift"
or "civtlizat.omst" ideology of the
black bourgeo.sie, Robeson argued that
Africans were going to liberate themselves."
In contrast, W.E.B. Du Bots believed, until 1945,
mat the Dtaspora should lead
Afncans to mdependcnce through the "trusteeship"
system led by African Amencans
and developed states. Du Bois' four Pan-Afncanist
congresses were predated on this
perspeeve
- Du Bois only changed his mind on
thts tssue after the emergence of
11
African independence movements during the Second World War. In this sense, Du
Bois' perspective is similar to that of 19th Century black nationalists Martin Delany,
Henry McNeal Turner, Alexander Crummell and back-to-Africa prophets like Marcus
Garvey who subscribed to the "civilizationist" creed of racial uplift.21 In contrast,
Robeson's association with revolutionary African nationalists like Nkrumah, Kenyatta
and Azikiwe, and with African-American communists like William Patterson and
Benjamin Davis Jr., led him to support African national liberation movements.22
Robeson's speeches indicate that he saw the liberation struggle in the United
States as part of the struggle of the colonial world for freedom. In 1944, for instance,
Robeson warned the United States "It is impossible to keep 150 million Africans in
Slavery and think we can be free here." Robeson also linked his struggle with that of
the working class and sought coalitions with white workers around the world. In this
sense Robeson's perspective was pluralist and pragmatic. He sought to develop a
"united front" in the struggle against both colonialism and segregation.
This black-led, anti-colonial organization took shape in 1939 after Robeson
returned to the United States as the chairman of the International Committee on
African Affairs with Max Yergan as executive secretary. The board featured a cross-
section of African-American leaders including Garveyites, Pan Africanists,
nationalists and integrationists foreshadowing the creation of TransAfrica in 1977.
Among the board of directors were Ralph Bunche and Mordecai Johnson of Howard
University; Y.M.C.A. secretaries Charming Tobias and F.E. DeFrantz; Rene Maran, a
12
Caribbean-born novelist who was the committee's representative in France; Dr.
Rosebery T. Bokwe, a black South African who was also a member of the African
National Congress; and five white liberals.24 By 1943, this membership list included
other prominent African Americans like Dr. Alphaeus Hunton a former Howard
University professor, Charlotta Bass, a Garveyite and publisher of the California
Eagle, E. Franklin Frazier, professor of sociology at Howard University, Earl
Dickerson, president of the black National Bar Association and William Yansey Bell,
professor of theology at Gammon Theological Seminary, Mary McLeod Bethune of
the National Association ofNegro Women and A. Philip Randolph of the Brotherhood
of Sleeping Car Porters.
25
Scholar and Pan Africanist W.E.B. Du Bois was to join the
CAA as vice chairman in 1948 after being sacked, again, from the NAACP for his
radical political perspective.
Alphaeus Hunton, Charlotta Bass, Du Bois and Robeson reflected the CAA's
radical position in the post-war period. Hunton, who was the editor of the CAA's
journal New Africa and Paul Robeson's right hand man, was a former English
professor at Howard University who had been educated at Howard, Harvard and New
York universities. Hunton became a Marxist in the 1930s and played an active role in
the Washington branch of the National Negro Congress.
26 Hunton and Eslanda
Robeson also represented the CAA at the United Nations where they were deeply
involved in anti-colonial politics and initiated the involvement of Americans in the
campaign to impose global sanctions on the Union of South Africa.
13
The CAA focused on South Africa from the outset and worked in tandem with
African nationalists to influence Congress. In 1945, the CAA was the only
organization in the United States to take note of a devastating famine in South Africa.
Responding to appeals from the ANC, the CAA set up the National Sponsors'
Committee for South African Famine Relief. The campaign began with a rally of five
thousand at the Abyssinian Baptist Church in Harlem on 7 January 1946, which was
followed by rallies in forty major cities throughout the United States. 27 New Africa
described the Harlem rally as "One of the greatest meetings ever held in Harlem." 28
Marian Anderson and Paul Robeson addressed the meeting, among others. According
to the article, the keynote of the meeting was a message of support sent to Dr. R.T.
Bokwe, a member of the Council of African Affairs and the African National
Congress in South Africa. The message read:
We want our brothers and sisters in South Africa to know that they have
friends here in America who realize that the fight against discrimination in the
United States can be won only as part of the war against human exploitation
and oppression in South Africa and everywhere else. We are your allies and
together we shall achieve the first people's victory.
Several thousand cans of food and cash, together valued at about $14,000 was
collected in the campaign as "a practical demonstration of the unity between the
people of this country and the Africans." The meeting unanimously approved
resolutions sent to Prime Minister Jan Smuts of South Africa, the United Nations and
the U.S. State Department. The messages called on the UN to "to insure the
observance ofhuman rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to
race in the Union of South Africa." They also urged the international community not
14
to grant South Africa "the retention of authority over the mandate
territory of
Southwest Africa, or the right of trusteeship or control over any other territory
unless
and until the Dominion's discriminatory practices embodied in the pass
laws, color
29
bar, residential restrictions, and other devices have been abrogated."
During the South African miners' strike in 1946, the CAA organized a meeting
in Madison Square Garden attended by 19,000 to "cast a searing
spotlight on the
vicious discrimination in the Union of South Africa and the plight of
the African
millions resident there."
30 The rally opposed the annexation ofNamibia; demanded an
investigation of racism; the abolition of pass laws and restrictions
on land ownership;
and condemned US support for South African whites.
31 At the meeting, Robeson
argued that Africa was the "jackpot" of the post-war world
because it was the source
of strategic minerals like uranium, cobalt and industrial
diamonds that were used to
make American bombs. He assailed the U.S. for supporting
white supremacy in
southern Africa and called on the West to implement
the Atlantic Charter's promise of
self-determination.
32 The meeting, which was descnbed as the largest
meeting on
African issues ever held in the United States,
adopted a "Charter of African Freedom"
that urged the United States and South Africa to
abolish racial segregation.
33
Although apartheid became official policy in
South Africa in 1948, the
campaign for international sanctions was launched
by India and the Council on
African Affairs at the first General Assembly
meeting in London in 1946. The Council
on African Affairs, which had been formed in
1937 to lobby for African causes,
15
maintained a lobbyist at the UN form the outset. In 1946, CAA lobbyists Alphaeus
Hunton and Eslanda Goode-Robeson successfully lobbied against
South African
Prime Minister Jan Smuts' attempt to annex South West Africa
(now Namibia) with
the blessing of the United Nations. Foreshadowing anti-apartheid
activism in the
1980s, CAA members (with the support of members of the liberation movements)
attended sessions of the Ad-Hoc Committee on Non-self-governing
Territories, the
Trusteeship Council and the General Assembly, distributed
literature prepared by the
CAA and personally lobbied members of the Trusteeship Council.
34
Although the UN refused to allow the annexation, the United States voted with
South Africa. U.S. representative John F. Dulles, said:
"I do not feel that the United
States, in V1ew of its own record, was justified in adopting
a holier-than-thou attitude
toward the Union of South Africa."
35
In 1947, Dulles again told the United Nations
that it was regrettable that South Africa had not complied
with the request of the
United Nations for information but that the United
Nations could not force South
Africa to bring the territory under trusteeship. The
United States eventually requested
that the issue be reviewed by the International Court
of Justice. Meanwhile, South
Africa proceeded to incorporate the mandate territory
through the South West Africa
Act of 1949.
36
Hunton and Eslanda Robeson also worked behind
he scenes to shape the anti-
racism resolution presented by India's representative
Vyaya Pandit Nehru.
37
India's
representative, V.L. Pandit, challenged South
Africa's right to exclude people of
16
Indian descent from voting. To support India's call
for sanctions, the CAA organized a
letter writing campaign to President Truman, the U.S.
State Department and the
United States delegate to the UN, urging "full support to the
Indian government's
petition to the United Nations."
38 On December 8, 1946, the U.S. representative, John
Foster Dulles, voted "No" on a majority resolution that India
and South Africa report
on the next session on the treatment of Indians
in South Africa.
39 The General
Assembly also proposed that negotiations take place
between India, Pakistan and
South Africa with respect to the treatment of Indians
in South Africa. Both the United
States and South Africa voted "No." On the same day the
General Assembly plenary
meeting passed Resolution 616 (VII) A to establish a United
Nations Commission to
study the government of South Africa and its
white supremacist system. The United
States abstained.
40 The representative of India, Sir Maharaj Singh, noted the
CAA's
work on behalf of South West Africa during the 1947
session of the General
Assembly. The African National Congress also
congratulated the CAA during its 1947
annual conference when it adopted a resolution saying:
"Congress desires to make
special mention of the Council on African Affairs
for its noble efforts to defend
fundamental human rights."
In 1 948 the United Nations adopted the
Universal Declaration of Human
Rights drafted by the United States and colonial
powers including Prime Minister Jan
Smuts of the Union of South Africa. Despite its
dubious origins, the UN charter, like
the United Nations itself, was to become an
important site of struggle in the anti-
apartheid movement. During the drafting process,
the commission had received
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petitions from the National Negro Congress, the Council on
African Affairs and the
NAACP urging the investigation of racial discrimination in the United States and
South Africa. The Council on African Affairs called on the
newly formed Commission
on Human Rights to "give specific consideration to the
flagrant violation of the most
elementary principles ofhuman rights in South Africa where Africans
are kept in a
status of permanent subservience to a white minority."
41 The statement urged the
United Nations body to outlaw legal and political discrimination
such as prevailed in
South Africa; investigate and make public its findings on the
degree to which
fundamental freedoms are observed in countries such as
South Africa where the great
majority are barred from exercising citizenship rights; and expel
from the United
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Nations states like South Africa that practice racial
discrimination.
In a letter dated 12 September 1952, 13 African
and Asian countries brought
the issue of racial discrimination before the
Secretary-General of the United Nations.
This time, however, the issue was apartheid m general
and not just the treatment of
Indians and the issue of South West Africa. The
letter said:
The race conflict in the Union of South Africa
resulting from the policies of
apartheid of the South African Government
is creating a dangerous andSS tuition which constitutes both a threat to international peace and aSrvioS of the basic principles of human rights and fundamental
freedoms which are enshrined in the Charter of
the United Nations.
The NAACP, the War Resisted League, and
several African American
organizations also launched a campaign to get the
United Nations to allow Prof. Z.K.
Matthews to address the General Assembly on
the issue of apartheid. On November
18
13, 1952, Executive Secretary
Walter White sent a telegram to the United States
delegation at the United Nations urging them to
allow "native Africans to give oral
evidence on apartheid legislation and other
discnminatory policies of the Union of
South Africa" before the Ad Hoc Political Committee
considering the South Africa
question.
44 On December 5, the NAACP presented an anti-apartheid
petition endorsed
by 30 church, labor and civic organizations
calling on the United States to "take a
course of action that will identify our
country with the hopes and feelings of
millions
of Africans."
45 The letter argued that the United States
"dare not act in a way that will
shut off the United Nations as the last
hope of millions of increasingly desperate
Africans and thus drive them down the dark
path of violence and anarchy." The letter,
which was signed by a Who's Who of the African
American civil rights leaders,
concludes with an anticommunist broadside:
We have to think and act in a manner consistent
with out great purpose^which
totalitarianism.
A, the 1952 General Assembly
meeting, however, the United States
opposed
the establishment of a United Natrons
Cornmiss.on ,0 "study the rae.a, sttuahon
in
Son* Africa" and "report its conelustou"
a. the next General Assembly.*
6 The
resolntion was adopted by a majority of 35
members of the Umted Natrons. One
abstained. During the meeting, U.S.
spokesman Charles A. Sprague
stressed the elose
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respects fully the sovereignty of the Union of South
Africa with which it has had a
long and friendly relationship. There is a steady
interchange of travel and trade
between our countries.... my delegation is exceedingly reluctant
in this gathering of
the nations to point an accusing finger at
this Member State and does not intend to do
„47
SO.
While the CAA's and India's call for United Nations
sanctions against South
Africa was opposed by the United States and the
United Kingdom and failed, the
campaign to raise the world conscience to the
plight of non-whites in South Africa set
in motion the sanctions movement that would
eventually lead to the sanctions
resolution ofNovember 6, 1962, when member states
voted in the General Assembly
to sever diplomatic, transportation and
economic relations with South Africa.
Although this resolution was non-binding, it
was a major victory for the external anti-
apartheid movement. To be effective, however,
the movement needed the support of
the Security Council where the UK and the US continued
to block mandatory
sanctions
48* 1963 the Security Council adopted
a voluntary arms embargo and the
sympathetic Kennedy administration in the
United States announced an end to military
sales to South Africa. Britain also banned
arms sales to South Africa m 1963.
International organizations like the
United National Educational, Scientific
and
Cultural Organization (1956) and the
International Labor Organization (1961),
voted
to expel South African representatives
to protest the country's
racial policies.
49
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Apartheid and Jim Crow
On 26 May 1948, a massive turnout by rural Afrikaners gave Rev. Daniel
Malan's Nationalist Party a majority of five seats in the whites-only Parliament of the
Union of South Africa. The Nationalists had won on a racist platform that played on
white fears of the so-called "black threat" and promised to establish strict "apartheid"
or separate development policies to counter it. Soon after the Nationalists took power
they began to implement apartheid policies including the Population Registration Act
(1949) which required registration and racial classification of all persons above 16
years of age; the Mixed Marriages Act (1950) which made the marriage of whites and
non-whites a criminal act; the Suppression of Communism Act (1950) that associated
anti-apartheid activities with communism; the Group Areas Act (1950) which allowed
the government to determine areas in which members of particular groups could reside
and own property; and the Bantu Education Act (1953) which brought mission schools
under government control and circumscribed the education of Africans.
50
In the United States, Harry Truman won the presidential elections of 1948 with
a huge majority despite defections by Democrats on the right and left. On the right,
Strom Thurmond of South Carolina formed the States' Rights Party and led a
defection by a group of Southern Democrats called the "Dixiecrats." Thurmond and
his segregationist cohorts objected to Truman's concessions to African Americans. In
particular they attacked Truman's Executive Order 9981 of 1948 to desegregate the
armed forces. Thurmond called this presidential order "un-American." Truman also
survived a defection from the left that led to the formation of the Progressive Party led
21
by former vice president Henry Wallace. The party, which attracted
the support of
leftist African Americans like Paul Robeson and W.E.B. Du Bois, took a strong
pro-
civil rights, anti-lynching position and called for peace talks with
the Soviet Union.
Truman's campaign stayed on the middle ground while redbaiting the
left and
dissociating the president from the extremism of the Dixiecrats and
Republicans.
Th|s fu^tpreiiide^^
ofj^ojitiw^ In 1947 ' the Truman Doctrine
had made it clear that the United States would not tolerate criticism
of its foreign
policy while engaged in a struggle with the Soviet Union for the
"hearts and minds" of
newly decolonized countries in Africa and Asia. Truman
courted mainstream civil
rights organizations like the NAACP and the Congress on Racial Equality
(CORE)
with civil rights concessions while marginalizing and
eventually criminalizing leftist
groups like the Council on African Affairs and the
National Negro Congress. In June
1947, Truman made an unprecedented appearance before
the NAACP where he said
the United States "can no longer afford the luxury
of a leisurely attack on
segregation," and promised to support civil rights and
anti-lynching legislation. In
February 1948, after a particularly heinous lynching,
the president delivered a national
civil nghts message that promised to strengthen
the civil rights division of the Justice
Department, abolish the poll tax, and pass anti-lynching
legislation.
51 Pressured by
Paul Robeson, A. Philip Randolph and civil rights
groups, who were threatening
unrest if the president allowed a Jim Crow draft,
Truman issued Executive Order 9981
on 26 July 1948 to desegregate the Armed Forces.
52 The order also established the
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President's Committee on Equal Treatment and
Opportunity in the Armed Forces. The
members of the committee reflected a new African
American elite including
industrialist Dwight Palmer and Lester Granger of the
Urban League and John
Sengstacke, publisher of the Chicago Defender
53
Truman's concessions to civil rights groups
and strong-arm tactics against the
left convinced moderate groups like the
NAACP and the Urban League that "full
American nationalism apparently promised greater
immediate rewards than racial
mternationalism."
54
Historian Gerald Home argues that African American
moderates
made a "Faustian bargain" to abandon racial
internationalism for civil rights
concessions at home.
55 W.E.B. Du Bois, who had supported Wallace's
candidacy, was
expelled from the NAACP for partisan politics although
the NAACP's leadership itself
had supported Truman
56 Du Bois's biographer Gerald Home argues
that the
octogenarian was "ousted from the (NAACP) principally
because of his leading role in
the Wallace campaign and his persistence
on pressing the issue of United States
racism m the United Nations."
57 Du Bois had been invited back to the
NAACP in 1944
as Research Director after a ten-year
hiatus. He returned to the association
during a
period of renewed interest in international
issues in the African American community.
While at the association, he had helped
organize the fifth Pan African
Congress m
Manchester, England and wrote two
influential books, Color and Democracy
and The
World and Africa.
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With the emergence of the Cold War, however, Du Bois's leftist and anti-
imperialist politics became a liability to forces in the NAACP that deemed it safer
to
conform to the new order. These tensions were played out
in the battle over Du Bois's
petition to the United Nations detailing racial oppression in
the United States. The
petition, An Appeal to the World: A Statement on the Denial of
Human Rights to
Minorities in the Case of Citizens ofNegro Descent in the
United States ofAmerica
and an Appeal to the United Nations for Redress, was
presented to the UN Human
Rights Committee by the Soviet Union because the U.S.
delegation, which included
NAACP board member Eleanor Roosevelt, refused to present it.
58 The petition led to a
serious rift between Du Bois and the NAACP's liberal leaders.
Walter White and
Eleanor Roosevelt opposed the petition on the
grounds that it would embarrass the
United States.
59
In addition to the controversies over the
Wallace candidacy and the
United Nations, Du Bois had continuing personal
problems with Executive Secretary
Walter White and other board members.
60 By 1948 these tensions led to his second
expulsion from the organization he helped to
found ostensibly because he was
engaging in partisan politics. Du Bois then joined the
CAA that was undergoing its
own readjustment process.
Cold War politics also led black newspapers
like the Chicago Defender and
Amsterdam New to tone down the anti-,mpenal,s«
rhetoric they had adopted during
the war." Like the NAACP, black leaders and
commentators continued to advocate
decolouration as a defense aga.ns, communism.
At the same time, they also argued
tha, the Umted States could not claim to be
a leader of the "free world" white
holding
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10 percent of its population in bondage. 62 Although studies show that the majority of
African Americans were against aid for European countries, the Marshall Plan and
NATO,63 the NAACP supported the programs while urging that "similar aid should be
extended as needed to peoples in Asia, the Mideast and Africa." Executive Secretary
Walter White urged the United States to extend the European Recovery Program to
Africa in testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee in 1948. He argued that
the United States "has a moral obligation to require that the countries receiving foreign
aid adopt programs under which people currently subjected to their rule shall speedily
be given a chance for freedom." 64
In contrast to White's position, Paul Robeson, chairman of the left-wing
Council on African Affairs, argued that the council was "morally bound" to take a
stand against the ERP because the countries that would receive aid from the United
States had nothing to offer except the raw materials to be found in their African
colonies. The CAA released a policy statement on U.S. foreign policy that said:
It is the United States that is decisive in determining Africa's immediate future.
Without American loans and credits, without the political backing of the
Truman administration ... and without the military assistance of the United
States already granted or promised, the European colonial powers could not
now maintain the imperialistic control they exercise over Africa and other
colonial areas.
65
Although the CAA was actually reflecting popular Black opposition to aid for
Europeans, the policy led to a major rupture in the CAA's ranks and cut it off from
important sources of funding.
66
In early 1948, Executive Secretary Max Yergan tried
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to force the CAA to conform to the Truman Doctrine
and support the European
Recovery Program (ERP). When he failed to wrest
control of the organization from
Robeson and Hunton, Yergan resorted to
Redbaiting.
67 He told the press that a
Communist-led minority was trying to force the CAA to support
the candidacy of
Henry Wallace.
68 At a press conference called to reply to Yergan's
charges, Robeson,
speaking as the chairman of the CAA, said Yergan
has resorted to "public Red-baiting
in an effort to cover-up his own
retreat from genuine struggle on behalf of
African
freedom and against imperialist oppression."
Robeson said that the real issue that had
split the CAA's membership was the decision
to oppose the European Recovery
Program of foreign aid funded by the United
States. Although the Robeson camp won,
Yergan left with others like founding
members Channmg Tobias, Hubert Delany and
69
Rene DeFranz and Adam Clayton Powell Jr.
After his ouster from the CAA, Yergan
became a spokesman for the State
Department, traveling to South Afttca
m 1949 where he spoke, in a complete
about
face, m favor of aparthetd™ Yergan
was embraced by the South Africans
who hosted
him repeatedly in the 1960s and 70s and
even gave htm "honorary wlute"
status."
Yergan mm to the right was bmely as some
of hts former Commumst Party associates,
of ,948 Durmg the ,950s and '60s
Yergan was associated with the
South African
dtplomattc corps and rtgh, wmg tntellectuals
and .oumahsts „ke Wdham Buckley and
, n , in thp 1 960s he supported the Katanga
William Rusher of the National Review.
In the 0US n w
, hpPTlbacked by Belgian mercenaries
and was a major
secession movement that had been
K a o d s
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supporter of Ian Smith's Unilateral Declaration of Independence
in 1965.
72 Yergan
was one of the first African American apologists for South
African apartheid who
emerged out of the woodwork in the 1950s. He joined longtime
conservative
Pittsburgh Courier commentator George Shuyler who had declared
that Africans were
not ready for independence.
Nationalist groups like the African Nationalist Pioneer
Movement led by
Carlos Cooks and the United African Nationalist Movement
formed by James Lawson
in 1948, continued to organize along Garveyite
principles of back-to-Africa and self-
reliance under the ubiquitous "buy-black" and "don't
buy where you can't work-
campaigns. Like the left, these African Amencan
nationalists showed consistent
interest in South Africa during the course of the
anti-apartheid movement. Nationalists
played an important part in mobilizing a
constituency for Africa among the new
migrants from the South and immigrants from the
Caribbean. These communities
lived "below the radar screen" of the black and
white press and have thus been erased
from the recent historiography of black
internationalism. Instead of using the black
press as an organizing tool, the Harlem nationalists
mastered the technique of "street-
speakmg" which was initially associated with
immigrants from the Caribbean but had
been Harlemized by the first world war. Among
the most accomplished street speakers
during the Depression and World War Two
were nationalists like Carlos Cooks and
Richard B. Moore, a Harlem resident from
the turn of the century. Malcolm X also
sharpened his debating skills on "Africa
Square" m Harlem where he also displayed
his pan-Africanist orientation.
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James Lawson's UANM established strong ties with representatives of African
nations at the UN and organized famine relief and informational campaigns in the
1950s. After a trip to Tunisia and Ethiopia in 1952, for instance, the New York
Amsterdam News praised Lawson for his internationalist perspective saying that
although the paper did not agree "when his preachments for African Nationalism'
come close to setting black people against whites ... Mr. Lawson has recognized the
potentialities of these colored people who have voices in the United Nations and how
both Negro Americans and they can be of overwhelming mutual benefit, both in the
short and long runs." 73 Elijah Mohammed's Nation of Islam had a relatively
unenlightened position on Africa during this period, preferring instead to call
themselves "Asiatic" black men and to identify with the Arabs of North Africa and the
Middle East. The NOI's position
,
however, changes in the mid-1950s with the
independence movements in Africa and the emergence of Malcolm X as a national
spokesman. In "Africa Conscious Harlem," Richard Moore argued that "consciousness
of Africa was by no means limited to the various groups which called themselves
'nationalists' and who are quite vocal but who actually contribute little or no
substantial, direct support to African liberation movements."
74 Moore argued that the
nationalist groups were unable to put aside their power struggles and unite and had the
destructive tendency of opposing more popular and effective groups.
As apartheid began to take shape in 1948, therefore, the black left was still
vibrant (Ben Davis was still the communist New York City Councilor) although leftist
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groups had become targets of the FBI and the Justice Department. Liberal groups like
the NAACP had thrown their lot in with the Truman administration while the
nationalists continued to push Garvey's black pride and self-reliance agenda.
Meanwhile, a small but vocal right was beginning to emerge under the direction of
George Schuyler and Max Yergan.
Financing Apartheid
In the United States, the Truman administration considered the Union of South
Africa an important source of strategic raw materials and an ally in the struggle
against communism. Key to this relationship was the fear that southern Africa's
uranium deposits might fall into Soviet hands. In 1948 the United States was still
getting 90% of its uranium from the Belgian Congo although it had started
negotiations with South Africa which had large deposits of the strategic mineral.
During the war, Africa had become a critical sources of strategic minerals including
asbestos, lead, manganese, tin, uranium, coal, cobalt, copper, chrome, diamonds and
gold. As the New York Times put it:
Africa is the continent of the future. We learned its strategic value in the
Second World War. Its economic potentialities are the hope of the Western
Europe not in the sense of exploitation but for the good of the Africans and the
77
rest of the world.
As the undisputed leader of the "free world," the United States chose to
maintain control of the region through the existing colonial structure established by its
NATO allies, France, Portugal, and Britain. President Truman himself had stated the
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importance of Africa to U.S. foreign policy arguing that
the continent could not be
allowed to "fall to Soviet Russia. We would lose the sources of our most
vital raw
78
materials including uranium which is the basis of our atomic
power."
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By 1948, New Africa was calling the United States the "new
boss in Africa."
The newsletter reported that Africa was getting the
attention of American bankers,
industrialists, diplomats and military heads. The report said,
"The United States,
through the Marshall Plan, has acquired top
priority to the strategic minerals it wants
from (Africa)." In a March 26, 1953 article the
New York Times also reported in a
story "Africa Called Key to World's Future, Army
Officer Emphasizes Its Importance
as Storehouse of Strategic Minerals," that
a Col. Alvin R. Glafka of the United States
Army had described Africa as "the continent of
tomorrow" during a two-week
Economic Mobilization Course attended by 400
business and military leaders. Col.
Glafka told the participants that the United
States and its NATO allies Portugal,
France, Belgium and Great Britain planned to
make large investments in Africa to
counter any threat from the communists.
Detailing Africa's economic potential
Colonel Glafka said the continent
produced 98 percent of the worlds diamonds,
89
percent of its uranium oxide, 85 percent of
its cobalt and 30 percent of its manganese.
Colonel Glafka's predictions were
accurate. In 1946 a New York bank group
Laedenburg, Thelman and Co., merged with
British-South African interests covering
extensive mining properties over 100 South
African industrial companies called
Lezard Freres and Company
80 Time magazine descnbed this
merger as "the first big
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beach-head of American capital in South Africa." By 1949 the Truman
administration
also moved to cement ties with the apartheid regime in South Africa.
Faced with an
economic crisis in 1949, the South African government sent its
finance minister to the
United States to seek a loan of $70 million.
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After some negotiations, however, it was
announced that there would be no loans because South Africa
"could not accept the
strings attached." By December 1950, however, an agreement
had been reached
allowing the United States and Britain access to South
African's uranium mines as an
alternative to the mines in the Belgian Congo.
82 The U.S. helped South Africa apply
for and receive a loan of $80 million from the U.S. dominated
World Bank in January
1951. South Africa also received $30 million from private
banks in the United
States.
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In June 1951, the U.S. Export-Import Bank,
at the request of the U.S. Atomic
Energy Commission, allocated $35 million for uranium
production in South Africa,
and advanced another $27 million in 1952. The uranium
project was expected to cost
$100 million. 84 This infusion of investments and loans
bailed out Malan's Nationalist
Party and allowed it to win a larger majority in
parliament in the all-white elections of
1953. New Africa warned that the money was
"intended to speed up the exploitation of
African resources" and to "guarantee and
expand the super profits derived from
unpenalist enslavement of African workers."
85 The newsletter went on to condemn the
U.S. for "guns and loans to Malan's regime
and says nothing in criticism of its
"free
world" ally's policy of Jim Crow oppression.
Instead it persecutes the one
organization
in Amenca which has been exposing
South African racism and seeking
support for
Africa."
86
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Liberal African American organizations like the NAACP also noted the
growing ties between the United States and South Africa. Although the NAACP had
supported the Truman administration's foreign policies in 1948, it continued to
question certain polices although the queries were cloaked in anticommunist garb. In
February 1951, for instance, Walter White received mail from a Mr. Palmer Webber
urging the NAACP to protest to the World Bank over an $80 million loan it was
considering for South Africa. 87 The letter urged White to send the chairman, Mr.
Eugene Black, "a clear statement ... strongly protesting the $80 million loan to South
Africa specifying that it is completely false to the fundamental interests of this country
to strengthen fascist and racist powers in Africa, South America or Asia."
On February 1, White fired off an urgent protest letter to Eugene Black of the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) via Western
Union on behalf of the NAACP "and its 1,600 branches." The letter vigorously urged
the bank to reconsider the "$50 million" loan to South Africa until the country "ceases
its defiance of the United Nations with respect to South West Africa and abandons its
dangerous racist policies." Comparing the apartheid system to Nazism, the letter said:
Granting of this loan to the Union of South Africa is all the more remarkable
and dismaying in light of the recent refusal of both government and financial
leaders in Britain to give financial aid to the Union of South Africa because its
policies infuriate colored people everywhere, who constitute two-thirds of the
88
world's population.
Five days later White received an answer from Black stating that the bank
would not "reconsider such loans since the agreements have been signed following
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official approval by the Bank's Executive Directors, who represent
governments of the
Bank's 49 member nations, including the government of the
United States."
89 Black
also quoted the bank's articles of agreement stating
that loans shall be made "without
regard to political or other non-economic influences or
considerations." Nevertheless,
the World Bank president assured White that the projects
that the bank had agreed to
finance would benefit "all of the South African people
regardless of color." Two days
later, White answered taking issue with the bank's
contention that the loan would
benefit all South Afncans. He argued that the "grim
and bloody truth" was that
Africans enjoyed none of the benefits of government. Indeed,
he continued, "The
dangerous apartheid doctrine of the Malan Government
proposes denial to an even
greater extent of the few crumbs that have been
grudgingly given to the native
population."
90
In conclusion White urged the bank to weigh
future loans carefully as it
was "entirely proper, we believe, to
advocate that no economic assistance be given
to
governments which unashamedly advocate a
dangerous racist policy."
In 1952, White was again informed that
the South African government had
sent a delegation to the United States to
seek a $19 billion loan. In a letter to Jonas
Reiner ofNew York seeking more information,
White recalls that the World Bank
loan had helped the South African economy
at a time when more moderate forces
were hoping that the Nationalists would
fail. "The International Bank's loan
not only
saved Malan's hide but the loan was
widely used to convince English-speaking
South
Afncans ... that the racial policies of
South Africa were not disapproved."
91 White
asked Ramer to find him any information
on the amount and sources of loans
to South
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Africa "to use as a basis for opposition to
any loans to the Union of South Africa until
the government there is willing to
act in a more civilized manner." On July 21, 1953,
White followed up his earlier communication
with Eugene Black, president of the
World Bank, by asking whether the bank still
believed that the loan it had made to
South Africa in January 1951 had benefited
all South African people regardless of
color "in the light of hat has happened in
South Africa since 195 1."
92 A week later,
Black replied informing White that the
loans had financed electric power production
and improvement of railroads which had
"helped the whole economy grow (and)
created more job opportunities at higher pay
for everyone.- Incredibly, Black added
that, "On balance, it is likely that Africans
have benefited economically rather more
from this growth than other sections
of the community."
ThP Defiance Campaigns
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We a~ess om grautude for the assrstance^ou
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Sarts made by your Council (on African
Affairs) in edueaung
h d the public of America as
a whole,
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South African communists and the
African National Congress
called the May
Day ,950 stnke to protest the
Suppress ofCommunism Ac, that
had been passed
by Malan's reg.me. On May 1, thousands
of hlaca workers boycotted
the^obs. The
government responded vrolently,
sending thousands of armed
pohcemen to d.sperse
On 26 June, the ANC called another strike
to protest the shoofings
and the
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Suppression of Communism Act. The protest was well supported by Communists,
Indians and ANC members leading the formation of a broad-based, nationalist
movement that was unprecedented. The May Day strikes, however, were only a
prelude to the mass civil disobedience campaigns of 1952 and 1953 called the
Campaign of Defiance of Unjust Laws.
The plan was for a civil disobedience Campaign of Defiance where Africans
would defy petty apartheid regulations like whites-only drinking fountains, train
compartments and waiting rooms.95 The campaign was launched on April 1952 when
whites were marking the 300th anniversary of the arrival of Jan Van Riebeck and the
first colony of Dutch settlers in South Africa. Before the campaign, the ANC sent a
letter to Prime Minister Malan urging him to repeal the land acts, pass regulations, and
the Group Areas and Suppression of Communism acts or face mass action.96 The letter
deplored apartheid legislation like Group Areas Act, the Suppression of Communism
Act, and Bantu Authorities Act:
The cumulative effect of this legislation is to crush the national organizations
of the oppressed people, to destroy the economic position of the people and to
create a reservoir of cheap labor for the farms and the gold mines, to prevent
the unity and development of the African people towards full nationhood and
to humiliate them in a host of other manners.
Saying that the ANC can no longer remain silent in "a matter of life and death" the
letter called on Malan to repeal apartheid legislation "by NOT LATER THAN THE
29TH DAY OF FEBRUARY, 1952, failing which the African National Congress will
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hold protest meetings and demonstrations on the 6th day of April 1952 as a prelude to
the implementation of the plan for the defiance of unjust laws."
On 29 January 1952, the prime minister's office responded with a threat that
"the government will make full use of the machinery at its disposal to quell any
Q7
disturbances." The letter also claimed:
You will realize, I think, that it is self-contradictory to claim as an inherent
right of the Bantu who differ in many ways from the Europeans that they
should be regarded as not different, especially when it is borne in mind that
these differences are permanent and not man-made.98
Following this rebuff, Walter Sisulu of the ANC and Yusuf Chachalia of the
Indian Congress were appointed joint secretaries and Nelson Mandela volunteer-in-
chief of the defiance campaign." The campaign was launched at meetings on April 6,
1952 when thousands of nonwhites vowed to "defy unjust laws that subject our people
to political slavery, economic misery and social degradation." 100 In Johannesburg, The
New York Times reported that "several thousand non-whites marched in Fordsburg
Freedom Square to the tune of Paul Robeson songs played on a loud speaker. The
carried banners reading, "Down with Apartheid," "Down with Passes."
101 As
volunteer-in-chief, Mandela made hundreds of speeches throughout the country urging
Africans to confront the apartheid machine and invite arrest. The government reacted
by "banning" four known ANC militant leaders including Dr. Dadoo and J.B. Marks
from public gatherings. The leaders promptly defied the ruling by addressing public
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meetings and were arrested. The government also banned Paul Robeson's songs,
radical newspapers and warned the public not to support the ANC action. 102
On June 22, 1952, the first batch of 52 "volunteers" was arrested at the
Boksburg "Native" Location 20 miles from Johannesburg. 103 The ANC reported later
that its volunteers broke apartheid laws in six different cities and that mass meetings
preceded the acts of defiance. Mandela, Sisulu, Chachalia and other leaders of the
campaign were arrested on 26 June. Yusuf Dadoo, president of the Indian Congress,
Moses Kotane, of the ANC, and J.B. Marks of the African Mineworkers Union were
given four to six months in jail under the Suppression of Communism Act. 104 Between
July and August 1952, the police raided the homes and offices ofANC leaders around
the country seizing numerous documents. On August 26, 1952 they arrested twenty
leaders of the campaign including Dr. Moroka, Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu, J.B.
Marks, Dr. Dadoo and Yusuf Chachalia and charged them with promoting
communism. 105 The group were eventually found guilty of "statutory communism"
under the Suppression of Communism Act and sentenced to 9 months in prison. 106 In
sentencing these leaders, the magistrate said:
It is common knowledge that one of the aims of communism is to break down
racial barriers and strive for equal rights for all sections of the people, and to
do so without discrimination of race, color, or creed. The Union of South
Africa, with its peculiar problems created by a population overwhelmingly
non-European, is fertile ground for the dissemination of Communist
propaganda. This would endanger the survival of the Europeans and therefore
legislation must be pursued with the object of suppressing communism.
1 7
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By December 16, 1952, 8,057 had been arrested in the campaign, 5,719 in
Eastern Cape, 423 in Western Cape, 1,41 1 in Transvaal, 246 in Natal, and 258 in
Orange Free State.
108
To coincide with the ANC's defiance campaign, the CAA, which had also been
accused of being a "communist-front" by the Justice Department, organized a large
support rally on April 6, 1952 in Harlem.
109 The Daily Worker of April 7, 1952 led
with a story titled "Harlem Rally Cheers African Freedom Struggle."
110 The article
reported that Congressman Adam Clayton Powell Jr. D-N.Y., and Councilman Earl
Brown addressed the rally of 5,000 people where they urged the U.S. to
stop
supporting the racist regime in South Africa with loans and other forms
of aid.
Robeson and Charlotta Bass, a former Garveyite and the publisher/editor
of the
California Eagle, also spoke.
111 The meeting was followed by 30 hours of picketing
(from Monday April 7 to Friday April 1 1) outside the South African
consulate in New
York. The demonstrators called on the United States to stop
providing financial and
military support to the racist regime in South Africa.
112 The CAA also circulated a
widely endorsed petition to the President of the United
States urging him to "halt
United States assistance in any form to the government
of the Union of South Africa,
and to denounce publicly that government's racist
program as an international
menace."
113 The petition was launched on July 24, 1952,
at a conference in New York
City attended by over 60 leaders of African American
and white churches, labor
unions, civic and peace organizations from New York,
Philadelphia and Boston.
114
The conference resolutions demanded the immediate
release of the hundreds of
38
Africans jailed for their participation in the defiance campaign under
the Suppression
of Communism Act. The group also pledged to seek 100,000 signatures
on the petition
and to raise $5,000 to be sent to the Fund For the Victims of Nationalist
Persecution
which had been established in South Africa by the leaders of
the defiance campaign.
115
In September of that year, the CAA reported that $900 had been forwarded
to the
ANC to support the civil disobedience struggle. Announcing the continuation
of the
petition and fund drive Alphaeus Hunton called for
"redoubled efforts on the part of
the organization's members and friends to broaden the
petition drive and thus translate
into concrete and effective action the widespread
bitterness and indignation of
Americans, particularly black Americans, over the
rampant racist barbarism of the
Malan government."
116 The CAA described the trial of 28 Africans and Indians as
"desperation in seeking to crush the rapidly growing
Campaign of Defiance of Unjust
Laws which has resulted in the jailing of over 4,000
volunteers who deliberately
violated various Jim-Crow and pass law regulations."
Eventually, the CAA collected
and forwarded $2,500 for legal defense of the over
8,000 men, women and children
who were incarcerated during the defiance campaign
117 This support for the legal
defense fund and the campaign for the release
of political prisoners were a precursor
to the massive "Free Mandela" campaign
that emerged in latter years.
u African Liberation Subversive?
The anti-apartheid movement therefore
emerged in a period of extreme Cold
War hysteria. CAA leaders were subjected to severe
harassment by the FBI and the
Justice Department
118 Paul Robeson's passport was
withdrawn in 1950; W.E.B. Du
39
Bois was indicted as a foreign agent in 1951; and Alphaeus Hunton was jailed for
contempt.
119 Although Robeson was never charged with any crime, the U.S. State
Department revoked his passport on August 7, 1950 on the grounds that "Paul
Robeson's travel abroad would be contrary to the best interests of the United States."
Although the State Department did not elaborate on the decision at the time,
a
government attorney justified the passport cancellation during an appeal hearing
on
March 13, 1953, when he argued that the passport had been revoked "in view of
the
applicant's frank admission that he has been extremely active politically
in behalf of
the independence of the colonial peoples of Africa ... the diplomatic
embarrassment
that could arise from the presence abroad of such a political
meddler, traveling under
the protection of an American passport is unimaginable."
120 The CAA and its
supporters in the anti-colonial press interpreted this
statement as indicating that
African independence was not in the interest of the United
States. Lloyd L. Brown,
writing in Freedom, argued, "The conclusion is clear: the
U.S. State Department
considers that advocating independence for the colonial
peoples of Africa is against
121
the best interests of the United States."
Although the interest of the United States in
maintaining colonialism in Africa
only became clear in the 1950s, the FBI and the
Justice Department were already
associating support for African liberation with
communism and subversion when they
put the CAA under surveillance in 1942.
122 Director J. Edgar Hoover initiated
investigations "m view of the fact that the informant
describes this organization as
being a Communist front."
123 Three months later, Hoover authorized
a full-scale
40
investigation as per bureau policy on "active front" organizations.
124 A FBI report
prepared for the Justice Department included a report from an informer that argued
that:
The purpose of the CAA is to stimulate the Negroes here to a sense of hostility
to the U.S. by stimulating consciousness of Africa and showing the Negro
people are of African nationality. It is the purpose of the CAA to attempt to
divorce the American Negroes from the American way of life and to stimulate
consciousness of Africa. The above statement concerning the CAA has been
discussed in my presence at Communist meetings.
In July 1947, Attorney General Tom Clark put the CAA on a list of
organizations he considered "totalitarian, fascist, communist or subversive."
In 1950,
the organization was ordered to submit its membership records
to the Federal
Government in 1950 under the McCarran Act.
126 Congress had passed the Internal
Security (McCarran) Act in 1950, that required communists and
"Communist-front"
organizations to register as foreign agents or be prosecuted.
During the same year
South Africa passed the Suppression of Communism Act that was
used to silence and
prosecute scores of African nationalists. In South
Africa, the Bantu Forum (June
1950) called the Suppression of Communism Act "a direct
attack on the progress of
African people. Communism is being used merely as a cloak to
conceal the real
127
character of this legislation."
The intersection between anti-communism,
colonialism and anti-black racism
was demonstrated in the mob scene that prevented a
Robeson concert at Peerskill,
N.Y. on August 28, 1949 and badly marred
another on September 4, 1949.
128 The mob
41
scenes were a result of national hysteria after Robeson was
misquoted by an
Associated Press reporter. At the World Peace Conference in Paris,
France in April,
1949, Robeson said that "it is inconceivable that American
Negroes would fight with
those who have oppressed them for generations against the
Soviet Union, which, in a
generation, has raised them to a position of equality."
129 When Robeson returned from
Paris he found that this statement had became "Negroes
won't fight for the U.S." and
that the establishment had decided to make him an
example. Former colleagues turned
against him. Adam Clayton Powell was quoted as saying that
Robeson "does not speak
for the overwhelming majority of the Negro people."
According to Paul Robeson Jr.,
Jackie Robinson, Max Yergan, and Josh White were
induced to give similar
statements by the FBI. The NAACP's Crisis published
a vicious attack on Robeson
and the CAA by Walter White, claiming the CAA was
"long ago labeled a
ci ii 130
Communist-front by the Department of Justice.
Despite the difficulties posed by the
anticommunist witch-hunts, the CAA
continued to be active to (he very end. On Apnl 24,
1954, for instance, .« held a
Conference in Support of African Liberation
in Harlem's Fnendship Baptts. Church
and a senes of pubfic meetings on
Harlem street comers where Afrtca
Must be Free-
buttons were sold."' Among the conference
resolutions was a message to the ANC
and SAIC which saluted them for the
"courageous and heroic struggle which
they
have waged agamst the face of fascist like
repression by the Malan government."
In a
"Declarafion m Support of African Liberation"
sent ,0 the Umted Nations and the
Umted States government, tbe conference
called on the UN to "abolish the pract.ee of
42
gross racial discrimination ... particularly in Kenya, the
Union of South Africa, and
other territories where rule by tyrannical decree and armed might
prevails." The
declaration also called on the United Nations to set a specific time-limit
for the
achievement of self-government in every colonial territory in Africa;
to stop the
annexation of Namibia, Swaziland and Bechuanaland; and to bar
the granting of
military, financial and technical assistance to governments
that suppressed the rights
of racial minorities.
132
"Nothing illustrates more clearly the hysteria of our times
than the career of the
Council on African Affairs," W.E.B. Du Bois wrote in 1952
in an assessment of the
CAA's work.
133 By 1952, the CAA was reeling from sustained attacks from the
FBI
and the Justice Department. W.E.B. Du Bois was indicted
as a foreign agent in 1951;
Alphaeus Hunton was jailed for contempt; and Du Bois'
and Paul Robeson's passports
were withdrawn.
134 The withdrawal of Paul Robeson's passport led
to the cancellation
of hundreds of concerts around the world.
The passport debacle was disastrous for the
CAA because it cut off the flow of funds from Robeson,
the principal fund-raiser and
benefactor. Thus the first anti-Apartheid
organization was hounded into oblivion in the
mid-1950s principally because of its anti-colonial
and anti-apartheid work.
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As apartheid began to take shape in 1948,
therefore, the Afriean Amenean
eonstttneney for Afriea was divided
between the .eft, the liberals and the
nationaUsts.
On the left, the CAA was a targe, of the FBI, the
Justiee Department and the Honse
UnAmerioan Aettvft.es Committee; libera,
groups like the NAACP had thrown their
43
lot in with the Truman administration; the nationalists
continued to push Garvey's
black pride and self-reliance agenda; while the right was beginning
to emerge und
the direction of George Schuyler and Max Yergan.
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CHAPTER 3
COLD WAR ALTERNATIVES
The American Committee on Africa is a right-wing organization with
Christianity and some big money behind it. Naturally it is doing some
good work and publishing some facts about the present situation, but
fundamentally it is reactionary. You cannot depend on it to tell the
whole African story.
W.E.B.DuBois, 1956 1
As Africans stepped-up the struggle for independence in the
1950s, the United
States government and intelligence agencies began to pay
closer attention to events on
the continent. During the Second World War, Africa had become
critical to U.S.
foreign policy as the source of strategic minerals like
uranium, industrial diamonds
and cobalt. These minerals, found in abundance in
southern Africa, were critical to the
production of nuclear weapons.
2 As a result, intelligence agencies, the military and
philanthropic foundations began to finance studies of
African societies by cold
wamors designed to ensure that the United States
would maintain control of these
strategic resources. They also established "African
Studies" programs at major
universities and provided scholarships for selected
African students to study in the
United States. The aim was to develop a new
generation of pro-capitalist African
leaders by reaching out to African students in the
United States. These Cold War
liberal and religious interests led to the formation
of the African-American Institute
(1953), the American Committee on Africa (1954),
the American Society for African
53
Culture (1957), and the African Studies Association (1957).
3 Some, like the ACOA,
became more radical in the 1960s and 70s while others like AAI and AMSAC
maintained strong ties with the CIA.
Meanwhile, the collapse of the CAA reflected the marginalization of the left
just as the modern civil rights movement was emerging. This movement was led by
liberal clergymen who were anti-communists but were influenced behind the scenes
by former leftists like Bayard Rustin, E.D. Nixon and A. Philip Randolph. Other
former communists joined the Nation of Islam where they worked as teachers and
writers/editors for the NOI's publications. African American liberals who had been
involved in the anti-apartheid movement helped form an organization
called
Americans for South African Resistance (AFSAR) in 1952 to support the ANC's
Campaign of Defiance of Unjust Laws. As historian Hollis Lynch put it the
AFSAR
emerged "precisely because its liberal members of both races could
not work through
the council, seeing it as 'tainted' with Communist influence."
4
Americans For Smith African Resistance
AFSAR (which became the American Committee on Africa in 1954)
emerged
out of the Congress of Racial Equality, a multi-racial
organization that helped pioneer
the modern civil rights movement in the United States.
CORE activists had organized
civil rights sit-ins at a Chicago restaurant in 1942 and
"Freedom Rides" through the
South in 1947.
5 George Houser, who was the secretary ofAFSAR says he was
introduced to the apartheid issue by an African-American
associate, Bill Sutherland,
54
who had toured South Africa and encouraged CORE to support the defiance
campaign.
6
Houser, Sutherland, James Farmer, Adam Clyaton Powell Jr., Canada Lee,
Bayard Rustin and others then organized the AFSAR, which began as a project of
CORE.7
Houser began correspondence with the leaders of the defiance campaign soon
after being appointed secretary ofAFSAR. He wrote to several religious and
community leaders seeking their impressions about the ANC's civil disobedience
campaign planned for April 6, 1952. Among the first questions that came up was
whether the ANC was a communist-front or under the influence of communists. These
reports were fueled by people like Manilal Gandhi (Mohandes "Mahatma" Gandhi's
son), who opposed the defiance campaign on grounds that, "There is too much of
a
communistic influence (in the ANC) and very little of the spirit of non-violence as
preached and practiced by Mahatma Gandhi."
8 Yusuf Dadoo, president of the South
African Indian Congress was a member of the Communist Party of South
Africa
before it was banned. Houser explains that "although
our supporters were opposed to
McCarthyism, we were not interested in joining forces with the
Communists in a
united front."
9
was
Eventually, the group decided to support the defiance
campaign and AFSAR
formed as an ad hoc support group for the campaign
of defiance. Donald
Harrington of the Community Church and Charles Y. Tngg,
minister of the Salem
Baptist Church of Harlem, were chosen as co-chairman
and George Houser was
55
named secretary. The executive committee included Roger Baldwin, Norman Thomas,
Bayard Rustin, A. Philip Randolph, and Conrad Lynn. The group saw itself as "a
vehicle for information about the campaign and to raise funds" a statement of purpose
that was remarkably similar to that of the CAA.
10
AFSAR's first action was a rally of 800 at Abyssinia Baptist Church in Harlem
on April 6, 1952. The meeting resolved to support the non-violent campaign and to
"continue its work of education and of rallying support in this country for the struggle
against Apartheid and for brotherhood and freedom in South Africa."
11 The meeting
12
raised $200 for the non-European congresses in South Africa.
As we saw above, a CAA rally earlier that day had attracted 5,000 and
collected thousands of dollars for the same cause. Like the CAA, AFSAR organized a
letter-writing campaign to the United Nations asking the organization to
allow South
African academic Z. K. Matthews to address it. A reply came from the Charles E.
Allen, Director of the Office of Public Affairs at the UN mission, saying that allowing
petitioners to address the UN would "involve radical changes in the structure of the
U.N."
13
Allen made it clear that the United States would oppose the
petition, saying
that the function of the U.N. was to reconcile judgments and policies
of governments,
not to function as a fact-finding agency. The U.N.,
dominated at the time by the
United States and its western allies, rejected Matthews'
request.
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Although the AFSAR was formed to support the ANC's defiance campaign,
there is no record of events or activities that rival those of the CAA. Indeed, the
activities of the group seem to have been confined to the first meeting at Abyssinia
Baptist Church and a petition to the U.N. AFSAR was disbanded in 1953 after the
Campaign of Defiance Against Unjust Laws was discontinued under extreme pressure
from the South African government. According to Houser, "The AFSAR was
transformed into an organization which would relate to the whole anti-colonial
struggle in Africa. The name chosen for this new entity was the American Committee
on Africa (ACOA)."
14
American Committee on Africa
In a letter announcing the formation ofACOA George Houser wrote that
AFSAR had garnered a remarkable response from around the country. The
informal
group had received numerous letters seeking more information
on Africa and
thousands of dollars in unsolicited donations. AFSAR concluded that
"there is a
growing and permanent interest in Africa among American
people" and that "there is a
definite need for an American organization adequately
staffed and financed to provide
information to Americans on Africa as well as to be a
service agency for African
projects." 15 A prospectus for the organization distributed to
groups like the NAACP
argued that another organization focusing on Africa
was necessary because the only
American group working directly on African problems
"is the Communist oriented
Council on African Affairs."
16
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ACOA was formed in 1954 with George Shepherd as the executive director
and George Houser as secretary. The organization held its first conference on April 30,
1954, to introduce the members of the executive committee to the community, recruit
volunteers and raise money. The conference featured a keynote address by Dr.
Rayford Logan ofHoward University and the NAACP titled "Is Colonialism Dying in
Africa?"
17
Logan, who had just returned from a tour ofWest Africa, warned that the
colonial powers were stronger than they seemed. Curtis Strong of the State
Department, who also spoke at the conference, said he welcomed the formation of the
ACOA but justified US support for colonial powers at the United Nations.
The first edition of its magazine, Africa Today, which was
published in April
1954, said the ACOA had been formed because of: "Moral concern that America
should fulfill our responsibilities in Africa by helping the
emergence of democratic,
self-governing states free from racialism, poverty and
ignorance under which the
people of Africa suffer today."
18 The ACOAs statement of purpose was to act as a
"clearmg house" for information and create a concern
for "intelligent and constructive
American action on Africa." However, the magazine's
Cold War perspective was
made clear m a story on the war of independence in Kenya
titled "Mau Mau Threat
Grows."
19 The story referred to "encouraging" news that a
captured "Mau Mau" leader
was arranging secret meetings "to discuss surrender
terms" but that the "danger of
Mau Mau spreading is greater than ever." This
demonization of the war of
independence and the use of derogatory language
in reference to liberation fighters
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revealed the limited political horizons of the ACOA's leaders and foreshadowed their
inability to communicate with African and African American radicals.
20 The June-July
21
issue ofAfrica Today continued to refer to African liberation fighters as "terrorists."
A story titled "Terror in North Africa," for instance, reported that "terrorism and
violence" was spreading throughout "French North Africa" pointing to
the killing of
five white settlers in Tunisia by "terrorists" and several "bomb throwing"
incidents in
Algeria.
As Du Bois had predicted, therefore, the ACOA was constrained by its roots in
liberal, anticommunist organizations while trying to support
an African liberation
movement that was becoming increasingly radical. Armed struggle had
erupted in
Kenya and Algeria in 1954 while minor bloodshed had led
Britain to set a timetable
for independence for its West African colonies. In 1956,
Gamer Abdel Nasser
nationalized the Suez Canal in Egypt sparking the first
major Cold War skirmish in
Africa featuring Britain, France and Israel on one side
and Egypt and the Soviet Union
on the other. In 1955 recently liberated African
and Asian countries held the Bandung
Conference where they pledged to eradicate colonialism
and racism. No white nations
were allowed to attend the conference although
Harlem Congressman Adam Clayton
22
Powell Jr. "acted as a vigorous unofficial
spokesman for the United States."
According to an Africa Report analysis of the
conference written by Homer Jack,
Powell said that the United States was making
progress in eradicating racism, a
statement that sparked a heated argument
between African Amencan novelist Richard
Wright and the Harlem Congressman. South
Africa was singled out for special
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attention at the conference. Prime Minister Nehru of India told South Africa to "forget
about communism and anti-communism and learn some decency."
Africa-American Institute
As Africans stepped up their struggle for liberation, the US government sought
ways to influence the direction of African nationalism. Among the strategies utilized
by the CIA and State Department was to try to influence African students in the
United States through social and cultural programs sponsored by CIA-fronts run by
African Americans. The career of the African-American Institute, for instance,
epitomizes the fate of liberal African-American organizations in the face of emerging
corporate and government pressure.
23 The AAI was incorporated on May 18, 1953 as
the Institute of African-American Relations, Inc.
24 The founding directors were Dr.
William Leo Hansberry of Howard University, William Steen, Robert Williams,
James P. Grant and Horace Mann Bond "to foster closer relations between the peoples
of the United States and Africa."
25 The AAI established Africa House in Washington
D.C. to provide "guidance and advisory services to African students in the
United
States," and to facilitate social and cultural exchanges. The organization also
helped
place Americans in teaching and other service positions in Africa.
During the early period, correspondence shows that the members
of the
institute were concerned about maintaining credibility with
Africans and U.S. funding
sources at the same time. In a letter to Robert Williams, for
instance, Bond says:
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My own experience here has been that if you are "pro-African" you cannot get
financial support. On the other hand, ifyou are not "pro-African" you will
never get the sympathy and friendship of Africans. Faced with this dilemma I
have remained consistently "pro-African."
26
This concern with credibility among Africans is ironic given reports that the
CIA sponsored the AAI. We can assume that Williams ignored Bond's advice because
according to Waldmar Nielsen, who worked for the State Department before
becoming the president of the AAI, the organization, "was largely funded by the
Central Intelligence Agency in the 1950s."
27
Neilsen says CIA Director Allen Dulles
recruited AAI board members Harold Hochschild, chairman of the board of American
Metal Climax, Ltd., Dana Creel, head of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, and
Alan
Pifer, head of the Carnegie Corporation, "to take on this responsibility as
a public
28
service in the national interest."
Neilson says he "was disturbed by the extent to which several
emerging leaders
in the decolonization process were becoming involved, often
without their knowledge,
in CIA-funded initiatives." Among the leaders he mentions are Kwame
Nkrumah and
Julius Nyerere. Other African leaders associated with
the AAI and the U.S. State
Department were Kenya's Tom Mboya and Mbiyu Koinange.
The organization rapidly became a mouthpiece of the
U.S. government and
corporate interests in Africa. It virtually monopolized
foundation and U.S. government
support for Africa-related programs. By the late-50s it was
providing scholarships to
African students in the United States, assisting in the
placement of American teachers
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in African schools, disseminating information about Africa through its publication,
African Special Report, and funding leadership-exchange programs. The Institute
established Africa House in Washington, D.C., where it hosted African students
studying in the city and other Africans visiting the capital. Africa House hosted
receptions, films and informal get-togethers where African students met with
diplomats and other U.S. government employees.
A major program funded by the Institute was the United States-South Africa
Leader Exchange Program, which was created to develop "a wider knowledge and a
basis of understanding between religious, professional, business and civic leaders of
the United States and the Union of South Africa." Financed by "business and
philanthropic organizations in both countries," the program provided one-year
exchange fellowships for "librarians, journalists, industrial relations experts,
clergymen, professors, school teachers, civil servants," to work on the staff of an
organization in the U.S. or South Africa in the individual's field of
specialization. It
also sponsored short-term exchanges to allow individuals to
undertake field trips in
South Africa for less than a year.
Lists of participants in the exchange programs show that they were
all white and
included a steady stream of extreme Afrikaner nationalists
from newspapers like Die
Berger. Thus, these exchange programs were forms of
"constructive engagement" with
the apartheid regime 30 years before the Reagan administration
adopted the policy.
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The American Society of African Culture
The CIA, State Department and major foundations also sought to influence
resurgent African nationalism by sponsoring tours of Africa by African
American
entertainers, journalists and civil rights leaders. These tours were designed
to counter
the embarrassing publicity lynchings and other forms of racist
violence were receiving
abroad. Journalist Carl Rowan, writer J. Saunders Redding,
entertainer Duke Ellington
and CORE activist James Farmer all went on Africa tours sponsored by the
US
government through organizations like the American Society of
African Culture
(AMSAC). AMSAC grew out of the First International Congress ofNegro
Writers
and Artists that met in Paris between September 19 and 22,
1956. The conference
brought together prominent members of the black bourgeoisie
under the auspices of
Presence Africaine, a magazine established by French-speaking
Africans and Afro-
Canbbeans writers like Leopold Sedar Senghor and Aime
Cesaire with the help of
French intellectuals like Albert Camus and Jean Paul
Sartre.
The conference organizers asked African-American
novelist Richard Wright,
who was also living in Pans, to contact Black writers
in the United States and
encourage them to attend the conference. Wright
wrote many black writers but most
were unable to afford the trip. Those that did
make it to Paris were sponsored by
philanthropes. Orin Lehman who had also sponsored
the AAI. The delegation inelnded
of James Ivy, editor of the NAACP's Crisis;
John Davis of C.ty College; Horaee
Mann
Bond, president of Lincoln University; Willi*-
Fortnne, professor of philosophy a.
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University of Pennsylvania, and Mercer Cook, professor ofRomance Languages at
Howard University who would become US ambassador to Niger.
According to a Ramparts article, the CIA funded AMSAC from the outset.
The article argues that "at some point, the CIA decided that the development of a safe
cultural nationalism was critically important to US interests in Africa." "Negritude"
and other forms of cultural nationalism were deemed "safe" despite their anti-white
rhetoric because they were hostile to communism. The United States followed the
same strategy at home, where it tolerated the anti-white rhetoric of the Nation
of Islam
and US organization but destroyed leftist groups like the Council on African Affairs
29
and the Black Panther Party.
This cultural nationalist perspective was less threatening to the
establishment
than the political economy perspectives of radicals like Paul
Robeson and W.E.B. Du
Bois. The report argued that the CIA's strategists had a sophisticated
understanding of
how African American culture could be used to maintain an effective
presence in
resurgent Africa while promoting pro-Western artists and
writers. In other words
AMSAC constituted a cultural strategy to complement the political strategy
followed
in the AAI.
The Americans who attended the first International Congress
ofNegro Writers
and Artists formed the American Society of African
Culture which was open to "men
of culture ... ofNegro descent in America." Horace
Mann Bond was elected president,
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Dr. Mercer Cook chairman, William Fortune secretary, James Ivy treasurer, John
Davis executive director and James Harris assistant director. AMSAC's program
included a plan for a series of seminars to discuss the impact of African culture on
Western Civilization; a publication program including the distribution of Presence
Africaine; the formation of personal and family relationships between African scholars
and "men of cultural achievement" and "representative Negro families," and a festival
of African culture.
Again Mr. Orin Lehman ofNew York and Matthew McCloskey of
Philadelphia provided the funds for the establishment of the organization. John
Davis
and Orin Lehman were on the board of the Council on Race and Caste in World
Affairs (CRCWA), which approved a $5,000 grant for AMSAC on November 27,
1957.
30 The CRCWA meeting that approved the funds included John Davis, Orm
Lehman, Bethel Webster, Frederick Van Vatchen and James Harris.
Ramparts
identified the CRCWA as a CIA-front.
31 The CRCWA was the main financier of
AMSAC with which it merged in 1957. The new organization was incorporated in
1961.
CIA funding of groups like AMSAC was designed to encourage ties
between
anticommunist writers and artists on both sides of the
Atlantic. The agency used a
strategy of "enlightened patronage" to influence
favored artists who found ample
opportunity to publish in magazines like Africa Report
(African American Institute);
Transition and The New African (Congress of Cultural
Freedom); African Forum
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(AMSAC) and Classic (Fairfield Foundation).
32 The writers whose works appeared in
these journals and the members of some of these organizations
were often not aware
of the sources of funding but were deemed acceptable in the
CIA's grand
anticommunist scheme.
With this infusion of funds, AMSAC then proceeded to invite a number of
"men of culture" to join the organization. Invitations went
out to Lorenzo Turner of
Roosevelt College, Claude Barnett of the Associated
Negro Press, Lester Granger of
the Urban League, St. Clair Drake of Roosevelt College,
Melvin Tolson of Langston
University, Martin Jenkins of Morgan State University,
and John Davis of City
College.
33 AMSAC quickly received acceptance letters from most of these
academics.
AMSAC's cultural and educational programs sponsored
visits to Africa by
some of the most prominent black artists in
the country: Odetta, Randy Weston, Nina
Srmone, Langston Huges, Jacob Lawrence
and Elton Fax were all AMSAC
spokesmen. The most interesting case, however,
was that of James Farmer, a founder
of CORE and its nafional president between 1961 and
1966 who became an unwitting
instrument of CIA shenanigans in Africa. Farmer
had impeccable "movement"
credentials. He had orgamzed the "Journey of
Reconciliation" an integrated ride
through the South in 1947 that became the
model for the "Freedom Rides" of 1961,
which Farmer also organized. He had been
arrested numerous times and was almost
lynched by state troopers. Farmer made two
CIA-sPonsored trips to
Africa during this
penod.
34 He made the first trip in 1958 as a member
of a five-man delegation of the
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Public Services International (PSI), which was part of the International Confederation
of Free Trade Unions, which was the labor union mainstay of CIA operations in Africa
and elsewhere. A PSI report on the trip indicated that Farmer's presence had benefited
the delegation because the Africans were drawn to "the colored trade unionist."
In
1964, Farmer was again called upon to make a trip to Africa to counter the bad
publicity that the US had received after the assassination of John F. Kennedy and
Malcolm X's two tours of African countries.
Although the members ofAMSAC were "men of culture" and generally
focused on scholarship and the arts, the organization sponsored two
key conferences
on Southern Africa and sometimes published articles about the
volatile situation in the
region in its journal African Forum. In the first issue ofAfrican
Forum, James Farmer,
then director of CORE detailed the situation in South Africa and called
for economic
sanctions against the regime. In 1960, John A. Davis
protested the massacre at
Sharpeville saying, "there are times when even 'men of culture'
must protest against
35
barbarous acts."
In April 1963, AMSAC sponsored a conference called "Southern
Africa in
Transition" at Howard University. The conference was
significant in that it attracted
600 participants and brought together leaders of
African nationalist movements like
Oliver Tambo, leader of the ANC in exile, Eduardo Mondlane,
president of
FRELIMO, and Ndabaningi Sitole of Zmibabwe.
After the conference, Bond criticized
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South African apartheid and called for sanctions. Rumors of CIA funding quickly led
to the demise of AMSAC.
AMSAC seemed to vacillate between a focus on high culture and involvement
in politics. Like the NAACP and the Urban League, AMSAC occasionally protested
against the most heinous acts of the South African government. They
also maintained
contact with African nationalists in organizations like the ANC and FRELIMO. Yet its
program was strictly liberal and informed by the "ideology of racial
uplift.
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CHAPTER 4
THE MOVEMENT AGAINST APARTHEID
The international potential of nonviolence has never been employed.
Nonviolence has been practiced within national borders in India and the
United States and in regions of Africa with spectacular success. The
time has come to fully utilize nonviolence through a massive
international boycott which would involve the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, Great Britain, France, the United States, Germany
and Japan. Millions of people can personally give expression to their
abhorrence of the world's worst racism through such a far-flung
boycott.
1
Martin Luther King Jr., 1965
With the demise of the CAA in 1955 and the silencing of the black left, the
initiative passed to the nationalists and liberals at a time
when Africans were entering
a critical stage in their struggle for independence.
Although both the black nationalists
and liberals supported African independence in the
abstract, they differed on the
question of armed struggle. Nationalists like Carlos Cooks,
Richard B. Moore and
Malcolm X celebrated the emergence of armed struggle in the settler
colonies of
Kenya and Algeria in 1954. In Kenya, the Land and
Freedom Army (LFA) engaged
the British in a 10-year guerrilla struggle
that inspired revolutionaries around the
world and foreshadowed the armed struggles in
southern Africa. The case of the
Kenyan struggle epitomizes the myopia of recent
scholarship on African Americans
and Africa during the early cold war years.
Most of this scholarship focuses on
negative statements from the NAACP's Crisis and other
liberal organizations without
examining the response of black nationalists and
the left. As we saw in the last
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chapter, the leftist CAA was unequivocal in its support for the LFA and was indicted,
in part, for supporting the Kenyan struggle. As we shall see below, black trade
unionists in New York continued to demonstrate on behalf of South African workers
into the late 1950s.
Black nationalists like Malcolm X and Carlos Cooks valorized the guerrillas in
Kenya and supported the turn to armed struggle in southern Africa. Carlos Cooks, a
former Garveyite and founder of the African Nationalist Pioneer Movement, lauded
the "torch of freedom so gallantly blazing in the hearts of East African Nationalists."2
Cooks described the Kenyan war of independence as "the eternal war against the white
aliens. The spirit of Mau Mau is a forerunner of the mighty surge of Martial Black
men (that will) drench Africa with the blood of the parasitical white colonial
exploiters."
3
Cooks's program was closely related to that of the UNIA. He said the
purpose of the Christian church was "to destroy Black people's minds and turn them
into Negroes."
4 Cooks distinguished between "Negroes" (integrationists) who were
anti-African and "Blacks" who were proud of their African origin. "As Negroes, Black
people are the stoutest defenders of white supremacy and the loudest defamers of
Africa and everything pertaining to it."
5 He argued that Negro was a "Caste name" that
obscured "our true racial identity --Black people or Africans." Cooks's ANPM's
newsletter continued to publish anti-imperialist tracts that were similar to those
published in the CAA's New Africa, Freedom and Spotlight on Africa. Again this is
contrary to conventional wisdom that claims that anti-imperialist voices were totally
silenced in the United States during the 1950s. The ANPM's newsletter, for instance,
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continued to carry articles by Africans, nationalists and Pan Africanists. An article by
Tchekedi Eketembe on African nationalism described the South African Boers as
"nothing more than the scum of Holland" and "the fiend that today assumes the power
of life and death over the rightful owner of South Africa -the Black native ... those
Parasites were practicing the same policy of exploitation, iniquity, debauchery and
genocide on the people of South East Asia, even as they are currently doing in South
and Southwest Africa." Eketembe argues that: "The African will have to reconcile his
course of action to one based on a policy of total violence, asking no quarter, and
giving none, scorching the earth if necessary, using all means to rid Africa of its
greatest scourge since the Tsetse Fly —the European white man." Like Cooks,
Eketembe considers both communists and capitalists "white supremacists" and thus
the enemies of Africa and Africans.
According to Richard B. Moore, Malcolm X joined Cooks frequently at
"Africa Square" in Harlem during the early 1950s and was influenced by his (Cooks's)
pan-African orientation. Malcolm X had been appointed the minister of Temple No. 7
in Harlem in July 1954, a few weeks after the Supreme Court had outlawed
segregation in the public schools. Moore argues that Malcolm "borrowed freely" from
Cooks's rhetoric about Africa, the Buy Black campaign and the themes of black pride.
In his autobiography, Malcolm X describes how he went "fishing" for converts at
Black Nationalist meetings in Harlem:
Next we went to work "fishing"... on the fringes of the Nationalist meetings. ...
At a Nationalist meeting, everyone who was listening was interested in the
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revolution of the black race. We began to get results almost immediately after
we began thrusting handbills into people's hands.6
Thus it is clear that in the mid-1950s, the constituency for African liberation in
Harlem was in the left and nationalist movements which continued to promote an anti-
imperialist and anti-colonial perspective through the worst years of cold war
repression in the United States. The nationalist movement included a mixed group of
revolutionary, economic and cultural nationalists. Some, like Carlos Cooks, had
visited Africa during the Second World War and had established connections with
African liberation movements. Many were Garveyites who maintained an interest in
Africa and the Caribbean. As Malcolm X put it: "At a nationalist meeting, everyone
was interested in the revolution of the black race." Since his concientization by the
Nation of Islam in prison, Malcolm had developed an anti-imperialist, anti-colonial
position. He read widely on African and African American history arguing that, "Of
all our studies, history is the best qualified to reward our research."
7 He recalls how
his seventh-grade teacher in Mason, Michigan, had covered "the history of the Negro
in one paragraph."
8
Initially Malcolm was introduced to Black history through the
teachings of the Nation of Islam as conveyed to him by his brother and sister. Through
them he discovered that "history had been 'whitened' in the white man's books and that
the black man had been brainwashed for hundreds of years." He learned that the
"Original man was black, in a continent called Africa." The black man had built "great
empires and civilizations and cultures while the white man was still living on all fours
in caves." The NOI's teachings stressed that the greatest crime in history was the
"traffic in black flesh" that brought millions of black women and men to the Americas.
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These people were then cut off from "any knowledge of their religion and past
culture" creating a "Negro" race that had "absolutely no knowledge of his true
identity." In a Massachusetts prison where Malcolm taught himself to read and write,
he read widely on African history. As he put it: "Once I heard of the 'glorious history
of the black man' I took special pains to hunt in the library for books that would
inform me on details about black history."
9 Malcolm traced his conscientization to his
discovery of this African identity and claimed that: "(History) is the one reason why
Mr. Muhammad's teachings spread so swiftly all over the United States, among all
Negroes, whether or not they became followers of Mr. Muhammad." With this
background, Malcolm became a formidable prison debater on African history and
politics. His early debates with prisoners were on African history, what he called
the
"the glorious history of the black man."
10
Later, after he was released from prison in
1952, history would "became one ofmy favorite subjects when I became a minister
of
Mr. Mohammed's."
Malcolm's focus on Africa and the slave trade was a key theme
of Black
nationalist rhetoric from Martin Delany to Henry McNeal Turner to
Marcus Garvey to
Carlos Cooks. This invocation of the "glorious African past"
as a justification for
freedom is very different from the invocation of the Constitution
of the United States
and the bible by civil rights leaders like Martin Luther King
Jr. This fundamental
difference in orientation was to be erased after Malcolm's
trip to Africa and the
formation of the Organization of African American Unity in 1964.
Duong the 1950s,
however, Malcolm advocated the traditional nationalist position
based on land in a
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separate black nation in North America or in Africa. He was also constrained by the
NOI's avoidance of politics. Yet his insistence upon Black pride and uncompromising
support for liberation movements laid the groundwork for the numerous liberation
support movements that emerge in the 1960s and 70s. Malcolm X is the link between
the liberation support movements of the 1920s and 30s and the nationalism of SNCC
and the African Liberation Support Committee in the 1970s. His early support for the
armed struggle in Kenya was a precursor to the support for armed revolution in
southern Africa during the 1970s. Although some in the black and white press and the
civil rights leaders like Roy Wilkins condemned the "Mau Mau" as primitive and
unacceptable, Malcolm X considered them "freedom fighters."
Nonviolence. The "Big Six" and South Africa
During the movement, the black liberal perspective on Africa was represented
by the so-called "Big Six" civil rights leaders including Martin Luther King Jr., SCLC,
Whitney Young, NUL, Roy Wilkins, NAACP, A. Philip Randolph, BSCP, Dorothy
Height, NCNW, James Farmer, CORE. These individuals represented civil rights
organizations that were liberal, nonviolent, integrationist and sought to influence
government policies through mass action. Many of the leaders and the organizations
they represented had been involved in anti-apartheid activism from the outset. James
Farmer was on the founding committee of both the ACOA and its precursor the
ASAR. A. Philip Randolph had been a member of the CAA in the 1940s and was
involved with AMSAC and the ACOA. Roy Wilkins was also associated AMSAC and
worked with the ACOA on issues related to Africa.
77
11
The liberal position on Africa in the late 1950s and early '60s was epitomized
by Martin Luther King who believed that it would be a tragedy for Africans to turn to
violence in their struggles for independence. In a 1957 speech, for instance, he
claimed that "violent revolution in South Africa would be immoral and impractical."
King was catapulted onto the national and international stage by the spectacular
success of the Montgomery Bus Boycott in desegregating public transportation in
Montgomery, Alabama in 1955-56. The bus boycott had emerged in the wake of the
1954 school desegregation decision (Brown vs. Board of Education of Topeka,
Kansas). The NAACP's legal victories against Jim Crow segregation in the south and
the new willingness of the Supreme Court to rule against southern
segregationists, had
created an atmosphere of hope and belief in the power of non-violent direct
action to
engender change. King had been asked to lead the movement by more established
leaders like E.D. Nixon, president of the Montgomery, Alabama, chapter
of the
NAACP and older pastors because he was a relative newcomer to the city and did not
have ties to the establishment.
12 The success of the boycott, King's eloquence and the
media spotlight ensured his rise to prominence in the budding civil
rights movement.
Although the story of King's rise to leadership in the
domestic civil rights
movement is well-documented, few scholars have investigated
his interest in Africa in
general and South Africa in particular. One of the few studies
on this aspect of King's
legacy is Louis Baldwin's Thejtejoyed Community- Martin Luther
King And South
Africa published in 1995. Baldwin argues that King's
exposure to South Africa began
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early because King Sr. had corresponded with Walter Sisulu in the 1940s and invited
Albert Luthuli, president of the ANC, to his Atlanta church in 1948 where the young
Martin would have heard him speak.
13 Once he became a pastor, King constantly
compared apartheid in South Africa to Jim Crow segregation.
King's first major trip after the bus boycott was to attend Ghana's independence
celebration in March 1957. The SCLC and church members held a special fund-raiser
to send their young pastor to Ghana where he met leaders of the anti-colonial, anti-
apartheid and Pan Africanist movements. He also met with white activists like
Michael Scott, Trevor Huddleston and Ambrose Reeves and heard African leaders call
for an international movement to eradicate white supremacy in Africa. On returning
from Ghana, King delivered a speech titled "The Birth ofA New Nation" a lyrical
reflection on the powerful liberation movements emerging on the continent of Africa.
The young pastor was obviously excited about the connections established between
black freedom movements around the world. The delegation from the United
States
consisted of over 100 persons, many ofthem African American leaders like
Charles
Diggs, Adam Powell, Ralph Bunche, Mordecai Johnson, Horace Mann Bond and A.
Philip Randolph.
14 King urged African Americans to emigrate to Ghana "and lend
their technical assistance" and take advantage of "rich opportunities
there." King also
joined the ACOA as a member of the National Committee.
15 At this stage in his
development King still thought non-violence could work in South
Africa. In a 1957
speech, for instance, he claimed that "violent revolution in
South Africa would be
immoral and impractical."
16
In taking this position, King was reflecting the
position of
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the leadership of the liberation struggle in southern Africa at the time although
armed
struggle was imminent
17
In 1957 the ACOA organized a Declaration of Conscience campaign to protest
1
8
the arrest of 156 leaders of the liberation movements in South Africa for
"treason."
Among those arrested were Professor Z.K Matthews, the principal of the historically
black University College of Fort Hare. Matthews was well known in the Unite
States
because he had been a visiting scholar at Union Theological Seminary between
1952
and 1953. Also arrested was Albert Luthuli, president of the African
National
Congress. Luthuli was also well known to the U.S anti-apartheid community
because
he had traveled around the country as a representative of the
Congregational Church in
1949 and had preached at Martin Luther King Sr.'s church in
Atlanta.
The arrests shocked the growing international anti-apartheid
community. In the
United States, the ACOA organized an international "Declaration of Conscience
on
South Africa" to be unveiled on Human Rights Day,
December 10, 1957. Eleanor
Roosevelt and Martin Luther King Jr. were co-sponsors
of the declaration that called
on world leaders to join a "world-wide protest against
the organized inhumanity of the
government of the Union of South Africa."
19
In a letter to Thurgood Marshall of the
NAACP, the campaign organizers argued:
At this crucial time, when 156 leaders of the
opposition to apartheid are
being tTd for treason because the desire a democratic,
multi-racial society,
and when new laws injecting racism into the
churches, hospitals and
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universities are about to be passed, we are obliged to record our protest in hope
that the Government of South African will respond to moral suasion.20
123 world leaders eventually signed the declaration. 21 The "Declaration of
Conscience" was an example of international protest that sought to express horror at
human rights violations and tried to persuade governments to change their policies.
These petitions and declarations of solidarity were a standard technique of the post-
war liberal activists in the ACOA. This had also been the strategy of the ANC under
Albert Luthuli and his predecessors. By 1957, however, these strategies were seriously
outdated in South Africa and the United States where petitions and declarations had
been replaced by strikes, economic boycotts and talks of armed struggle.
The ACOA also organized the South Africa Defense Fund with the goal of
raising $100,000 to help pay legal fees for the Treason Trial defendants.22 The appeal
for funds was signed by eighteen prominent clergymen including Martin Luther King
Jr. and stated, in part:
As Christians and Americans we feel a grave responsibility to help meet the
need in South Africa. The treason trial is a challenge to people of goodwill
around the world who realize what is at stake. Not unmindful of our own
failures in race relations in the United States, we nevertheless call for your
support to help a people whose government sponsors a most rigid program of
segregation.
23
These activities culminated in a "Day of Protest" on Human Rights Day,
December 10, 1957. The call letter urged supporters to join the demonstration "to
protest the apartheid policies of the Union of South Africa and to demand the Union
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live up to its obligations under article 1, Paragraph 3 of the United Nations Charter."
The highlight of the "Day of Protest" was an address by Martin Luther King Jr.
The Declaration of Conscience received an overwhelming response from over
50 countries where Human Rights Day (December 10, 1957) was observed as a Day of
Protest against South Africa's apartheid policy. In a report on the campaign, the
ACOA said it had realized the aim of the campaign namely:
To mobilize the spiritual, moral forces of mankind on this Day of Protest to
demonstrate to the Government of the Union of South Africa, that free men
abhor its policies and will not tolerate the continued suppression ofhuman
freedom.
24
The campaign report included numerous statements of solidarity from church,
labor, student and other organizations around the world demonstrating the growth of
anti-apartheid sentiment.
Among the most remarkable responses to the campaign was a 3,000-word
radio address by South Africa's Minister of External Affairs, Eric Louw, on the night
ofDecember 12, 1957. In an unprecedented speech, Mr. Louw told his national
audience: "I have been requested by the cabinet to address you (and) deplore in the
strongest terms this concerted effort to undermine our international position." An
underlying theme of the speech was the claim that the opponents of apartheid were
communist sympathizers. On December 12, 1957, the New York Times reported that
Louw had characterized Eleanor Roosevelt as "not a stranger to American Left-wing
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circles" and George Houser as "a known leftist." In response, Houser told the New
York Times reporter: "I have never been connected with any Communist-front
organization and have kept strictly away from them." A more extensive report in the
Christian Science Monitor of December 13, 1957, quoted Mr. Louw claiming that
"communist" groups like the ACOA were "propagating their doctrine of universal
equality in the guise of protests against racial discrimination and that the latest charges
against South Africa were 'false and spurious.'"
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In a reference to the violent reaction
of whites to the desegregation of public schools in Little Rock, Arkansas, early that
year, Louw urged American to examine their own consciences and devote their
energies to the elimination of racial discrimination in the United States. Louw also
explained that certain "control measures" were necessary to subdue the "largely
uncivilized" nonwhites of South Africa. The Christian Science Monitor's
Johannesburg correspondent John Hughes then concluded:
Nevertheless, although Mr. Louw's remarks indicated government concern at
the effect on South Africa of this adverse international publicity,
particularly insofar as it may influence American government policy toward
the country, the External Affairs Minister gave no indication of any
change in
the South African Government racial policies as a result of the protest.
Thus
whether the protest had brought the South African government any nearer a
reversal of its present policy or merely embittered it even further
against its
overseas critics is a question which remains unanswered at this stage.
The Right Reverend Ambrose Reeves, Anglican Bishop of Johannesburg,
also
thought that Mr. Louw's speech was irrational. According to Reeves:
While he (Mr Louw) accused the American Committee responsible for this
document of having a 'a decidedly pinkish tinge' he did not tell
his listeners
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that its membership includes four U.S. senators, sixteen members of the House
of Representatives, both Republican and Democrat, two university presidents,
as well as eight national religious leaders, and eleven authors and scholars
...Those who heard the Minister's broadcast would do well to recognize that it
is the present government of South Africa, and not the white population as
such, that is being criticized.
27
On December 17, the South African Government announced that it was
dropping the case against 61 of the 156 who had been arrested on charges of treason.
The ACOA concluded "the Declaration of Conscience campaign with its worldwide
support may well have been a factor in causing the Government to moderate its action
against those accused of treason."
In 1958 the newly elected President of Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah, visited
Harlem where he addressed over 10,000 people, inviting them to come to Ghana as
teachers and technicians. He was presented with a silver bowl on behalf of the people
of Harlem as a symbol: "the vessel that has caught the tears of all the mothers of
Africa weeping as their children were torn from them and sent across the ocean."
Nkrumah, who had developed a close relationship with African American leaders,
extended a formal invitation to black people to attend the Pan African
conference in
Ghana. Later that year, a contingent of African American leaders traveled to
Ghana to
attend the All Africa Peoples Congress. The AAPC was billed as the most important
Pan Africanist conference of the post-second world war period
and the first Pan
African conference in an independent African country. At the
AAPC, President
Kwame Nkrumah said he was pleased to see so many black participants
from the
United States and the Caribbean:
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We take their presence here as a manifestation of their keen interest in our
struggle for a free Africa. We must never forget that they are part of us. These
sons and daughters of Africa were taken away from our shores and despite all
centuries which have separated us they have not forgotten their ancestral links.
... Many of them have made no small contribution to the cause of African
freedom. Names which spring to mind are Marcus Garvey and Dr. W. E. B. Du
Bois.
28
It was at this conference that the independent African states articulated their
determination to eradicate colonialism and apartheid as the first step toward
continental unity -the raison d'etre of Pan Africanism. The AAPC declared: "the
existence of colonialism in any shape or form is a threat to the security and
independence of the African states and the world." South Africa was singled out for
particular criticism because apartheid was seen as an extreme form of settler
colonialism. During the conference African leaders called for international
sanctions
against South Africa and announced their determination to overthrow the
racist
regime. This call for sanctions was in line with the ANC's 1958 annual
conference
resolution, which declared that: "The economic boycott is going to be one
of the major
political weapons in the country."
Anti-apartheid organizations answered the AAPC's suggestion
that the world
observe April 15 as Africa Freedom Day until all African
countries were independent.
The first Africa Freedom Day celebration was organized by
the ACOA on
Wednesday, April 15, 1959.
29 Tom Mboya of Kenya was invited to make a major
address along with Governor G. Mennen Williams of
Michigan who had recently
returned from a trip to the continent. The program included
popular African American
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entertainers like Harry Belafonte and Eartha Kitt, Langston Hughes and Olatundi's
African ensemble.
In 1959, Representative Charles Diggs of Michigan caused a sensation in the
African American community by suggesting that the NAACP should try to influence
US policies on Africa by establishing a special office on African issues. These reports
induced George Houser to send Roy Wilkins a letter supporting the idea and
suggesting that the ACOA would be interested in discussing the idea "inasmuch as our
committee is closely allied in its interest and approach on the international level with
the NAACP viewpoint."30 Wilkin's assistant, John A. Morsell, answered Houser on
January 13 saying he doubted the NAACP would establish the office "in the near
future."
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Morsell told Houser that the NAACP's board had discussed the issue
because it had been raised by Congressman Diggs. Despite Diggs' stature, the issue
was referred to a committee. According to Morsell: "Ralph Bunche contributed most
constructively to the discussion of the Board, pointing out, among other things that the
Africans tended justifiably to regard themselves as reasonably capable of managing
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their advance toward freedom without outside advice."
The earliest specific call for international economic sanctions against
South
Africa came from the ANC on June 26, 1959 when the ANC urged an international
boycott to support their internal boycott of goods produced by
Afrikaner nationalists.
The call was answered in July 1959 when the Jamaican government
announced a total
ban on the importation of South African goods. Ghana's trade
union federation also
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announced a boycott on July 1959. On September 1959, the Pan-African Freedom
Movement of East and Central Africa and the Northern Rhodesia Trade Union
Congress also announced a boycott of all South African products. On January 30,
1960, the Second All Africa People's Conference in Tunis, Algeria, urged a boycott of
goods from South Africa and Southwest Africa. Also that January, the presidents of
trade union federations in Finland, Sweden, Norway and Denmark decided to support
the boycott in principle.
Meanwhile, however, the brutality of the South African system of apartheid
made itself evident in a small black township outside Johannesburg. On March 23,
1960 some 20,000 South Africans marched in a nonviolent protest against pass laws
called by the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC). In Sharpeville, a stronghold of the
PAC's, 7,000 marched to the police station where police opened fire on demonstrators,
killing at least 72 men, women and children and wounding over 200. Most of the
victims were shot in the back as they tried to escape. Photographs of the massacre
victims were displayed around the world. Newspaper opinion and letters pages
were
filled with statements of outrage. South Africans were expelled from
international
sport, cultural and academic institutions. In the United States, the
Sharpeville
Massacre reinvigorated the anti-apartheid movement. On 24 March 1960, the
ACOA
sent a cable to Prime Minister Verwoerd of South Africa:
Americans are shocked at (the) Sharpeville Massacre. The
December
in Windhoek has now been exceeded on the Rand. Your only
ar
continued pleas of United Nations to end apartheid appears to
be mas
unarmed Africans by your armed police. How long will machine
gun-
87
apartheid continue in face of African and world revulsion and increasing
isolation of South Africa in community of nations? The demands of
Africans to outlaw passes are just. We deplore the flagrant injustice and
flaunting of world opinion in South Africa as in Hungary, Tibet, and our own
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Southern States.
The cable was signed by John Gunther, A. Philip Randolph, Jackie Robinson,
Donald Harrington, Rev. James Pike and George Houser. The group also announced
plans for pickets from "Woolworth's up Fifth Avenue to the South African consulate
on Madison Avenue between 60th and 61st streets" to protest the killings.
On 25 March, 29 African and Asian member states asked the Security Council
to condemn South Africa for the massacre. During the debate the South African
ambassador Bernadus Fourie blamed the massacre on "A splinter organization of
extremists."
34
Fourie told the UN that the PAC had gathered thousands of people in
the small town of Sharpeville "by intimidation of and threats to persons who do not
belong to the group." He justified the shootings because "the police were attacked."
After lecturing the Security Council on the dangers of police work, Fourie concluded:
"No Government can allow hundreds of thousands of its citizens to be intimidated
by
extremists, as the Bantu in South Africa often are." According to Fouries, therefore,
the men, women and children killed in Sharpeville were "extremists" who deserved to
die. On April 1, the Security Council considered the issue and adopted Reso]utionl34_
(April 1, 1960) in which it recognized the situation in South
Africa had led to
"international friction" and was a danger to international peace and
security. The
resolution deplored the loss of life and the called on the government
of South Africa to
"initiate measures aimed at bringing about racial harmony based
on equality in order
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to ensure that the present situation does not continue to recur and to abandon its
policies of apartheid and racial discrimination." The resolution passed by 9 votes in
favor and none against with two abstentions (the United Kingdom and France). The
council also deplored the policies of the apartheid regime and asked the Secretary
General, Dag-Hammerskjold, to consult with South Africa on the status of race
relations. Hammerskjold met with the South African representative in London and
visited South Africa in 1961 but was unable to report any progress. Instead, the South
African Government declared a state of emergency on 30 March I 960; mobilized
citizens' force to supplement the police, army and air force and detained thousands of
people. On April 8, 1960, the regime banned the African National Congress and the
Pan Africanist Congress and arrested their leaders. PAC leader Robert Sobukwe was
accused of organizing the anti-pass protests and sentenced to three years in prison. In a
draconian measure against planned strikes, the government made refusal to work
punishable by five years imprisonment and a heavy fine.
On Africa Freedom Day, 13 April 1960, the ACOA organized a protest
meeting to "Protest the recent massacre in South Africa" and "Celebrate the freedom
ofnew African states."
35 The honorary chairmen of the meeting were Martin Luther
King Jr., Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt, A. Philip Randolph, Jackie Robinson and Harry
Belafonte. The keynote speaker was Kenneth Kaunda, then head of the United
National Independence Party of Northern Rhodesia on his first tour of the United
States. Kaunda called on the participants to join his party in the struggle for
independence and its boycott of South African goods:
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We of the United National Independence Party have boycotted South African
goods to show how strongly we feel against the massacre of voteless and non-
violent African peoples in the Union. Is it beyond the reach of the American
people to organize a boycott of South African goods to show that men of all
races are shocked by what the Verwoerd regime is doing?36
The meeting also featured the NAACP's Thurgood Marshall, who had recently
returned from London where he was an advisor to the Kenya Constitutional
Conference. Other speakers included Mlahleni Njisane, a sociologist from the
University ofNatal, and Dr. Tsefaye Gebre-Egzy, a representative of the Organization
of Independent African States.
On the international level, the massacre reinvigorated the boycott movement in
Britain where the Anti-Apartheid Movement voted to continue the embargo
indefinitely. The Norwegian and German trade union federations also called for a
consumer boycott of South African products, while Ghana's Positive Action
Conference on April 10, 1960, called on religious and humanitarian organizations to
"condemn the policies of the South African Government and give every possible help
to its victims." The conference also called on African states to sever all trade and
diplomatic ties with the South African regime. In the United States, World Telegram
columnist Inez Robb called for a U.S. boycott of diamonds and other goods from
South Africa, while Americans for Democratic Action released a statement signed by
prominent Americans urging the United States to recall its Ambassador to Pretoria for
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consultation. The NAACP's Crisis also protested the massacre in a May 1960
editorial, scoring the "brutality of apartheid" and predicting that the "tragic course in
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South Africa is still unfolding and will probably get worse before it gets better."
On 4 June 4 1960, the ACOA announced that the U.S. Government had
refused to grant Oliver Tambo, the deputy president of the African National Congress
of South Africa a visa to visit the United States on a lecture tour organized by the
ACOA. Tambo, who had escaped from South Africa in May, had been invited as the
keynote speaker at the Emergency Action Conference on South Africa on May 31-
June 1 in New York City and was scheduled to appear before a Congressional
subcommittee evaluating U.S. policy toward Africa. He was also scheduled to address
NAACP rallies in Petersburg, Virginia, St. Louis, Mo., and Younstown, Ohio. Tambo
was also to be the main speaker at the third convention of the American Society for
African Culture in Philadelphia. All these meetings were canceled because of the visa
snag.
In a telegram to Secretary of State Christian Herter, Houser, the executive
director of the ACOA, said:
We are shocked that a visa for the lecture tour under our auspices is denied
Oliver Tambo, Deputy-President of South African National Congress. The
denial will inevitably be interpreted throughout Africa as prejudicial to
opponents of apartheid and as resulting from South African government
pressure This will be a setback to the announced U.S. policy of
condemning
apartheid during Security Council meeting. At a time when our country and
U S S R are vying for the allegiance of the whole continent of Africa, the
one outstanding leader who has been able to escape from South Africa is
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denied entrance to the U.S. for the purpose of speaking to the American
people. Further this denial comes at a time when the whole world has been
aroused by the massacre of African by the South African police. On the other
hand, a succession of architects of apartheid are routinely admitted from South
Africa to the United States. We urge immediate reconsideration of Tambo's
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application and reversal of the decision."
In the absence of Tambo, the Emergency Action Conference was addressed by
South African exiles Prof. Absalom Vilakazi and Prof. Mlahleni Kjisane and
Congressman Charles Diggs Jr. The conference adopted resolutions that called on
UnitedLStates consumers to boycott South African diamonds, lobster tails, wool, metal
and furs. They urged U.S. firms with investments in South Africa to "abstain from
participating in apartheid." U.S. labor unions were asked to consider refusing to
unload ships with South African goods and the World's Fair in New York was asked
to deny South Africa's request to erect a pavilion. In addition, the International
Olympic Committee was asked to ban South Africa from appearing at its Rome
games.
39 Members of the emergency committee included officials of the American
Friends Mission at the United Nations, the United Automobile Workers, Americans
for Democratic Action, the NAACP and the Prince Hall Masonic Lodge. On June 7,
1960, the U.S. finally announced that it would admit Oliver Tambo.
40 The policy
reversal was seen as a victory by the anti-apartheid movement. It signaled a
change in
the unwritten policy of focusing on the white perspective in
South Africa. As George
Houser put it: "We welcome the decision to allow one of the leading
nonwhites to
address American audiences."
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Meanwhile on June 15, 1960, the Second Conference of Independent African
States meeting in Addis Ababa, renewed the call for sanctions against South Africa.
The African Heads of State again expressed their conviction that "colonialism is one
of the factors which provoke friction between peoples and endanger international
peace and security." They unanimously agreed that their member states would close
their ports to South African ships and their airports to South African airplanes. They
also urged Arab states to stop selling oil to South Africa.41 All the independent African
states and several Asian governments severed relations with the regime and imposed
restrictions on travel, trade and investment in South Africa. Disapproval in the
Commonwealth meeting in London that May forced South Africa to resign and
declare itself a "Republic" citing a whites-only referendum on 5 October 1960. The
African Group of States at the United Nations proposed diplomatic, economic and
other measures against the South African regime during the fifteenth and sixteenth
sessions of the General Assembly but did not succeed because of opposition from
western countries.
In November,^John F. Kennedy defeated Richard Nixon with a slim margin in
one of the closest presidential races in American history. Kennedy won seven out of
ten black votes during the election. This solid showing in the black community was
attributed to the fact that Kennedy had called Mrs. Coretta Scott King on October 19, .
1960, to express solidarity after the arrest of Martin Luther King Jr. during a sit-in at
an Atlanta department store restaurant organized by black students. King and thirty-
five other people were arrested and sentenced the following week to four months on a
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Georgia road gang. According to Corretta Scott King, the call from Senator Kennedy
led to the release of Dr. King the next day. The call by Kennedy also helped deliver
the black vote to the Democratic Party candidate through the efforts of King Sr.
Africa had figured prominently in the U.S presidential elections of 1960.
Kennedy charged repeatedly that the United States had lost ground in Africa. When
the Eisenhower administration failed to support Kenyan students who had won
American scholarships but could not afford the airfare, Kennedy organized a well-
publicized airlift through the Kennedy Foundation. This airlift was in response to a
petition from African American leaders like Harry Belafonte. Once in office, Kennedy
appointed G. Mennen Williams assistant secretary for African Affairs. Williams
created waves in the colonial world on his first trip to Africa when he was quoted by a
Nairobi newspaper saying that Africa should be for the Africans. The statement
produced a storm of protest in London but Kennedy stood by his aide. Kennedy also
appointed Black American ambassadors to several emerging nations in Africa and to
other important posts in his administration. Robert C. Weaver, a former member of the
FDR's "Black Cabinet," was appointed Housing Administrator; George Weaver
became Assistant Secretary of Labor; journalist Carl Rowan, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State; Andrew Hatcher, White House Deputy Secretary; Thurgood
Marshall became one of five Blacks appointed to federal judgeships.
The Kennedy victory inaugurated a new era U.S. foreign policy toward Africa.
The State Department had established the Bureau of African Affairs in 1957
in
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response to the rising tide of African nationalism. Even after 1957, however, the
United States continued to defer to European colonialists in its relations with Africa.42
That year, for example, there were more Foreign Service personnel stationed in West
Germany than in the whole of Africa. According to Arthur Schlesinger Jr., an advisor
to the Kennedy administration:
Now that the European colonial powers were joined with us in the Atlantic
Alliance, there seemed all the more reason, in the interests ofNATO solidarity,
to defer to them in African matters.43
Nevertheless the U.S. government could not ignore African nationalism which
had reached a boiling point in 1960. The emergence of African nations was especially
evident in September and October 1960 when sixteen new African nations sent
representatives to the United Nations General Assembly in New York City. These
African diplomats, with their flowing robes and impeccable English and French, had a
major impact on black American observers. The fiery Patrice Lumumba of the Congo
in particular became a shining example of uncompromising African nationalism. His
visit to Harlem in 1960 was organized by nationalist groups like the Nation of Islam
and the African Nationalist Pioneer Movement and held at the Henry Lincoln Johnson
Lodge Hall at 15t W. 126th Street. Lumumba's visit electrified the nationalist
community. Carlos Cooks wrote a glowing profile ofLumumba in his newsletter The
Street Corner calling Lumumba "One of the greatest African personalities to appear
on the stage of world affairs."
44 Cooks was particularly impressed with Lumumba's
use of the United Nations system to thwart the secessionists in Katanga. In a rare
compliment, Cooks argued that Lumumba was "more oriented towards orthodox
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African Nationalism, along the Garveyism pattern, than any of the other African
officials I have had the privilege to converse with." Malcolm X was also impressed
with Lumumba and outraged at the machinations of the Belgians and their ally Moise
Tshombe.
In early February 1961 supporters of African liberation were outraged to hear
that Moise Tshombe's forces had executed Congo's Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba.
Activists were convinced that the Central Intelligence Agency and United Nations
forces had allowed Lumumba to be captured so they could install a pro-Western
government in the Congo. African countries and their allies in the United Nations
were also convinced that the Untied States and the United Nations were responsible
for Lumumba's death.45 Nationalist groups in Harlem put out a call to protest during a
United Nations Security Council meeting called to debate a Soviet-sponsored
resolution condemning the United Nations for complicity in the murder of Lumumba.
On 15 February 1961 hundreds of protesters turned up at UN headquarters and packed
the visitors' gallery. US Ambassador Adlai Stevenson was about to speak when a
woman in the gallery screamed: "Murderers of Lumumba, you Ku Klux Klan
Motherfuckers!" Soon after, a melee broke out in the gallery as security guards and
later police tried to clear the area. Demonstrators continued into the evening until a
crowd chanting "Congo Yes, Yankee No" on 42nd Street was dispersed by mounted
police. The press called the protest a "riot." Arthur Schlesinger Jr., who was an advisor
to President Kennedy at the time, wrote later in his memoir that the demonstrations
were "a frenzy of hatred" stirred up by the Soviet Union to discredit the United States.
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Roy Wilkins of the NAACP said it was "natural that black should protest the murder
of Lumumba" but added that the demonstrations at the United Nations on February 15
did not "represent either the sentiment or the tactics of American Negroes." Wilkins
complained that the press had labeled the protest the work of black people in general
creating a "misleading picture of the opposition of American Negro citizens."
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To counter the emergence of militant black internationalism, liberal groups
organized a conference on "American Policy Toward Africa" on March 9-10, 1961,
chaired by A. Philip Randolph, then vice president of the AFL/CIO and Donald
Harrington, chairman of the ACOA 47 The conference call letter urged the new
administration to seize the opportunity "for the adoption of dynamic and courageous
policies" arguing that "A re-assessment of American policy toward Africa is urgently
required now. ... because Africa has emerged on the international stage with explosive
force." Noting that "American prestige in Africa has suffered greatly in the last few
months," the organizers called for a leadership conference "on American
responsibilities towards Africa, believing that no more urgent or challenging task
confronts the American people today than that of formulating a creative policy to meet
the demands of the dynamic changes occurring in Africa."
48 The call was signed by a
virtual "Who's Who" of the civil rights movement including Randolph, Roy Wilkins,
Martin Luther King, Lester Granger, Jackie Robinson, James Robinson,
Thurgood
Marshall, Charles Diggs, Dorothy Height and Harry Belafonte
49
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The conference featured a debate between Senator Frank E. Moss (Utah), co-
author of a joint Senate Report on Africa following a fact-finding tour, and Rep.
Charles Diggs Jr. (D-Michigan), a member of the House Subcommittee on Africa. A.
Philip Randolph gave the keynote speech, "Is the U.S. Meeting the Challenge of
Africa in the World?"50 The conference resolutions called on the United States to
adopt a "much more vigorous policy toward Africa" by: (1) supporting the U.N.'s
demand that colonial powers set target dates for the independence of colonies; (2)
taking economic action against apartheid; (3) supporting the independence of South
West Africa; (4) opposing white settler domination in Rhodesia; (5) recognizing the
right of Algerian people to independence; and (6) bringing more recognized African
nationalist leaders to the U.S. under the U.S. cultural exchange program.
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The most incisive analysis of the demonstration at the United Nations,
however, was advanced by John Henrik Clarke, who wrote that fall in a Freedomways
article that the demonstrations were a manifestation of a "new Afro-American
nationalism."
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Clarke argued that the crowd at the UN demonstration interpreted the
execution ofLumumba as a "the international lynching of a black man at the alter of
colonialism and white supremacy." Clarke said Lumumba had become a hero to
African Americans because he was a symbol of the black man's struggle for freedom
and recognition. This was why Lumumba was hailed as "Lincoln of the Congo" and
"Black Messiah." Clarke described the Nation of Islam led by Elijah Mohammed in
Chicago and Malcolm X in Harlem as "the most dynamic force for protest and change
in the United States. Of all the Afro-American nationalist groups this is the one that is
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most feared by white people." Other major nationalists groups in Harlem, "the
incubator of black nationalism in the United States" were: the Muslim Brotherhood,
led by Talib Ahmed Dawud, which claimed to follow orthodox Islam; the United
African Nationalist Movement started by James Lawson in 1948, described as one of
the most active groups that had established close relations with African missions at the
United Nations; the Universal African Nationalist Movement led by Benjamin
Gibbons, described as one of the many splinter groups formed after the break up of
Garvey's UNIA; the Cultural Association for Women of African Heritage, led by
Abby Lincoln and representing the entry of entertainers into the nationalist movement;
and the African Nationalist Pioneer Movement headed by Carlos Cooks, which Clarke
describes as the most active of the Garveyite groups. Other new nationalist
groups
identified by Clarke are the Liberation Committee for Africa; On Guard Committee
for Freedom; and Provisional Committee for a Free Africa.
Clarke argued that these new Afro-American nationalists "had learned a
lesson
and discovered a great truth that still eludes the Negro leadership
class. They have
learned the value of history and culture as an instrument in
stimulating the spiritual
rebirth of a people." This turn to history, Afnca and nationalism
had been seen before
in Black America. Cultural nationalism was an important
aspect of Garvey's UNIA.
Clarke argues, however, that many of these new Afro-American
nationalists were
"gravitating toward a form of African Socialism." In the
terms of the time they were
"revolutionary nationalists" inspired by the African revolutionary
theorists like Julius
Nyerere, Eduardo Mondlane and Amilcar Cabral.
99
The renewed interest in Africa led to a revival of African religions like Vodun
by a group called the Yoruba Temple. The leader of the Temple, Rev. Adefumi
explains; "The Yoruba Temple is the advance guard for the change now being felt in
the minds of every awakening Afro-American ... It is the only society which is the
same in West Africa, Cuba, Haiti, Trinidad and Brazil, because it is African through
and through. The Yoruba Temple does not believe we can ever fully succeed by trying
to be Negroes, Arabs or Jews. ... There is only one thing we can be -Africans, because
that is what we were meant to be-face it." Clarke also reported the emergence of a
Black Nationalist political party called the "New Alajo Party." In a position statement
the party declared: "The re-Africanization of the black people of America has begun."
For the NAACP and the Big Six civil rights leaders, the reemergence of Black
Nationalism was disturbing. This discomfort with the growing identification with
Africa was natural given that the organizations were committed to integration into full
American citizenship and considered pro-Africanism a liability in that cause. This
perspective is reflected in an article by NAACP official James A. Marshall in the
Crisis of February 1962 titled "The Meaning of Black Nationalism." Marshall
argued
that black nationalism as represented in the UN demonstration of February 1961, was
"an extremist cry rising out of deep and ancient fear and suspicion
nourished by
current frustration." For Marshall, "fixing Africa as the
chief symbol ofNegro
militancy ... really implies acceptance of a derogatory
stereotype of the Negro as
submissive and dependent." Nevertheless he urged the NAACP to: "face the fact
that
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logic notwithstanding sizable segments of the community will continue to heed the
call of false prophets and with disturbing implications."
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The Arden House Conference
In response to this upsurge in grassroots interest in Africa and pan- Africanism,
some liberal African American leaders sought to form a black organization that could
lobby Washington on African affairs. The ANLCA emerged from the efforts of A.
Philip Randolph, the president and founder of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters
who had been calling on civil rights leaders to form a black liberation support
organization since the demise of the CAA in 1955. Randolph, who had worked with
AMSAC, the NAACP and ACOA, felt there was a need for a black American
organization to work with African leaders at the United Nations and support anti-
colonial movements on the continent. In November 1959, Randolph called a meeting
of African American leaders to discuss the "roles they can play both, collectively and
individually, in the dramatic developments taking place so rapidly in Africa today."
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On May 16, 1962, a group of African American leaders held a meeting on a
proposal to form an Afro-American Leadership Conference on American Policy
Toward Africa.55 The group agreed that there was an urgent need for such a
conference to organize African American opinion on Africa because of the explosive
situation in southern Africa. Violence had erupted in Angola and bloodshed
seemed
inevitable in South Africa. Noting that the United States was likely to
"continue to
follow a somewhat equivocal position on these issues because of the nature
of the
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western alliance and because of other factors" the group resolved to organize African
American opinion "sympathetic to the aims of African nationalism which in turn backs
up the idea of independence and equality." The group agreed to organize an Afro-
American leadership conference on Africa in October while the United Nations
General Assembly was in session. It was also agreed that the group would invite Roy
Wilkins, Martin Luther King Jr., Whitney Young, Hobson Reynolds and C.B. Powell
to the next meeting.
The call for the conference argued that the struggle for freedom in Africa had
reached a critical stage in Angola where armed resistance had broken out on March
15, 1961 and in South Africa, where black liberation organizations were banned,
leaders imprisoned and freedom of movement curtailed.
56 The letter pointed out that
the United States had a special responsibility in the implementation ofUN resolutions
because of its economic ties with both Portugal and South Africa. The letter also said:
The Afro-American community in the U.S. has a special responsibility to urge
a dynamic policy on our country. Although we have a serious civil rights
problem which exhausts much of our energy, we cannot separate this struggle
at home from that abroad. If the U.S. cannot take rigorous action to help win
freedom in Africa's troubled zones, how can we expect to maintain trust, the
friendship of the newly independent and soon to be independent peoples of
Africa and Asia?
This position reflected the evolution of liberal African American thought on
Africa since the Sharpeville Massacre. It was a far cry from the dismissal of Africa
at
the NAACP board meeting on 1959 when Ralph Bunche argued that there was no
connection between the struggles in Africa and the United States. This time a large
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cross section of the African American leadership was involved in an effort to influence
U.S. foreign policy toward Africa. The difference was that there was an upsurge of
nationalism and race consciousness in the new generation of activists that sparked an
interest in history and people of African descent around the world.
At a meeting held on June 15, 1962, the group had firmed up plans to hold the
American Negro Leadership Conference on Africa in October.
58 They formed a
planning committee consisting of John A. Davis, AMSAC; James Farmer, CORE;
George Houser, ACOA; Clarence Jones, Gandhi Society; Frank Montero, African
Students' Foundation; John Morsell, NAACP; Guichard Parris, NUL; A. Philip
Randolph, BSCP and Martin Luther King Jr. of the SCLC. The ANLCA was the
second black united front for Africa formed by African American organizations since
the Second World War. It included seventy-five of the nations largest Black
organizations. Unlike the radical coalition led by the CAA in the 1940s and early
1950s, however, this organization reflected the nonviolent/integrationist politics of its
principal leaders although it included radicals and black nationalists in its coalition. By
the time of the Arden House Conference the ANLCA included representatives of
organizations that ranged from black nationalists (E. Frederick Morrow of the
Liberation Committee for Africa) to African American legislators and business
owners.
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Both the Black and mainstream press compared the ANLCA conference to the
Pan African conferences of the past. Clarence Hunter of the Washington
Evening Star,
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for instance, claimed that: "The last such gathering of this magnitude probably was the
first Pan African conference organized by W.E.B. Du Bois in 1919."
60 The article
announced that the conference would be concerned with the role of African Americans
in U.S. foreign policy toward Africa and the participation of African Americans in
foreign policy through appointments to the State Department and diplomatic posts.
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Scholars like Adelaide Cornwell Hill of Boston University, St. Clair Drake of
Roosevelt College, John Marcum of Lincoln University and Eduardo Mondlane of
Syracuse University had been asked to prepare papers for the conference. Theodore
Brown, director of the conference, encapsulated the reinvigoration of Pan Africanist
thought when he argued:
Since the turn of the century Negro leaders and scholars have expressed the
concern ofNegro Americans for the elimination of colonialism and all its
evils. While our conference will not initiate a new interest on the part of
American Negroes, it will launch a more aggressive determination to make our
influence felt on the policies of our government on the critical
areas of that
vast continent especially south of the Sahara."
The Washington Afro-American claimed in an editorial that
"November 23,
1962 may well be one of the most important days in the history of
the colored
American's relationship with Africa."
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In a searing editorial titled "OUR Conference
on Africa," the Afro-American argued that the ANLCA conference would
debunk the
"great myth that friction between colored Americans and
Africans precluded any type
of continuing relationship." The editorial argued that the
relationship between
Africans and African Americans was guaranteed by the
presence of millions of people
of African descent in the United States. Arguing that
"Few can gainsay the enormous
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impact Africa's successful freedom drive has had on the colored American's effort,"
the editorial predicted that the ANLCA would "render a great service to the entire
spectrum of American foreign policy." In conclusion the Afro-American urged the
conference to examine whether American foreign policy had a European orientation;
to what extent the hostility toward Africa stemmed from the presence of southerners in
key foreign affairs committees in Congress; the use of private foundations and
businesses as a secret arm of the U.S. government policy toward the continent; and the
resistance to the appointment of "colored" ambassadors in the State Department. Even
the Washington Post picked up on the Pan African theme of the conference. In an
editorial on September 11, 1962, the Post wrote:
The announcement of a three-day conference, to be held at the Arden House
campus of Columbia University in November, is indicative of the American
Negro community's growing interest in United States policies toward the
newly independent nations of sub-Saharan Africa. Interest by American
Negroes in African affairs can be traced back to the first Pan African
conference organized by W.E.B. Du Bois in 1919. The 1919 meeting and
subsequent meetings in the 1920s were largely directed towards the
establishment of cultural links, the forthcoming conference .. will be devoted
to an analysis of the Government's Africa policies and the ways in which they
can be influenced by the Negro community.
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Although the Post's analysis lacked historical depth, the contention that the
ANLCA was comparable to the Pan African conferences of the past was apt. The
conference's wide support in the African American community indicated a new
discourse on Africa engendered by the successful liberation struggles in Africa and the
emergence of armed struggle in South Africa. This struggle paralleled the Black
American struggle in the United States creating an interesting situation where
news
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about civil rights workers being beaten in the south alternated with stories about
massacres in South Africa.
On November 23, 1962 over 100 African American leaders met under the
auspices of the American Negro Leadership Conference (ANLCA) at Arden House,
Columbia University. Apartheid was very much on the agenda at the "Arden House
Conference" ofNovember 23-25, 1962. Roy Wilkins of the NAACP gave the keynote
address stressing the United States had to go beyond verbal condemnations of
colonialism and apartheid and impose sanctions on Portugal and South Africa.
We well know sanctions is a war word, but in the cases of Angola and South
Africa, it is a word in a war against terror, despotism, murder and massacre.
South Africa, like Mississippi, justifies her course unashamedly upon the
inglorious and debasing theory of white supremacy. And like Mississippi, she
is exposing to the world, with a clarity not contemplated when the theory was
adopted in another age, the bankruptcy of the hateful doctrine.
The conference endorsed the "Appeal for Action Against Apartheid" sponsored
by Martin Luther King Jr. and Albert Luthuli, president of the African National
Congress in South Africa. It called on the United States government to support United
Nations sanctions against South Africa; to impose a total arms embargo; and
discourage public and private investment in the regime. The group demanded that the
United States Armed Forces cease military maneuvers in South Africa and stop using
South African waters or bases. The conference also called on participants to seek a
meeting with the president to discuss U.S. foreign policy toward Africa.
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At a wide-ranging press conference after the second day of deliberations on
November 24, the leaders argued that the decision to formally link the civil rights
movement in the United States to the independence struggle in Africa represented a
"new phase in the civil rights struggle."66 They agreed on a two-pronged program of
action: The first was to instill a conscious identification with Africa in the Black
communities of the United States through education and exchange programs. The
second, to use the Black voting strength to convince the government to support the
liberation movements in Africa. The leaders rejected the suggestion that identification
with Africa "might stimulate a greater awareness of separateness as opposed to
integration." Dr. King stressed that the new phase of the civil rights struggle was part
of a worldwide struggle for freedom rather than a special African issue although
African independence "has given the American Negroes inspiration for their struggles
here." King called for a "Marshall Plan, the recruiting of American Negroes for
official United States and unofficial American jobs of all categories in Africa, and an
intensive effort to cultivate African diplomats and their families in this country."
There was some discussion about the perception of Africans on the role of African
Americans in the United States. Some thought that the Africans had an exaggerated
view of Black American power in the American political system. Others accused the
State Department of hiding behind the contention that African states preferred white
ambassadors because they felt that Blacks had little access to the power structure in
the United States. The leaders also disagreed with the view that African American
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students were not interested in Africa because they rarely volunteered for the Peace
Corps. They argued that even in cases where Black students were ignorant about
Africa, they maintained an emotional attachment that could not be underestimated.
They attributed the lack of Black Peace Corps volunteers to socio-economic
conditions in the United States that made it inadvisable for a Black student to sacrifice
two or three years. They also argued that educational foundations had helped establish
African studies centers at white universities instead of historically black institutions.
St. Clair Drake, for instance, attributed this disparity in funding to the fact that Black
Americans were not part of the decision making process at major foundations.
On 26 November 1962, the New York Times reported that the "Arden House"
conference had ended "with a set of resolutions designed to transform the struggle for
civil rights into an international problem" because the program "would involve the
American Negro community with sub-Saharan African affairs."
67 The report
highlighted a resolution calling on a committee to seek an audience with President
Kennedy on Human Rights Day, December 10, 1962 to transmit to him the resolution
of the conference. The New York Times writer also informed readers that some of the
Black leaders had indicated "in private conversation" that "they regarded the organized
political action of Jewish groups in the United States as a model." Other resolutions
included demands that the United States support the liberation of Angola,
Mozambique and South West Africa and the unification of the Congo. In the final
plenary session, which the reporter describes as "fiery", Roy Wilkins is credited with
getting participants to remove "all phraseology that might have involved the
United
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States Government in any unpleasantness with its European allies ... as politically
68
unsound and of no practical value."
On December 17, 1962, the Big Six, King, Randolph, Height, Young and
Wilkins, met President John F. Kennedy to discuss U.S. foreign policy toward
Africa.
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In an unprecedented 3-hour meeting with black leaders on foreign policy,
they urged Kennedy to institute a "Marshall Plan" for Africa, impose sanctions on
South Africa and support a United Nations proposal for an arms embargo on Portugal.
The United States had voted against both sanctions and the arms embargo. Kennedy
claimed the NATO agreements forced him to arm Portugal although he agreed with
the ANLCA about the need to support the anti-colonial movements in Africa. The
black press hailed the meeting as a major breakthrough in U.S. relations with Africa.
President Kennedy spelled out his administration's position on apartheid
in a
speech he gave to the General Assembly in November 1962 after African
countries
had presented a sanctions resolution that was passed by a heavy
majority in the
General Assembly. In a patronizing speech drafted by Arthur
Schlesinger Jr. and
Ambassador Francis Plimpton the president stated:
We do not believe (sanctions) would bring us closer to our objective
-the
abandonment of apartheid in South Africa. We see little value in a
resolution
which would be primarily a means for a discharge of
our emotions, which
would be unlikely to be fully implemented and which
calls for measures which
could be easily evaded by the country to which they
are addressed-with the
result of calling into question the whole efficacy of
the sanction process.
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The refusal of the United States to support the sanctions resolution outraged
African leaders and anti-apartheid organizations around the world.
On Human Rights Day, 10 December 1962, Martin Luther King Jr. and Albert
Luthuli issued a joint "Appeal for Action Against Apartheid."
71 The appeal recalled
that the Declaration of Conscience of 1957 had shown the nonwhites in South Africa
that they were not alone and also demonstrated how isolated white supremacists were
in the international community. Since the declaration, the appeal continued, South
Africa had banned the ANC and PAC, silenced the press, established an independent
arms industry, defined protest against apartheid as sabotage -a crime
punishable by
death, and continued to maintain power through terrorism and violence.
The appeal
argued that the international community was faced with two options: (1) race
war
caused by repression of African liberation movements; and (2) a
nonviolent solution
based on Chief Albert Luthuli's statement in Oslo while receiving
the Nobel peace
Prize in 1960: ""Nothing which we have suffered at the hands of
the government has
turned us from our chosen path of disciplined resistance."
Therefore, the appeal urged
supporters to: Hold meetings and demonstrations on December 10,
Human Rights
Day; urge their churches, unions, lodges, or clubs to
observe this day as one of protest;
urge their Governments to support economic sanctions; write
to their mission to the
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United Nations urging adoption of a resolution calling for international isolation of
South Africa; refuse to buy South Africa's products; trade or invest in South Africa;
and translate public opinion into public action by explaining facts to all peoples, to
groups to which they belong, and to countries ofwhich they were citizens until an
effective international quarantine of apartheid was established.
By this time, however, this appeal strategy was seriously outdated in both
South Africa and the United States. In South Africa, Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu,
Oliver Tambo and other members of the ANC had decided to launch armed struggle
against the South African regime after the banning of the liberation movements in
1960. In a statement titled "Why I Planned Sabotage in South Africa" Mandela said: "I
consider myself neither legally nor morally bound to obey laws made by a parliament
in which I had no representation."
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In 1961 ANC launched Umkontho we Sizwe, its
armed wing, with a series of attacks on military and strategic installations. The
Verwoerd government quickly passed the Sabotage Act of 1962 that made it treason to
engage in sabotage -- a crime punishable by death. In August 1962, Mandela was
caught by security forces and sentenced to five years for incitement and leaving the
country illegally. On 1 1 June 1963 police raided MK's headquarters in the town of
Rivonia, confiscated boxes of incriminating materials and arrested the armed wing's
leaders. Mandela was tried along with his colleagues in the infamous Rivonia Trial
and given a sentence of life in prison.
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Meanwhile the close ties between the United States and South Africa were
becoming serious obstacles to relations with African countries. At its founding
conference in May 1963, the Organization of African Unity made it clear that the
United States would have to choose between Africa and colonial powers like Portugal
and the apartheid regime in South Africa. The OAU also passed a resolution
expressing "deep concern aroused in all African peoples and governments by the
measures of racial discrimination taken against communities of Africa origin living
outside the continent and particularly the United States of America."
73 The Nigerian
Prime Minister, for instance, urged African states to: "use all the means at our
disposal, especially at the United Nations, to ensure that the last vestiges of racialism
and colonialism are wiped off the face of Africa."
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After the OAU meeting, "friendly" African leaders like Julius Nyerere and
Houphuet-Boigny warned the Kennedy administration that verbal condemnation of
apartheid would no longer be sufficient.
75 Mennen Williams informed Kennedy in
mid-June, 1963 that the United States would have to back up its anti-apartheid rhetoric
with action. In the memorandum, Williams recommended that the United States
consider imposing a full embargo on sales of arms to South Africa. Adlai Stevenson,
concurred, telling Kennedy that: "It seems clear that we are approaching a decisive
situation from which the Africans will draw conclusions about the long-run nature of
our policies."
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Although the proposal for an arms embargo on South Africa drew strong
resistance from the upper echelons of the State Department, Kennedy decided to call
for a voluntary arms embargo on South Africa and to impose a unilateral ban on the
sale of U.S. arms to South Africa as long as apartheid policies were in effect. On
August 2, Stevenson announced the decision to the Security Council and cast the
American vote for a resolution calling on all states to cease "the sale and shipments of
arms and ammunition of all types and military vehicles to South Africa."
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Despite this vote, the ACOA and other groups continued to push for full
sanctions against South Africa. In September, the ACOA launched yet another petition
drive aimed at influencing the policies of the United States mission to the United
Nations during the General Assembly.
77 The "Petition to President Kennedy" was
signed by A. Philip Randolph and Donald Harrington, co-chairmen of the ACOA. It
called on the president to provide "support for sanctions; for a U.S. embargo on trade
with South Africa; and, finally, for suspending American recognition of the Apartheid
Government." Two months later, George Houser reported to Roy Wilkins that the
petition had been signed by over 5,000 people in the United States. Meanwhile South
Africa had taken "measures to wipe out all opposition (and) have turned South Africa
into a virtual police state, are forcing the opponents of apartheid underground, and
78
pushing them into a position in which they have no legal methods of protest."
In July 1964, the South African Government sentenced Nelson Mandela,
Walter Sisulu and other leaders of the liberation movements to life in prison with
hard
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labor under the "Sabotage Act." Like other draconian measures, these sentences were
met with outrage in the anti-apartheid community. On 17 July 1964, hundreds of
African Americans led by Joseph Walker, an editor for the Local 1 199, the Drug and
Hospital Employees Union, picketed the South African Consulate in a demonstration
reminiscent of the Council on African Affairs in 1952.
79 The demonstration included
members of the CORE, the NAACP and SNCC. Walker and 11 other demonstrators
including Joe Brown, vice president, New York City chapter, Negro American Labor
Council, and Doris Turner, vice president, Local 1 199, Drug and Hospital
Employees
Union staged a sit-in at the South African Consulate and were arrested.
80 The Nation
of Islam's Muhammad Speaks published excerpts of Mandela's statements "Why I
Planned Sabotage in South Africa."
81 The newspaper, which had been started by
Malcolm X in 1960, remained the premier source of information about African
nationalist and anti-colonial forces during the late 1960s and
early 1970s.
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The ANLCA also convened foreign policy conferences in 1964 and 1967 that
featured African nationalists and the foreign policy
community in Washington D.C. It
was clear, however, that the civil rights groups were
losing ground both in government
circles and in the black community where a new generation
of leaders was emerging.
In 1964, a decade before the formation of TransAfrica,
an ANLCA conference called
for the formation of a permanent African American lobby
to influence US foreign
policy toward Africa. The conference, held at Howard
University between September
24 and 27, 1964, recognized "the evolution of United
States' policy toward South
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Africa in past years, but called for bold initiatives and a more dynamic approach in the
immediate future."
83 The resolution argued:
Although U.S. foreign policy has formally opposed apartheid and racial
oppression in South Africa, it must move beyond this. The unwillingness of the
government of the United States to support any concrete proposals for
economic, financial and related sanctions against South Africa government is a
major obstacle to the efforts of the United Nations and independent African
states to solve the South African problem.
4
The ANLCA's call for sanctions was echoed at the International Conference on
Economic Sanctions Against South Africa held in London from April 14 to 17, 1964.
The conference stemmed from discussions in 1963 about the need for an international
dialogue on the problems associated with the implementation of the UN General
Assembly's vote for global economic sanctions in 1962. The London-based
Anti-
Apartheid Movement and South African exiles, some ofwhom were members of the
ANC, took the initiative and set up a preparatory committee under the
direction of
Ronald Segal, a close associate ofANC president Oliver Tambo, who had fled in exile
after the Sharpeville Massacre. A London Observer reporter covering the conference
wrote, "The financial support for the conference is provided
mainly by African
governments."
85 Seven African and Asian nations acted as patrons of the
conference:
Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, Presidents Ben Bella
of Algeria, Julius Nyerere of
Tanzania, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Sedar Senghor of Senegal
and Prime Ministers
Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya and Tunku Abdul Rahman of Malaysia.
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In a report on the conference sent to ACOA members, George Houser and
Collin Gonze wrote that the conference was organized by a steering committee that
included members of the Africa Bureau and the African National Congress.
86 The Pan
Africanist Congress also supported the conference. Over 200 people attended it from
40 countries. The attendance list included 28 official national delegations and 16
unofficial ones. Official delegations came mainly from Africa, Asia and communist
countries like China, U.S.S.R., Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and
Poland. Participants from the United States included five representatives from the
ACOA, one from AMSAC, two from the NAACP, one from SNCC and one from the
National Council of Churches. The key leadership for the conference came from the
nonaligned countries. The chairman was Mongo Slim, foreign minister of Tunisia. The
commission included Tom Mboya, Kenya minister ofjustice, Nsilo Swai, minister of
development in Tanganyika, and Rev. Ambrose Reeves, former Anglican bishop of
Johannesburg.
The conference found that South Africa was vulnerable to sanctions because
it
imported 38 percent of its chemicals, 43 percent of transport and engineering
equipment and 52 percent of petroleum and cola products. In addition,
South African
agriculture, private transport and mobile defense were totally dependent
on oil, most
of which was imported. They also found that world trade and payments
would not
suffer greatly from the cessation of South Africa in gold sales.
Exports were estimated
at only one percent and loss from investment revenue would not
exceed $70 million.
West Germany and Japan would lose even less than the U.S. The
industrialized
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countries, therefore, could not plead economic hardship. A second group of
discussants at the conference found that South Africa was engaged in a race war as the
liberation movements had turned to violence after being denied any legal means of
struggle. This group also found that the fighting in South Africa was likely to
spread
to the neighboring countries thus plunging southern Africa into war. A third group
under the chairmanship ofTom Mboya discussed the legal implications of sanctions.
The group heard six papers and concluded that it was necessary to establish
that the
situation in South Africa constituted a threat to peace in accordance
with Article 39 of
the UN Charter that would then require the Security Council to impose mandatory
sanctions as an alternative to military action. The legal committee also
argued that the
main obstacle to the imposition of sanctions was the reluctance of the
U.S. and Britain.
The committee also recognized that policing sanctions was a
difficult undertaking in
southern Africa because the South and South African coastlines
were 2,500 miles long
and would require a naval blockade similar to the U.S. blockade
of Cuba in 1962.
In the final analysis, however, Houser and Gonze concluded
that while the
conference was "interesting and stimulating" it was doubtful
whether its resolutions
would have any impact on the policies of the UK, US and France
-the three countries
that continued to oppose international sanctions at the
Security Council. They also
criticized the conference for failing to involve
representatives of groups such as
churches, civil rights organizations, labor unions and
activists. A proposal that a
permanent organization be formed to continue the work of
the conference failed to
gain support. Instead the participants asked the OAU to consider establishing
a
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permanent anti-apartheid agency and agreed to send the conference's resolutions to the
United Nations.
In the United States, the ACOA, NAACP, ANLCA and other groups formed a
Consultative Council on South Africa to coordinate lobbying efforts.
87 On October 29,
1964 John O Killens of the CCSA wrote to Dr. John Marshall asking the NAACP to
join 30 other organizations in sponsoring a major conference on South Africa and U.S.
foreign policy called "South African Crisis and American Action." The CCSA planned
to start the conference on the fifth anniversary of the Sharpeville Massacre (Sunday
March 21, 1965). On 20 January 1965 Houser reported that the program would include
a presentation by Oliver Tambo, the deputy president of the ANC who was based in
Dar es Salaam.
88 Houser wrote to Wilkins on behalf of the planning committee to ask
him if he could be one of the main speakers at the opening meeting of the conference
on March 21 . The proposed topic was "to relate in any way you see fit the civil rights
struggle here with the struggle in South Africa." James Farmer ofCORE was the
chairman and commentator for the evening. On the same day, John Morsell, Wilkins's
assistant confirmed the NAACP's acceptance of the invitation to sponsor the
89
conference and promised to send a check for $100.
During the meeting, Gladstone Ntlabati said that Sharpeville had marked a
milestone in the South African struggle because the liberation movements had decided
to turn to armed struggle. According to Ntlabati, "Realizing all channels of peaceful
protest had been closed to us by banning our political organizations, the African
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National Congress and the Pan Africanist Congress, some of the Africans, together
with the whites, embarked on violent forms of struggle." Ntlabati detailed how every
act of nonviolence was met with state violence.
In 1966, the ACOA launched a "Committee of Conscience Against South
African Apartheid" to coordinate a campaign against banks that provided South Africa
with loans. The campaign focused on urging individuals and organizations to
withdraw accounts from Chase Manhattan and First National City banks because of
their close relations with South Africa. ACOA and the University Christian Movement
stepped in to expand the divestment movement started by students on a smaller scale.
In a 7 December 1966 press release A. Philip Randolph reported that Chase
Manhattan, First National and eight other US banks had granted loans worth $23
million and $40 million in revolving credit to South Africa. Randolph argued that "this
substantial financial involvement has not only enabled the perpetuation of
the
particular apartheid regime in South Africa, but also its pivotal role in the
continuation
of a complex of American corporate involvement in the country."
90 Randolph reported
that 23 million would be withdrawn from the banks by December 9.
Although the
banks disputed the validity of these figures, Randolph argued that
the movement had
received "withdrawal pledges" that included large sums such
as a $15 million account
and a $6.5 million account and smaller ones of $200,000, $65,000, $40,000
and
smaller individual accounts in the thousands. He argued that
the confusion may have
stemmed from the fact that "some of the withdrawals connected
with the campaign
have occurred without informing the banks of the
specific reasons for withdrawal and
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CHAPTER 5
"BY ANY MEANS NECESSARY": BLACK POWER AND PAN AFRICANISM
If South Africa is guilty of violating the human rights of Africans here
on the mother continent, then America is guilty ofworse violations of
the 22 million Africans on the American continent. And if South
African racism is not a domestic issue, then American racism is not a
domestic issue.
Malcolm X, address to the
Organization of African Unity's Heads
of State Summit, July 17, 1964 1
In 1 964 Malcolm X made two triumphant tours of African countries where he
addressed the Organization of African Unity's Heads of State Summit; met with
individual leaders; and spoke at numerous universities. Malcolm's worldview was
transformed by his visits to Africa. Like Paul and Eslanda Robeson, W.E.B. Du Bois
and other African Americans, he was deeply influenced by African nationalist leaders
like Jomo Kenyatta, Ahmed Ben Bella, Gammar Abdel Nasser and Kwame Nkrumah.
During his third tour of African countries, he became the first African American to
address African heads of state at the Organization of African Unity meeting where he
called for a strengthening of ties between Africans and African Americans. He called
on the OAU to raise the issue of African American oppression at the United Nations
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and link it to the campaign against apartheid in South Africa. In his address to the
African heads of state on 17 July 1964, Malcolm said:
America is worse than South Africa, because not only is America racist, but
she is also deceitful and hypocritical. South Africa preaches segregation
and
practices segregation. She, at least practices what she preaches.
America
preaches integration and practices segregation. South Africa is like a
vicious
wolf, openly hostile towards black humanity. But America is cunning
like a
fox friendly and smiling, but even more vicious and deadly than
a wolf. If
South Africa is guilty of violating the human rights of Africans here on the
mother continent, then America is guilty ofworse violations of the 22
million
Africans on the American continent. And if South African racism is not a
domestic issue, then American racism is not a domestic issue.
He went on to argue that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was
part of a
"propaganda maneuver ... to keep the African nations from
condemning (U.S.) racist
practices before the United Nations, as you are now doing
as regards the same
practices in South Africa." During this speech, he laid
out the plan for the OAAU
saying he intended to "internationalize" the black
freedom struggle in America by
"placing it at the level of human rights." This theme of
internationalization of the
freedom struggle is reminiscent of W.E.B. Du Bois's
efforts to get the U.N. Human
Rights Commission to consider the issue of racial
discrimination in the United States.
Just as the radical Civil Rights Congress had
also addressed the UN commission on
the issue without results.
4 Malcolm X, however, had a more powerful
platform
through the OAU and would no doubt have succeeded in his
quest had he lived longer.
By 1 964 he was already being accused of
influencing African heads of state to link
the
issue of the Congo with racial strife in Mississippi.
In an answer to a question about
his role at the United Nations, Malcolm said:
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I have never taken responsibility or credit, as you might say, for the stance
taken by African nations. The African nations today are represented by
intelligent statesmen. And it was only a matter of time before they would have
to see that they would have to intervene in behalf of 22 million black
Americans who are their brothers and sisters.
5
Nevertheless, Malcolm X had lobbied African nations to raise the issue of
racial discrimination at the United Nations and was instrumental in reestablishing
relations between African nationalists and Black American nationalists. Like Du Bois
and Robeson, Malcolm insisted that the African American struggle was an
international one. "The Afro-American problem is not a Negro problem,
or an
American problem, but a human problem, a problem for humanity."
6 Malcolm's
internationalization of the black freedom movement was among the most
long-lasting
legacies of the former NOI minister. This revolutionary internationalist
perspective
attracted a number of talented young activists associated with
SNCC and the MFDP.
Like Malcolm, the new generation of black activists was
impatient with the old tactics.
To them, the appeals, marches, sit-ins and declarations
had exhausted their potential.
The urban rebellions in the northern cities were
demonstrating a level of frustration
that shocked the moderate civil rights leaders. Free
from the restraints of the NOI and
eager to make connections with the movement, Malcolm
began to reach out to
movement activists, particularly to the young workers
in SNCC and its affiliates in the
colleges and universities. Soma Sanchez, who was a
member ofNew York CORE
during the early 1960s, recalls that when she first saw
Malcolm on television he scared
her. She had been advised to keep away from
Malcolm because he was a violent racist.
After hearing him speak at a Harlem rally, however,
she changed her mind, and, like
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many of her agemates, became a Malcomite.
7
In 1962, Howard University students
who were members of an affiliate of SNCC called the Nonviolent Action Group,
invited Malcolm X to debate Bayard Rustin. The debate had a major impact on some
of these students. Cleveland Sellers, for instance, says that SNCC workers listened to
o
tapes of Malcolm's speeches regularly after discovering him during the debate.
This new circle of close associates and members of the OAAU included Maya
Angelou who had returned to the U.S. from Africa and was interested in helping
Malcolm build an international organization. This "linkage" issue reached many who
were outside the nationalist and Muslim circles. This interest brought them closer to
civil rights leaders who had formed the American Negro Leadership Conference on
Africa in 1962. As we saw in chapter three, this organization had close relations with
the Kennedy Administration, held several conferences on African issues and
supported
sanctions against South Africa. Yet at the same time, Malcolm's insistence
on linking
racism in the United States and South Africa and his militant stand on race
relations
was anathema to the white liberals who controlled other anti-apartheid organizations
like the American Committee on Africa and the African Studies
Association. On the
Apartheid question, Malcolm pointed to the strategic location of
African Americans in
the United States and advised anti-apartheid activists to focus
on the United States
government:
22 million Afro-Americans in America can become for
Africa a great positive
force-while in turn the African nations could and should
exert positive force at
diplomatic levels against racial discrimination. All of
Africa unites in
opposition to South Africa's apartheid, and to the oppression
in the Portuguese
130
territories. But you waste your time ifyou don't realize
that Verwoerd and
Salazar, and Britain and France, never could last a day
if it were not for United
States support. So until you expose the man in
Washington, D.C. you haven t
accomplished anything.
9
Thus, in the last two years of his life, Malcolm X gravitated
towards a
politically activist pan-Africanism. Indeed, he
named his organization the
Organization of Afro-American Unity in honor of the
Organization of African Unity
and stressed the need to develop ties between
Africans and African Americans through
study and pilgrimages to the continent. For
example, the OAAU's preamble states:
"We Afro-American people will launch a cultural
revolution which will provide the
means for restoring our identity that
we might rejoin our brothers and sisters on the
African continent, culturally, psychologically,
economically and share with them the
sweet fruits of freedom from oppression
and independence of ractst governments.
The OAAU nrged African Amencan to restore
communications with Africa and
stressed the need for black Americans to
"travel to Africa, the Canbbean and to other
places where our culture has not been
completely crushed by brutality and
mthlessness." Reflecting an enduring
nationalist eoncem, fte unity program
rejects the
term "Negro" as "degrading in the
eyes of informed and self-respecting
persons of
African herttage. ... We accept the use of
Afro-American, African, and Black Man.""
This focus on Africa and pnde in being
African represented reinvtgorated
Pan
Africamst sentiment in the United
States. The new generation of African
Amertcans
took Malcohn's advice andbuil.
a series of organizations and
initiatives that were
critical for the evohmon of the African
Amencan constituency for South
Africa. This
131
new generation of Black American activists was characterized by several Malcolmite
perspectives including a rejection of the name "Negro"; a strong identification with
Africa; support for armed revolution in Africa and elsewhere; and a Pan Africanist
perspective. Malcolm had a direct impact on members of SNCC and the Mississippi
Freedom Democratic Party (MFDP). After the MFDP challenge to the Democratic
Party in 1964, entertainer Harry Belafonte, a principal fund-raiser for SNCC and
SCLC, raised funds for SNCC members to travel to Africa. Belafonte thought that the
activists should visit Guinea because:
I was most taken by the young spirit of the country, which had just recently
gained its independence from France, and in those early years the clear-
^
sightedness of its leader Sekou Toure held great promise for Africa's future.
Bob and Donna Moses, John Lewis, Jim Forman, Prathia Hall, Julian Bond,
Ruby Doris Robinson, Bill Hansen, Donald Harris, Matthew Jones, and Fannie Lou
Hamer left for Guinea on September 11, 1964. The trip had a major impact on the
SNCC workers. According to John Lewis:
For the first time you saw a group of black men and women in charge.
Growing up in the southern parts of America we had been talking and speaking
a great deal about one man one vote. In Guinea, in Ghana, m East
Africa, in
Zambia, we saw people making it real, making it happen.
In Nairobi, Kenya, the group ran into Malcolm X by chance and spent two
days discussing strategy and the independence process in Africa.
Lewis describes this
meeting as "one of the most moving meetings that I ever had with
Malcolm." The
group spent two days with Malcolm X discussing the political process in
African and
the United States.
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On December 20, 1964, representatives of SNCC and MFDP invited Malcolm
to speak at one of their rallies at the Williams Institutional CME Church in Harlem.
During his speech, Malcolm briefed them on his journey to Africa, the formation of
the OAAU and urged them to emulate Kenya's Land and Freedom Army ("Mau Mau")
which had won independence through guerrilla warfare:
They will go down in history as the greatest African patriots and freedom
fighters the continent ever knew, and they will be given credit for bringing
about independence ofmany of the existing independent states on the
continent
right now. ... What we need In Mississippi we need a Mau Mau. In Alabama
we need a Mau Mau. In Georgia we need a Mau Mau. Right here in Harlem,
m
New York City, we need a Mau Mau.
1
Malcolm X also invited Fannie Lou Hamer and the SNCC Freedom Singers to
attend a meeting of the Organization of Afro-American Unity that
evening. Speaking
to a group of SNCC teen-agers later that month, Malcolm said the greatest
accomplishment of the struggles of 1964 was "the successful linking
together of our
problem with the African problem, or making our problem a world
problem. ... It is
important for you to know that when you are in Mississippi, you're
not alone. As long
as you think you're alone, then you take a stand as if
you're a minority or as if you're
outnumbered, and that kind of stand will never enable you to
win a battle." On
February 4, 1965, SNCC again invited Malcolm X to speak in
Selma at a mass
meeting. Cleveland Sellers, a SNCC staffer who had heard Malcolm
X debate Bayard
Rustin at Howard University in 1962, said SNCC had invited
Malcolm to speak
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because they wanted the young people to hear leaders who were not as popular with
the press. According to Sellers:
We had Malcolm talk to them about the world struggle and how black people
fit into that struggle. ... Malcolm talked about the fact that people in the South
should not see their struggle as independence and separate from what he was
trying to do in New York. And that our struggle was not separate from Kenya
and Liberia and Angola and Southwest Africa and places like that.
By 1964, Martin Luther King Jr. had begun to rethink his position on the
efficacy of non-violence in a country like South Africa. At an address in London on
December 7, 1964, King compared the struggles against segregation in South Africa
and the United States and suggested for the first time that nonviolence may not be a
suitable tactic in the South African case.
Clearly there is much in Mississippi and Alabama to remind South Africans of
their country, yet even in Mississippi we can organize to register Negro voters,
we can speak to the press, we can in short organize the people in nonviolent
action. But in South Africa even the mildest form of nonviolent resistance
meets with years of imprisonment, and leaders over many years have been
restricted and silenced and imprisoned. We can understand, how in that
situation, people felt so desperate that they turned to other methods, such
as
sabotage.
16
In this landmark speech, King went on to warn of "the dangers of a race
war" if
the situation in South Africa continued to deteriorate. He called the United
States and
the United Kingdom to accept a "unique responsibility" which came with an
opportunity to join African nations "in the one form of nonviolent action that
could
bring freedom and justice to South Africa ... in a massive movement
for economic
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sanctions." Like Malcolm X, he argued that the West was the key to overthrowing
apartheid.
If the U.K. and the U.S. decided tomorrow morning not to buy South African
goods, not to buy S.A. gold, to put an embargo on oil; if our investors and
capitalists would withdraw their support for racial tyranny, then apartheid
would be brought to an end. 18
King also served notice to the American Government that the Civil Rights
Movement was flexing its muscles in the foreign policy arena. Referring to the
ANLCA conference of 1964, King said: "Though we in the civil rights movement still
have a long and difficult struggle in our own country, ... we are recognizing our power
as voters; already we have made our feelings clear to the president; increasingly we
intend to influence American policy in the U.N. and towards South Africa."
On December 10, 1964 King received the Nobel Peace Prize in Oslo, Norway.
In a moving speech that recounted the struggles of black people for freedom, King
called Albert Luthuli one of the "pilots" of the freedom movement and South Africa
the "most brutal expression of man's inhumanity to man."
So you honor the dedicated pilots of our struggle who have sat at the controls
as the freedom movement soared into orbit. You honor, once again, Chief
(Albert) Luthuli of South Africa, whose struggles with and for his people, are
still met with the most brutal expression of man's inhumanity to man.
19
On December 10, 1965, Martin Luther King Jr. took time off from the civil
rights drive in Alabama to give a major address on Africa at a Human Rights Day rally
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in New York City. In a letter inviting the press to the rally, the ACOA said: "Dr.
Martin Luther King will be the principal speaker at a benefit Rally for the South
African political prisoners on Human Rights Day, Dec. 10. It will be Dr. King's first
major speech on Africa."20 The rally also featured Ambassador Achkbar Marof of
Guinea, Chairman of the Special Committee on Apartheid, and Robert Resha, an
exiled South African leader. During his keynote address titled "Let My People Go" in
honor ofANC President Albert Luthuli, King said, "The struggle for freedom forms
one long front crossing oceans and mountains. The brotherhood of man is not confined
within a narrow, limited circle of select people." Sounding like Malcolm X, King
invoked the "rape of Africa" during the slave trade: "We have an obligation of
atonement that is not canceled by the passage of time" he said, calling on the West to
atone by joining an international sanctions movement:
To list the extensive economic relations of the great powers with South Africa
is to suggest a potent nonviolent path. The international potential of
nonviolence has never been employed. Nonviolence has been practiced within
national borders in India and the United States and in regions of Africa
with spectacular success. The time has come to fully utilize nonviolence
through a massive international boycott which would involve the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics, Great Britain, France, the United States, Germany
and Japan. Millions of people can personally give expression to their
abhorrence of the world's worst racism through such a far-flung boycott.
King also argued that there was a "special relationship" between the black
Americans and Africa. He said that the "civil rights movement in the United States has
derived immense inspiration from the successful struggles of those Africans who have
attained freedom in their own nations. The fact that black men govern states, are
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building democratic institutions, sit in world tribunals, and participate in global
decision-making gives every Negro a needed sense of dignity."
This speech by King was hailed as the most articulate explication of the link
between the civil rights movement and the international anti-apartheid movement.
King's new radicalism was noted by the ACOA, which praised him for raising
thousands of dollars for the prisoners in South Africa, but noted that "King did not, as
22
he had done in London, exhort South Africans to resist apartheid nonviolently."
King's new radicalism dovetailed with the frustration of the student movement
and the radicalization of youths in the northern ghettos. The SCLC's initial attempt to
use nonviolent direct action tactics in a northern city, Chicago, had been met with
violent unrest and an upsurge in racism worthy of Mississippi, and younger, more
militant African Americans began to assert that their struggle was connected to that of
other people of African descent around the world.
Among the younger generation of SNCC activists associated with Stokely
Carmichael (Kwame Ture) there was a definite turn toward Black Nationalism and
Pan Africanism. This turn toward "Black Power" or militant black nationalism
emerged in the mid-sixties when student activists became disillusioned with the pace
of change and adopted more radical tactics. This evolution of SNCC is evident in the
election of Stokely Carmichael as chairman in 1966. South Africa was
very much on
the agenda of the students. On 29 March 1966, for instance, SNCC workers held a
sit-
137
in at the South African Embassy in Washington shouting slogans like "Death to
Apartheid." Later SNCC and CORE activists took over the office of the US delegation
to the United Nations in New York. The group's leader, Stokely Carmichael, called on
the United States to comply with the General Assembly's anti-apartheid resolutions,
impose full economic sanctions, sever diplomatic ties and support the black liberation
23
movement in South Africa.
This new perspective was outlined in Black Power conferences held in 1966
(Washington DC), 1967 (Newark, NJ.), 1968 (Philadelphia, Pa.) and an international
meeting held in Bermuda in 1969. These conferences outlined a new ideology of
Black Nationalism or "black power" that led to the rejection of integration, the
expulsion of whites and the adoption of a self-determination strategy. A 1966 SNCC
position paper, for instance, called for an "all Black project" and "coalition
politics."
This strategy was designed to ensure that Black communities were first
organized
internally before joining forces with other progressive forces in the society. Like
Malcolm X's OAAU, SNCC leaders argued (in the Black Power period) that it was not
racist to exclude whites if one were willing to work with them in egalitarian
coalitions.
Ifwe are to proceed toward true liberation, we must cut
ourselves off from
white people. We must form our own institutions, credit unions, co-ops,
political parties, write our own histories.
The articulation of the Black Power position was to have a
significant impact
on the development of the liberation struggle in the United
States. Black Power
advocates articulated a sophisticated political strategy
based on the "interest group" or
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"ethnic group" model of U.S. politics. This Black Power strategy called for Black
control of institutions that serve the community. In Black Power The Politics of
Liberation Stokely Carmichael and Charles Hamilton argued:
Black Power means, for example, that in Lowndes County, Alabama, a black
sheriff can end police brutality. A black tax assessor and tax collector and
county board of revenue can lay, collect, and channel tax monies for the
building of better roads and schools serving black people. In areas such as
Lowndes, where Black people have a majority, they will attempt to use power
to gain control. This is what they seek, control. When Black people lack a
majority, Black Power means proper representation and sharing of control.25
This strategy of Black power had a dramatic impact on black politics in the
1970s. It led to the election of hundreds of city, state and national representatives. In
the anti-apartheid movement it also led to the confrontations between Black militants
and white liberals over strategy and representation of Blacks in leadership positions.
According to the ACOA's George Houser:
The period of focus on southern Africa coincided with a new situation in the
civil rights movement had in the development of black consciousness among
the more active elements in the black community. The mood in the black
community made it increasingly difficult for white or interracial
organizations to work closely with black organizations."26
This emergence of "black consciousness" was closely related to black
America's new internationalism. By 1966, for instance, SNCC had declared itself an
anti-imperialist organization and created an international affairs division with James
Forman as the director. 27 In June 1967 Forman sponsored another resolution that urged
SNCC to declare itself a "human rights organization working for the liberation not
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only of black people in the United States but of all oppressed peoples, especially those
in Africa, Asia and Latin America." According to Forman: "To have achieved the
realization that our fight was against racism, capitalism and imperialism represented a
major victory in itself."
As director of international affairs, Forman focused on forging stronger ties
between African liberation movements and the freedom struggle in the United States.
On his first trip back to Africa after the 1964 SNCC trip sponsored by Harry
Belafonte, Forman revisits the issue of skilled black Americans emigrating to the
newly independent African countries to contribute to their development. En-route to a
United Nations Seminar on Apartheid, Racism and Colonialism in Dar es Salaam,
Tanzania scheduled for July 24 to August 10, 1967, Forman writes in his diary:
"Should we as a colonized people remain in a sick and decaying country that is
doomed for total collapse? The question is a serious one. Frankly, I say no, we should
leave! We should return to Africa. We should use our skills where they are wanted."28
The problem with this perspective, however, was that there were millions of unskilled
African Americans who might not be welcome in Africa. Forman reflects on the
dilemma that black leaders had faced for centuries --leave for Africa or organize the
masses in America. Ever since his first visit to Africa in 1964, Forman had resolved
the dilemma by considering his work with SNCC and the movement as a training
ground for his eventual emigration. "My work with SNCC had been predicated on
many assumptions, but one of them has been the necessity for some of us to stay in the
United States and struggle from within. I elected to do this after serious self-
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examination covering a period of more than four years, during which time I tried to
prepare myself for the day when I would help join the African and Afro-American
struggle. The indivisible link had always been there, but at this time in my life I have
the opportunity to forge stronger links."29
Forman and Howard Moore Jr., SNCC's legal advisor, had been invited by the
United Nations to present SNCC's views on the international anti-apartheid
movement. Although SNCC had no illusions about the ability of the United Nations to
bring freedom to Africans and African Americans, Forman argued that: "like the late
Malcolm X, we believed that pressure upon the United Nations could be useful
nevertheless in shaping public opinion." Forman and Moore (helped by St. Clair
Drake) prepared a SNCC position paper titled "The Indivisible Struggle Against
Racism, Colonialism and Apartheid." Forman says they strove to make the paper as
political as possible, "to show the direct connection between American oppression of
blacks in Africa and of blacks in the United States."
30 When Farmer and Moore
arrived in Dar es Salaam, they were conscious of their position as representatives of
black America. The last black American to visit had been James Farmer ofCORE in
1965. Farmer had insulted the Tanzanians by arriving in Zanzibar and immediately
entering a US Embassy limousine instead of one provided by the Tanzanian
government. Farmer's behavior was not surprising, however, because his trip had been
sponsored by the State Department and the ANLCA and as it turned out later, the CIA.
As a result of Farmer's insensitivity, the SNCC representatives found themselves
having to deflect negative feelings about "Negroes" by urging the Africans not to
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assume every black American was a friend. They argued that they should be judged by
their actions alone. Nevertheless Forman considered Dar es Salaam "the most
beautiful city I have ever seen and the island off its shore ... the closest thing to
paradise on earth." Just one year before Forman's visit Tanzania had resolved to
develop a system of African Socialism through collectivization and nationalization of
key industries. Discussion of the Arusha Declaration deeply influenced the SNCC
representatives. According to Forman: "The freedom with which people talked of
socialism, armed struggle, the liberation of Africa, was a liberation itself for Howard
and me, coming as we did from the repressive atmosphere of the United States. ... As
we listened and exchanged ideas I could feel a growing passion for revolutionary
ideas." Thus like Garvey, Robeson, Du Bois, King and Malcolm, Forman was
transformed and radicalized by his visit to Africa and his discussions with African
nationalists.
In his historic address to the UN Seminar on Apartheid, Racism and
Colonialism in Southern Africa in Lusaka, Zambia on 27 July 1967, Forman put aside
his prepared statement to address the urban rebellions that had erupted in Newark,
Detroit and Springfield. Pointing out that the disturbances in American cities were not
"riots" but "rebellions against forced enslavement of a people who had been wrenched
from the African continent," Forman called on the participants of the seminar to
support the cause of black freedom in the United States. He urged them to support
SNCC Chairman H. Rap Brown, a symbol of resistance in the summer of 1967 who
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had been singled out as a scapegoat by the US Government. Returning to his prepared
remarks, Forman said:
We see the worldwide fight against racism as indivisible. Southern Africa, as a
stronghold of the Herrenvolk mentality has high priority in the struggle. To
win the battle there is to hasten the victory in the U.S.A. SNCC is dedicated to
a joint struggle of all who fight for Human Rights in Africa and in the USA.
We also come to assert that we consider ourselves and other black people in
the United States a colonized people; a colony within the United States in
many ways similar to colonies outside the boundaries of the United States and
other European nations. ... We have accepted our responsibility for the attack
on the American front.31
In its statement and position in general SNCC was in line with the OAU
Liberation Committee's multi-pronged strategy of internal armed struggle and external
sanctions. Forman reiterated that his organization supported the campaign for
international sanctions against Rhodesia; the condemnation of Portuguese colonialism;
independence for South West Africa; and armed struggle in southern Africa.
Although SNCC's presentation at the UN seminar on apartheid was a milestone
in the anti-apartheid struggle, the organization itselfwas in decline. Its anti-imperialist
stance aggravated relations between SNCC activists and white and Jewish liberals who
were traditional allies of the civil rights movement. Relations with whites deteriorated
further after SNCC published a pamphlet that was anti-Israel. The pamphlet included a
series of articles and cartoons that indicated support for the Palestinian Liberation
Organization. The most lasting impact of this anti-imperialism, however, was to
strengthen the ties between African liberation movements and the black freedom
movement in the United States.
143
In an essay published in The Black Scholar in 1969, Stokely Carmichael, the
former leader of SNCC and the Black Panther Party, argued that "the only position for
Black men is Pan Africanism." Invoking Malcolm X, he advocated a program that
included seeking a "land base" in Africa and teaching Black people everywhere that
they are "first of all and finally Africans." 32 Like Malcolm X, Carmichael argued:
"One of the most important things we must now begin to do, is to call ourselves
African.'" He called on Black people everywhere to fight for the unification of the
African continent.
So you start in Ghana for the unification of Africa and you recognize, if you
are intelligent, that South Africa is not going to be removed by talk. It is
not going to be removed by talk. It is not going to be removed by Britain, by
the U.N., or by anybody. Nor is it going to be removed by a handful of
guerrillas. It is only going to be removed by the entire black world standing up
against it, because when in fact the final confrontation over South Africa for
example takes place, the black man will see that he is not just fighting whites
in South Africa. He is fighting all of Europe, because all of Europe is going to
actively defend South Africa.
3
In 1969, Camichael's focus on a "land base" and Pan Africanism led him to
emigrate to Guinea where he became Kwame Nkrumah's personal secretary and an
organizer for the All African People's Revolutionary Party. Like many leaders in the
African diaspora, Carmichael concluded that: "Real black power requires a land base.
The only place where we have a material base for power is in Africa."
Carmichael's emigration to Guinea disappointed activists but it was
symptomatic of the despair black activists felt after the assassination of Malcolm in
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1965, Martin in 1968 and Robert Kennedy in '68. Former SNCC worker Cleveland
Sellers, for instance, said in a recent interview with Charlie Cobb ofAfrica News
Service that he fought with Carmichael about going back to Africa. "I thought we
needed someone here to talk about the connectedness. But SNCC was dying. The FBI
was tracking him everywhere ad we had all gone ten years with no break." Courtland
Cox argued that after Carmicheal's trip to Africa "he realized that a lot of forces you
were up against were global. And being in Africa with Nkrumah and Sekou Toure
allowed him to function at that level." 34
145
lMAn Appeal to African Heads of State," Malcolm X Speaks 75-76.
2The Autobiography of Malcolm X (New York: Grove Press, 1964) 343-364.
3Malcolm X Speaks, "An Appeal to African Heads of State," 75-76.
4
See Gerald Home, Communist Front? The Civil Rights Congress, 1946-56
(Rutherford, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1988) and Charles Martin,
"Internationalizing the American Dilemma: The Civil Rights Congress and the 1951
Genocide Petition tot he United Nations ," Journal of American Ethnic Studies
Summer 1997 v. 16 #4 p. 35-50
5From interview, Station WBAI-FM, January 28, 1965. In Malcolm X Speaks. 218.
6Malcolm X Speaks, 99.
7
Harry Hampton and Steve Fayer. Voices of Freedom An Oral History of the Civil
Rights Movement From the 1950s Through the 1980s . (New York: Bantam Books,
1990) 252-256
8
9Malcolm X, 354.
10Malcolm X "Basic Unity Program," OAAU, in William Van Deburg. Black
Nationalism from Marcus Garvev to Louis Farrakhan . (New York: NYU Press, 1997)
108.
1
'Unity Program, 115.
12
Harry Hampton and Steve Fayer. Voices of Freedom An Oral History of the Civil
Rights Movement From the 1950s Through the 1980s . (New York: Bantam Books,
1990) 204.
13
Hampton, Voice of Freedom, pp. 206-207
14Malcolm X Speaks, 106.
146
15
Voices of Freedom, 220.
16
Address by Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. in London, 7 December 1964. ACOA Papers
Part II Reel 7 Frame 00545.
17
King, London speech, ACOA Papers Part II Reel 7 Frame 00546
18
King, London speech, ACOA Papers Part II Reel 7 Frame 00546
19Nobel Prize Acceptance Speech (Dec. 10 1964)
20
"Note to Editors" December 6, 1965. ACOA Papers Part II Reel 7 Frame 00547.
21
Martin Luther King Jr. "Let My People Go," Speech at Human Rights Day rally,
December 10, 1965. ACOA Papers Part II Reel 7 Frame 00553.
22
"Human Rights Day in new York," ACOA press release. ACOA Papers Part II Reel
7 Frame 00555.
23New York Times 23 July 1966 p. 4.
24VanDeburg, 122.
25Kwame Ture and Charles Hamilton. Black Power The Politics of Liberation . (New
York: Vintage Books, 1992) 46.
26George Houser, "Meeting Africa's Challenge: The Story of the American Committee
on Africa," ISSUE Vol.. Vi 2/3, 1976. 22.
27James Forman. The Making of Black Revolutionaries . (Washington D.C.: Open
Hand, 1985.) pg. 480.
28Forman, 481.
29
Forman, 482.
30
Forman, 483
31Forman, 489
32Van Deburg, 209
33Van Deburg
147
Charlie Cobb. "From Stokely Carmichael to Kwame Ture," African News Online
April 1996.
148
CHAPTER 6
"IT'S NATION TIME":
PAN AFRICANISM AND AFRICAN LIBERATION
Basically when we speak of Pan African Nationalism, we mean simply
the knowledge that we are an African people, despite our slavery of
colonization by Europeans or dispersal throughout the countries of the
world. Pan Africanism is thus the global expression ofBlack
Nationalism. ...All black people are Africans, and that as Africans, we
are bound together Racially, Historically, Culturally, Politically and
Emotionally.
Ideological Statement of the Congress
of African Peoples, September 1970
During the 1970s, the anti-apartheid movement was rejuvenated by what
Ronald Walters calls the "new" or "modern" Pan Africanist movements
that emerged
in the Diaspora (Walters, 1993). Walters argues that the
independence of African
countries led to a reevaluation of blackness in the United States.
African American
youth began to explore their cultural heritage in Africa and to
adopt a Black/Pan
African identity. This new generation was influenced by the
African consciousness of
Malcolm X and the Black Power movement. Malcolm X had visited many
independent African states where he became the first African
American to address
African heads of state at an Organization of African Unity
meeting.
1 He called on
Africans to take on the African American cause at the United
Nations and told black
Americans to join Africans in their fight for freedom. By 1967,
SNCC and the Black
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Panthers had become anti-imperialist and Third Worldist.2 Stokely Carmichael, for
instance, emphasized the African dimension of SNCC and defined the Black Power
movement as a part of the Pan African struggle for liberation. Bob Moses attended
OAU meetings in 1965 and 1966. Cleveland Sellers also attended OAU meetings and
was invited to organize the Sixth Pan African Congress.
3
In the academic arena, the turn to Black Power led to a confrontation with
liberal white-led organizations like the African Studies Association. In 1969 Black
activists, scholars and students disrupted sessions at the ASA convention to
underscore their demand for proper representation on the association's board. The
group also wanted the ASA to take a more public and radical stand on apartheid and
the situation in southern Africa. When the ASA rejected their demands, the Black
Africanists formed a separate organization called the African Heritage Studies
Association.
4 Led by John Henrik Clarke, the AHSA adopted a radical, anti-apartheid
and national liberation struggle position from the outset.
Thus Africans and African Americans were reestablishing radical ties that had
been severed by anti-communism in the United States. The theories and activities of
African revolutionaries like Julius Nyerere, Amilcar Cabral, Agostino Neto,
Nelson
Mandela and Eduardo Mondlane heavily influenced African American activists
(Walters, 1993). In 1962 Amilcar Cabral addressed the United Nations
and then met
with African Americans where he discussed his ideas on revolutionary
nationalism.
Julius Nyerere's African Socialism was also a major influence leading to support for
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the armed struggle in South Africa, Angola and Mozambique; the study of Kiswahili
by African Americans and the formation of Maulana Karenga's Kwanzaa movement
also reflected this trend (Walters, 1993).
In September 1970 Imamu Amiri Baraka convened the Congress of African
Peoples which he linked to the long tradition of Pan African congresses going back to
the London conference of 1900.
5 Baraka was one of the new black nationalists who
were redefining Black identity in the Diaspora. As one of the founders of the Black
Arts Movement, Baraka was a product of the 1970s Black Nationalism when
playwrights, novelists, songwriters and artists reflected the rediscovery of Africa and
radical political critique.
6 The Congress of African Peoples was an expression of this
Pan African sensibility in the Diaspora. It included a remarkably diverse group of
African American radicals, liberals and nationalists. Among the speakers were
Guinea's Ambassador to the United Nations El Hajj Aboulaye Toure, Whitney Young,
Louis Farrakhan, Julian Bond, Mayor Richard Hatcher of Gary, Breadbasket's
Rev.
Jesse Jackson, Imari Obadele from the Republic ofNew Africa, Ralph Abernathy
of
SCLC and Kenneth Gibson newly elected mayor of Newark (Baraka,
.
The theme of the congress was "Unity Without Uniformity"
bringing together
activists and legislators of disparate ideological orientations.
The participants were
divided into eleven workshops discussing technology,
economics, education,
communications and politics. An "ideological statement" adopted by
the delegates on
6 September asserted that "All black people are Africans,
and that as Africans, we are
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bound together Racially, Historically, Culturally, Politically and Emotionally." The
statement focused on the need to develop a program to ensure unified action in the Pan
African world. To achieve this unity the ideological statement outlined the "Four Ends
of Black Power": (1) self-determination and the development of alternative political
and economic institutions; (2) self-sufficiency through cooperative economics
(UJAMAA); (3) self-respect by building a global revolutionary culture and; (4) and
acceptance of the need for self-defense.
Thus the CAP manifested a new kind of Diasporic Pan Africanism that was nationalist
rather than the traditional liberal/reformist posture that had been adopted by the four
earlier congresses organized by Du Bois. As Baraka indicated in his introduction to
the proceedings, the coordinating committee of CAP wanted to move beyond the
"radical" perspectives influenced by Marxism in search of an African perspective
influenced by Julius Nyerere's theory ofUJAMAA, a form of cooperative economics
based on the traditional of collective ownership and work patterns of some
African
ethnic groups.
National Security Memorandum 39
This radicalization of black politics was fueled by the right
turn in national
politics that had led to the election of Richard Nixon on an
anti-civil rights, anti-
welfare, "law and order" platform that used code words to
delineate its anti-black
message. Nixon had mastered the "white backlash" politics
perfected during George
Wallace's campaigns for governor of Alabama in the
1960s. Backlash politics had
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elected Ronald Reagan Governor of California in 1966 partly because of his strong
reaction to the Watts rebellion of 1965 and his opposition to the Civil Rights Act of
1964. In 1966, Congress rejected a civil rights bill for the first time in years. The GOP
had displaced forty-seven Democrats in the House and three in the Senate. In 1967,
the House refused to seat Harlem Congressman Adam Clayton Powell Jr. for payroll
irregularities that his colleagues got away with regularly (similar allegations would
lead to the demise of Charles Diggs in the late- 1970s).
Nixon rode the backlash into the White House in 1968. He was openly against
desegregation of housing and schools and promised to oppose integration and appoint
conservatives to the Supreme Court. During his presidency, Nixon exploited white
resentment at the gains of the civil rights years and fears of black rebellion. As he had
promised, he sought to stop school busing; nominated conservatives to the Supreme
Court; lobbied against fair housing and the renewal of the Voting Rights Act; slashed
funds for anti-poverty programs; and fired officials who were pro-integration. The
hard line against African American representatives was demonstrated in December
1969 when President Nixon refused to meet with members of the Congressional Black
Caucus after the slaying of Chicago Black Panther Party leaders Fred Hampton and
Mark Clark.8
In retaliation, Black Caucus members boycotted the president's State of the Union
address in January 1971. They finally met with the president in March. By then, the
relationship between the Black Caucus and the Nixon administration had deteriorated
beyond repair.
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It is in the area of foreign relations, however, that Nixon's support for white
supremacy was most evident. Secret documents discovered in 1975 show that the
Nixon administration reviewed its southern Africa policy and concluded that "the
whites are here (southern Africa) to stay and the only way that constructive change
can come about is through them."
9 The NSC review produced National Security
Memorandum 39 (1969) a historically significant document that is critical for
understanding US policies toward southern Africa. On April 10, while Diggs's hearing
was still in progress, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger wrote to the secretary of
defense and the director of the CIA informing them that the president had ordered a
"comprehensive review ofUS policy toward southern Africa." 10 The plan was to
consider background and future of area; alternative views ofUS interest; and
strategies and policy options available to the United States. On 15 August 1969, the
NSC released the report "in response to NSSM 39." The NSC report argued that
"Racial oppression by minority regimes and black African opposition to it" posed two
problems for US interests in the area: (1) US interests in the white states affected its
credibility in Africa; and (2) the prospect of increased violence, "growing out of black
insurgency," could jeopardize US interests. The document shows the difficulty the US
government had in balancing its desire to continue working with the white regimes in
southern Africa while maintaining relations with the rest of the continent. The
recommendation was that the US "balance its economic, scientific, and strategic
interests in the white states with the political interests dissociating the US from white
regimes and their repressive racial policies."
11 Although the NSC agreed that US
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interests in the region were not vital, they recognized that the government wanted to
keep the Soviet Union and China from gaining influence with African states. They
made five policy recommendations for consideration by Nixon and Kissinger. Cohen
and El-Khawas conclude:
What finally is glaringly obvious throughout NSSM 39 is the complete lack of
awareness or concern over the aspirations or fate of the nonwhite people in
southern Africa. Although "stability" very profitably serves the interests ofUS
corporations, the impact of the exploitative colonial and apartheid systems on
Africans' experience does not fall within the NSC's "framework of analysis." 12
Cohen and El-Khawas argue that the main outlines of Nixon's policy toward
white supremacist regimes in southern Africa were formulated at a meeting to discuss
NSSM 39's recommendations. They contend that Nixon settled on option two, which
stated that:
The whites are here to stay and the only way that constructive change can
come about is through them. There is no hope for the blacks to gain the
political rights they seek through violence, which will only lead to chaos and
increased opportunities for the communists. We can, by selective relaxation of
our policies toward the white regimes, encourage some modification of their
current racial and colonial policies and through more substantial assistance to
black states help draw the two groups together and exert some influence on
both for peaceful change.
13
This option was similar to Kissinger's theory that the African liberation
movements were communist "stooges" because of their reliance on weapons from
China, Cuba and the Soviet Union. As a result, the Nixon-Kissinger policy toward
southern Africa was based on a condemnation of apartheid in international forums
while continuing to build economic and military ties with colonial powers like
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Portugal and with white minority regimes in Rhodesia and South Africa. This
approach was evident in President Nixon's decision to keep open a consulate in
Salisbury despite the sanctions in place against the renegade regime of Ian Smith.
By 1970, it had become clear that the Nixon administration would maintain the
status quo in southern Africa. In line with NSSM 39's recommendations, Nixon
relaxed sanctions against Rhodesia and approved legislation allowing the importation
of Rhodesian chrome. This measure violated the UN call for sanctions against the UDI
regime and brought the regime under fire from both African Americans and African
states. Nixon also continued to provide military assistance to Portugal despite African
opposition based on the assumption that US aid would release other Portuguese
resources for use against liberation movements in Angola and Mozambique.
14 They
also argued that Portugal had used NATO equipment to attack civilians in southern
Africa. The Africans argued that the US had sacrificed the principle of self-
determination for the sake of maintaining its rights to the Azores base, which was no
longer necessary for refueling airplanes.
At the United Nations, the US shifted to openly supporting South Africa in
Security Council deliberations. During the Kennedy-Johnson years, the US frequently
abstained on votes about colonial issues. After 1969, however, the US often aligned
itself with South Africa and Portugal in votes against decolonization. On November
22, 1969, for instance, the New York Times reported that the United States had voted
against a resolution condemning apartheid "for the first time in years."
15
In a change of
156
rhetoric and policy the US suddenly insisted that South Africa was not a threat to
international peace and did not warrant sanctions. In the 1972 General Assembly the
US voted negatively on seven out of eight resolutions on southern Africa. On 30
October 1974 the US, France and Britain vetoed a Security Council resolution to expel
South Africa from the United Nations. A month later the US cast the only vote against
a more stringent arms embargo.
The Congressional Black Caucus and Apartheid
Despite the right turn in national politics, the legal victories of the civil rights
movement directly benefited the anti-apartheid movement in the United States. The
Voting Rights Act of 1965 led to the election of hundreds of African American
officials at city, state and national levels who became key allies of the anti-apartheid
movement by giving activists access to the decision-makers at the local and federal
levels.
16
Charles C. Diggs, D-Michigan, was first elected to Congress in 1954 and
made apartheid one of his top policy concerns from the outset. He was the founding
chairman of the Congressional Black Caucus, and became the first black chairman of
the House Subcommittee on Africa in 1969. Diggs and the Black Caucus led many
congressional inquiries into U.S. southern Africa policy that gave anti-apartheid
activists the opportunity to address Congress on the issue. Diggs served on the Foreign
Relations Committee for over 20 years where he became the expert on Africa and
established relations with the leaders of newly independent African states. Nicknamed
"Mr. Africa" by colleagues, Diggs became apartheid's most powerful opponent in the
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US Congress. Reuters correspondent Raymond Hearst wrote that Diggs had turned his
position in the FRC into "the main channel for anti-apartheid pressures."
Charles C. Diggs Jr. was born in 1922 in Detroit to a wealthy and politically
powerful family. His father was a mortician and real estate developer who operated
the House of Diggs. In 1936, Charles Diggs Sr. became Michigan's first black state
senator after a grassroots campaign that registered more than 12,000 new black voters
for the Democratic Party. Diggs Jr. attended the University of Michigan and Fisk
University and served in the Army Air Forces during the second world war. After the
war, he attended Wayne State University and Detroit College of Law before following
his father into business and politics. In 1951, he was elected to his father's old seat in
the Michigan State Senate serving till 1954 when he won the first of thirteen terms as
the representative of Michigan's 13th District in Congress. In 1955, Diggs was
assigned to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs where he became a leading
spokesman for civil rights and desegregation of schools and public transport facilities.
Diggs also served on the Foreign Affairs Committee where he became an authority on
Africa and an advocate for aid to the emerging nations. By 1969, he had risen to the
chairmanship of the House Foreign Relations Committee's Subcommittee on Africa.
One of Digg's tactics was to challenge South Africa's racist policies by
visiting the country himself. On 5 August 1969 a cabinet meeting chaired by the prime
minister of South Africa threatened to bar an official delegation of the House
Subcommittee on Africa unless two black delegates, Diggs and Reid, agree to do
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nothing, by word or deed, to interfere in the internal affairs of South Africa. Diggs and
Reid were also prohibited from addressing any public meeting. The white members of
the delegation, on the other hand, Congressmen Burke of Florida and Wolff ofNew
York were given unrestricted visas. In an address to Congress, Diggs said: "I find it
deplorable that officials at the highest level of government should limit our freedom
on the unfounded belief that the mission's intent is to interfere in the internal affairs of
their country."
17 Given the restrictions, Diggs and the delegation decided to skip South
Africa and South West Africa on their three-week tour that included Angola,
Mozambique, Swaziland, Lesotho, Botswana, Malawi and Tanzania. The purpose of
the visit was (1) to get firsthand information on economic development and future
prospects in black-ruled countries; and (2) to survey the prospects for peace in white-
minority ruled countries; (3) hold discussion with leaders of the freedom movements
in the region; and (4) evaluate the role ofUS aid programs, information services and
Peace Corps, programs.
In a report on the mission, Diggs and Wolff argued for a new US policy on
southern Africa that recognized the legitimacy of the African liberation movements
saying, "time and history is on the side of the revolutionary forces." They argued that
US self-interest in South Africa "is dramatized by the presence in our midst of over 22
million black citizens who are increasingly identifying with their cultural heritage and
who are on the threshold of linking up with the goals of African liberation
movements." 18 The representatives argued that the internationalization of the struggle
of African Americans would lead to support from their traditional allies in the labor
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movement, on the campuses, among the churches, and other liberal elements. This
could give impetus to Africanists, foreign policy organizations and former Peace
Corps, volunteers. "The activation of this kind of constituency is much nearer than
many policy-makers realize."
This prediction proved true at least in the case of church support for the anti-
apartheid cause. On May 24 clergy and students had protested at a hearing in New
York City where church groups were meeting with bank executives from Chase
Manhattan, First National Bank and Morgan Guarantee Trust to discuss divestment. 19
As a result of the meeting, the US Pentecostal Episcopal Church notified the three
banks that it would withdraw $2 million dollars if they continued to give South Africa
loans as members of a 106-bank consortium. The decision was seen as an "historic
moment in the awakening of Christian conscience against apartheid."
20 On 2 July the
Times again reported that the United Church of Christ's General Synod had
recommended that the church withdraw finds form any US company doing business
with South Africa. The UCC also agreed to fund a newly created Committee for
Racial Justice with $500,000 in 1970 and $600,000 in 1971. The 15-member
committee was made up of black churchmen and had decision making powers in the
disbursement of funds. The real coup for anti-apartheid forces came in 4 September
1970, however, when the World Council of Churches announced that it would give
$200,000 to guerrilla movements in southern Africa.
21
Prime Minister John Vorster
was shocked. South African bishops threatened to withdraw from the WCC. Even
Progressive Party "liberal" Helen Suzman said the WCC action was "ill advised."
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Towards A Black Foreign Policy Agenda
On 3 1 January 1972, the Congressional Black Caucus, other black elected
officials and civil rights leaders announced plans to hold the first National Black
Political Convention in Gary, Indiana between March 10-12.22 The idea for the
convention had first been broached at the Congress of African Peoples conference in
Atlanta in 1970 that had been attended by over 2000 black people of different
ideological perspectives. CBC chairman Diggs said the convention was expecting
4,000 delegates "to identify and ratify a national black political agenda for 1972 and
beyond." Diggs, Mayor Hatcher of Gary, and Imamu Amiri Baraka of the Congress of
African People were elected co-chairmen of the convention. The convention's motto
was "Unity Without Uniformity" and its purpose was to debate and ratify the National
Black Political Agenda. The Agenda decried US cities as "crime haunted dying
grounds" where youth and adults alike faced "permanent unemployment." The courts
were biased and the schools unable or unwilling to educate black children. Arguing
that the Democratic Party had failed to deliver its promise to its black constituency,
the Agenda called for the establishment of an independent black politics including:
black congressional representation in proportion to the size of the black community; a
bill of rights for black prisoners; community control of schools in black
neighborhoods; a system of national health insurance covering individuals "from birth
to death"; a guaranteed minimum annual income; and the elimination of capital
punishment.23
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Apartheid featured prominently among the resolutions but was upstaged in
media reports by a resolution supporting the Palestinian struggle for self-
determination. A survey of the participants showed however that Pan Africanist
sentiment was strong. 24 The survey showed that respondents were anxious to maintain
contact with other black communities around the world. They considered the adoption
of the black agenda as the most important step taken by the delegates.
The condemnation of Israel as an expansionist nation, however, became a
major issue because of the long-standing alliance between Jews and Blacks in the
Democratic Party. Many Black elected officials and organizations that accepted funds
from Jewish agencies found it difficult to support a hard line on Israel. On May 16 the
strain in the Black Agenda alliance began to show as the NAACP announced that it
was withdrawing its association with the National Black Political Convention
"because of difference in ideology."25 A press release and letter from NAACP
Executive Director Roy Wilkins to convention co-chairmen Rep. Diggs, Mayor
Hatcher and Amiri Baraka stressed that the NACCP could not support "separatist"
positions endorsed by the convention and that it found the resolutions on Israel and
busing "repugnant to basic principles." Baraka denounced the withdrawal as an
"irresponsible act" and said he had written to Roy Wilkins asking him to reconsider.
The Times also reported that sources close to Diggs had said that the Israel and busing
planks adopted at Gary had already been amended to make them more acceptable to
elected officials and national organizations. On May 19, the convention released the
National Black Agenda and was addressed by representatives of the three candidates
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for president. On June 1, however, the Congressional Black Caucus released its own
Black Bill of Rights that was presented as an amendment to the Black Agenda.26 The
main difference between the two agendas was that the Bill of Rights did not mention
the state of Israel. This disagreement over foreign policy weakened the impact of the
Black Agenda on the national level where candidates for the presidency and media
were able to downplay its other demands.
On 26 May the Congressional Black Caucus sponsored the "African-American
National Conference on Africa" that bought together activists, legislators and African
diplomats.
27
Speakers at the conference recommended that black Americans and
Africans form an alliance to fight white supremacist regimes in southern Africa and
that volunteers be organized to join African liberation movements. They called for a
boycott of companies doing business in South Africa, South West Africa and Rhodesia
and urged all black athletes, singers and entertainers not to perform in the region. The
conference also urged the US government to stop providing aid to the white-minority
regimes and instead increase assistance to newly independent African countries.
Speakers included E. Zhuwrara of the Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe and
Owusu Sadauki of Malcolm X Liberation University.
This conference was followed by a massive demonstration through the streets
of Washington DC on 27 May to protest the treatment of black South Africans and US
relations with South Africa
28 Organized by the African Liberation Day Coordinating
Committee, the march was a spectacular demonstration of the strong anti-apartheid
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and Pan African consciousness in the black community. Estimates of marchers range
from 8-10,000 (New York Times), to 30,000 (Sadauki, interview with author).
Organizers said the purpose of the march was to emphasize the widespread opposition
to apartheid among black Americans, to protest the growth of economic political and
military contacts between South Africa and the United States and to call for the
withdrawal ofUS corporations from South Africa.
The demonstrators marched to the South African Embassy where speakers read
out a list of charges against countries considered responsible for oppressing black
people in Africa. Rev. Doug Moore of the Black United Front said South Africa was
guilty of war crimes against Africans and was plotting to usurp more of Africa's land
and mineral wealth. He condemned West Germany and Israel for helping South Africa
develop nuclear weapons. The marchers then proceeded to the Washington Monument
where 1 5 former State Department officials read a statement denouncing Nixon for his
pro-apartheid policies. A joint statement by two under secretaries of state and twelve
ambassadors of the Kennedy-Johnson era said increased contacts between the United
States officials and the South African government created a sense of collaboration and
was an obstacle to the cause of African independence.
The ALD marches were a key expression of this new Pan African sensibility in
the Diaspora during the 1970s but the celebration of African Liberation Day was
initiated at the Conference of Independent African States in Accra, Ghana, in 1958
when eight heads of state declared April 15 "Africa Liberation Day" and called on
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Africans and people of African descent around the world to set aside the day for
rededication to the anti-colonial and ant-apartheid straggles in Africa. Between 1959
and 1963, ALD was celebrated in South Africa, Ethiopia, Ghana, Britain, China the
United States and the Soviet Union. In the United States, several nationalists groups in
Harlem and the ACOA regularly held separate Africa Liberation Day celebrations
throughout the late 1950s and 1960s (see chapter two). After the formation of the
Organization of African Unity on 25 May 1963, ALD commemorations were moved
to that date. In the United States, it is only in the 1970s that ALD becomes a "national"
holiday for the anti-apartheid community. By this time, the liberation straggles were
raging throughout southern Africa and black consciousness pervaded the African
American community.
During the 1970s, some of the largest ALD demonstrations were coordinated
by the African Liberation Day Steering Committee and organized by Howard Fuller
(Owusu Sadauki), head of the Malcolm X Liberation University in Greensboro, North
Carolina and others, in 1971. According to Fuller, he and other nationalists created the
committee to organize events to commemorate May 25 of each year as Africa
Liberation Day.
29
Fuller had visited Dar-es-Salaam in 1970 as the head of Malcolm X
University where he met leaders of the liberation movements in southern Africa and
was invited to visit liberated zones in Mozambique by leaders of FRELIMO, a
guerrilla movement fighting against Portuguese colonialism. After spending a month
touring the liberated areas in Mozambique, Fuller returned to Tanzania where he was
advised by Mwalimu Julius Nyerere that the best place for him to fight for African
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liberation was in the United States. After returning from southern Africa, Fuller was
determined to raise the consciousness of black Americans. He and associates Abdul
Alkalimat and Amiri Baraka decided to focus on Africa Liberation Day celebrations as
an ongoing project of education.30
In 1972, a steering committee made up of Sadauki, Alkalimat, Baraka and
representatives of 38 other black organizations planned Africa Liberation Day
marches across the nation. ALSC documents claim that over 65,000 people marched
in demonstrations in cities like Washington, New York and San Francisco. Marches
were also held in the Caribbean and Toronto, Canada. "These marches were the largest
organized by black people since the days of Marcus Garvey," Abe Ford of the Boston
ALSC wrote in a press statement.31 The Washington march drew thousands of people
from around the northeast. Ford says, for instance, that the Boston area sent ten
busloads of demonstrators to DC.
In June 1972, the National African Liberation Support Committee was formed
to plan the next Africa Liberation Day celebrations. The committee was composed of
representatives of 22 state chapters. The organization announced that it was
decentralizing in order to build a broad base among black people throughout the
country. The plan was to hold 22 simultaneous demonstrations in black communities
in cities like San Francisco, New Haven, Las Vegas, Washington, New York, Newark,
Raleigh, and Atlanta. "In addition it has been decided that these demonstrations should
be held within the African communities, directed at black people rather than at white
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people." The theme for 1973 was "There is no peace without honor -war continues on
the African continent and against African people in the U.S.A." The ALSC also
launched a United African Appeal for funds to support liberation movements. Funds
raised through this campaign were to be sent to PAIGC in Guinea Bissau, FRELIMO
in Mozambique, UNITA in Angola, and ZANU-ZAPU in Zimbabwe.
The growing polarization in the movement was demonstrated in September
when members of the Congressional Black Caucus and the NAACP boycotted the
second International Congress of African People. 32 On September 4, the New York
Times reported that 2,500 attending the Congress had cheered Amiri Baraka's call for a
global political alliance for the liberation of black people. Baraka had called for a
strong national black political party that could join similar parties around the world in
an effort to oppose white supremacy and "balkanization." Baraka said the purpose of
the conference was to plan for strong black parties that put candidates in office, make
alliances and "fight wars where necessary." Speakers at the four-day congress
included Howard Fuller (Owusu Sadauki) of Malcolm X University, Roy Innis of the
CORE, I. Sukumu of the National Involvement Association, J. Waller of the Pan
African National Organization, author C.L.R. James and several African political
leaders.
By the time the Sixth Pan African Conference was held in Dar es Salaam in
1974 the political scenery in both Africa and the diaspora had changed considerably
since the fifth conference in 1945. The freedom fighters of the 1940s had fulfilled the
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pledge made at the historic 1945 conference to free Africa from colonialism by armed
struggle if necessary. The majority of Africans and African Americans had finally
attained the franchise. Even the Portuguese Empire in southern Africa had collapsed
under pressure from African guerrilla armies in Angola and Mozambique. These
changes on the African continent and in the Diaspora led to the eruption of tensions
over the meaning of pan-Africanism and the place of Western ideologies in the
movement.
The conference was marked by controversy from the outset. Unlike the Fifth
Pan African Congress held in London in 1945, African American activists were
intimately involved in the organizing phase of the Six PAC. Courtland Cox was
named International Secretary General of the congress and Sylvia Hill a chief
organizer of the North America Secretariat. One of the major issues was the
composition of national delegations because some countries in Africa and the
Caribbean had attained independence and had established alliances with their former
colonial powers in Europe. Given the anti-imperialist history of the Pan African
movement, some in the non-governmental community began to question the direction
and motivations of Sixth PAC. The question of the US delegation also came up.
Would it also be a government delegation? In a letter sent to Mwalimu Julius Nyerere
and Courtland Cox, a group of African American activists composed of Ronald
Walters, Amiri Baraka, Jim Turner and Owusu Sadauki asked the Sixth PAC
organizers to clarify whether the conference would include delegations from
opposition political parties in independent Africa and the Caribbean, liberation
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movements not recognized by the OAU and black freedom movements in the
33
Diaspora. Given these tensions, and, in particular, the announcement from Guyana
that it was sending an official government delegation, C.L.R. James announced that he
was boycotting the conference although the international secretariat had used his name
and prestige in its campaign.
Finally Six PAC did get under way although it was marked by the ideological
struggle that was raging in the Black world at the time. This was the struggle between
"black nationalism" and "socialism" that had split the ALSC meeting in May. Some
Black delegates from the Diaspora were opposed to the inclusion of "whites" from
Cuba and North Africa. The conference was also marred by struggles between the
Black Nationalist/Pan Africanist and Marxist camps. 34 Nevertheless, progressive
African delegations, radical liberation movements and some members of the US
delegation seized control of the conference mid-way. Both Nyerere and Sekou Toure
criticized the "cultural nationalists" for "skin color" politics and essentially backed the
socialists. Eventually the progressive faction won out. The General Political Statement
released by Sixth PAC was generally progressive. It called for an end to colonialism
and neocolonialism and defining Pan Africanism as the struggle for the establishment
of African socialism. 35
In contrast to Baraka, Bai Kisogie agreed that victory had gone to the
"internationalists" but warned that it was a "phyrric" victory because this nonracial
version of Pan Africanism had "emptied" the movement of all content. Indeed, he
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argued that the congress had been called to "liquidate" the concept of Pan Africanism.
"Sixth PAC ends up with a virtual denial of the existence of the African world,"
Kisogie wrote. He argued that "Sixth PAC went too far" in craving for respectability
and racial transcendentalism noting that the resolution to include language against rac
consciousness was introduced and seconded by delegates from Libya and Algeria. 36
These tensions over the racial content ofPan Africanism had been simmering
since the series of meetings that led to the formation of the Organization of African
Unity in 1963. These meetings included leaders from both Black African and Arab
states, making it clear that the anti-colonial movement had downplayed its racial
content in the interests of continental unity. The problem with this redefinition of Pan
Africanism was that Blacks in the Diaspora were still faced with majority white
populations and racist political and economic systems that necessitated racial
solidarity as a defense mechanism. At the First African Diaspora Studies Institute held
at Howard University in 1979, for example, St. Clair Drake argued that Sixth PAC
faced problems that Kwame Nkrumah never had to deal with. As Drake put it:
"Delegates from the Diaspora felt that the conference had downgraded its racial
responsibilities too much when it passed a resolution criticizing skin color politics and
seated white delegates from Cuba." 37 Drake suggested that the movement had split
into "continental Pan Africanism" which had an explicit political content, and "racial
Pan Africanism" which was still dominant in the diaspora. Racial pan-Africanism
found expression in cultural forums like the Festival of African and Black Art
(FESTAC) held in Nigeria in 1978 where participants did not have to choose between
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left wing and right-wing dictatorships on the continent. Decolonization had removed
the fairly clear racial divide that had characterized the anti-colonial struggle. Drake
traces the point of divergence to the First Conference of Independent African States in
1958 when more than half of the eight states represented
-Morocco, Libya, Egypt,
Sudan and Tunisia- did not consider themselves black; Ethiopia was also ambivalent
about her blackness leaving only Ghana and Liberia as indubitably Black. This
situation led to the redefinition of "African" in geographic terms as anyone, regardless
of race or color, who believed in one man, one vote and political social and economic
equality. 38
Black Athletes And The Sports Boycott
Meanwhile, the international cultural and sports boycott against South Africa
was gaining steam and widespread publicity in the mainstream US press. In 1964
black American athletes joined an international effort to expel South Africa from the
Tokyo Olympics. The campaign began in South Africa with an organization called
South African Non-Racial Committee for Open Olympic Sports (SAN-ROC) which
was established in Durban, South Africa in October 1962 to seek accreditation from
the International Olympic Committee as an alternative to the whites-only teams
presented by the South African Olympic Committee. In 1963 SAN-ROC and the
British Anti-Apartheid Movement appealed to the IOC to demand that South Africa
"declare formally that it understands and submits to the spirit of the Olympic Charter
before December 1963," or withdraw from the 1964 Olympics. South Africa refused
and was expelled from the 1964 games in Tokyo, Japan. In retaliation, the South
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African authorities arrested Dennis Brutus, leader of SAN-ROC, and jailed him in
Robben Island. In 1966, Brutus left South Africa on an "exit permit" that prohibited
him from returning. He played a major role in the campaign to exclude South Africa
from the Mexico Olympics of 1968, which also drew the attention of African
American athletes. South Africa had campaigned hard to be included in the 1968
games and even offered concessions at the IOC's meeting in Teheran in 1967. The
IOC briefly accepted South Africa's concessions in February 1968 but recanted after
the Supreme Council for Sport in Africa, speaking for 32 African countries, called for
a boycott of the Mexico Olympics if South Africa participated.
Tennis star Arthur Ashe tormented the leaders of apartheid South Africa and
their supporters in the International Lawn Tennis Federation throughout the 1970s. In
1969, when Ashe was the top ranked male tennis player in the world, he and his
lawyer tried to find out whether he could play in the South African Open of 1969.
Soon after, Owen Williams of the South African Open in Johannesburg informed Ashe
and his lawyers that any application for a visa would be turned down. Ashe made the
issue public at the International Tennis Players Association meeting in London during
the summer of 1969. The head of the South African Lawn Tennis Union, Alf
Chambers, immediately said that Ashe had never applied to play in the South African
Open of 1969 because he had not formally applied for a visa. Thus Ashe decided to
utilize every possible avenue to get a visa for the South Africa Open of March 1970.
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Meanwhile anti-apartheid activists were picketing the 1969 US Open because
it had chosen a South African, Owen Williams, as tournament chairman. The activists,
a contingent from Harlem and another from Chicago, vowed to disrupt the tournament
unless Williams was dismissed. On August 29
,
the New York Times reported that
Ashe had refused to discuss boycotting the US Open with anti
-apartheid activists. 39
Ashe pleaded with the activists to tone down their protest and vowed to join them if
nothing had changed in nine months. According to Ashe, "I personally knew that if I
wanted to maximize my chances of getting a 'yes' on the visa, I would have to get
them (activists) to cool it. I pleaded with them and told them to give me 9 months, that
is all I asked, and that timing was all important." With the support of Williams and
Alstair Martin, president of the US Lawn Tennis Association, the South African Lawn
Tennis Association approved Ashe's application to play in the South African Open of
1970.
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The next day, July 29, Ashe announced that he planned to test South African
policies toward black athletes by applying for a visa based on the invitation by the SA
Lawn Tennis Association. On December 3, 1969, South Africa's Sports Minister
Waring criticized the tennis association for approving Ashe's application and vowed
that Ashe would never be permitted to compete in South Africa. Waring claimed that
Ashe had made disparaging and hostile statements against South Africa and that his
application for a visa was politically motivated. Ashe met Secretary of State Rogers on
December 7 where he raised the issue of South Africa. As a result, when Ashe applied
for a visa on December 15, the State Department asked the South African ambassador
in Washington and its foreign minister in Pretoria to approve Ashe's visa. 41 US
Ambassador Roundtree met with Prime Minister Vorster who promised to discuss the
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issue at the next cabinet meeting in January. On January 22, Ashe was told by UPI in
Sydney, Australia that he would probably be denied the visa because of an answer he
gave to a question by an aide of the Prime Minister of Australia. On January 27,
Vorster informed Roundtree that the cabinet had decided to deny Ashe a visa because
of his statements against the system of apartheid. In particular, the prime minister
argued that Ashe's desire to compete in South Africa was inconsistent with his
campaign to have South Africa excluded from the 1968 Olympic Games.
On 28 January 1970 the South African government announced that it had
denied Arthur Ashe a visa to compete in the South African Open.42 In a press
statement released on 28 January the South African Government said it had refused
Ashe a visa because he had been involved in a movement to prevent South Africa's
participation in the Olympic Games in 1968 and had made anti-apartheid statements
like: "South Africa is a very bigoted country, the most bigoted country in the world."43
According to the statement: "Had Mr. Ashe been going to South Africa as a member
of a United States team to play in a Davis Cup tie a visa would have been granted to
him. But the South African authorities are not prepared to admit him, as a private
individual, to play in the South African Open."
The decision led to revulsion around the world sparking a movement that
would culminate in South Africa's expulsion from the Davis Cup and the ILTF
(although it was readmitted later) and finally the International Olympic Association
four months later. In the United States, Congressman Diggs, chairman of the House
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Subcommittee on Africa, convened a hearing to discuss "The Foreign Policy
Implications of Racial Exclusion in Granting Visas." Witnesses at the heanng included
Arthur Ashe, US tennis champion; James Bouton, member of the Houston Astros
baseball team; Dennis Brutus, president of the South African Non-Racial Committee
for Open Olympic Sports; Oliver S. Crosby, director for southern Africa, Department
of State; George Gowan, general counsel-designate, U.S. Lawn Tennis Association,
David Sattersfield III, US Congressman from Virginia; and Frederick Smith,
Department of State. 44 Dlggs said the committee was concerned about racism and
South African policies in sport and the implications for US foreign policy. He argued
that: "One cannot separate the question of the denial of a visa to an Arthur Ashe from
the political questions that are generally involved and which have implications for the
United States."45 Diggs said he was convinced that the issue of sport provided the
"clearest insights" into the true nature of apartheid and the way in which it was
applied. He said it was clear that Ashe "was denied entrance solely because he is black
because there have been other athletes that have been critical of South Africa policy
and still have been permitted to come into the country and therefore this arbitrary
action reinforces our contention that something should be done."
During the Congressional hearing, Ashe said he stood by his statements against
South Africa and refused to retract them. He said many white athletes had criticized
South Africa and were still allowed to compete there. "I know ofno nonwhite athlete
from any part of the world who has ever been to South Africa on an independent
basis," Ashe said. "I conclude the only reason they gave me a 'No' in light of all I did
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beforehand was because I happened to be nonwhite." He said he was convinced that
the International Lawn Tennis Federation and the Davis Cup nations would exclude
South Africa because of the decision. The United States, as the champion nation, had
called an extraordinary meeting to change the rules so that the host nation can exclude
any national team that broke the ILTFs rule against racial discrimination. Ashe said he
expected South Africa to be excluded from the Davis Cup competition in March and at
the ILTF meeting in July. "I think my case constitutes a very clear-cut violation of
international rules,
... I bent over backwards to secure a 'yes' and they still said 'no.' So
I think the international federation has no recourse this time." Ashe said he felt that
"black athletes must use every public resource at their command to try to right things
that are obviously wrong, especially in their particular areas of responsibility."
George Gowen, general counsel-designate, U.S Lawn Tennis Association also
testified that the USLTA had supported Ashe's application for a visa to play in South
Africa. On learning of the denial, USLTA President Alistair Martin issued a public
statement in which he condemned the decision and accused South Africa of racial
discrimination. Gowen said the "USLTA at the meeting of the Davis Cup ofnations to
be held this march will undoubtedly vote to exclude the South African team from
Davis Cup competition. It is felt that South Africa, by its won conduct has precluded
itself from further Davis Cup competition."46
In a demonstration of the growing collaboration between black Americans and
South African exiles, Dennis Brutus, president of the South African Nonracial
176
Committee for Olympic Sports, argued that the United States should "respond
similarly by barring South African citizens from entering the US for purposes of sport,
until the position of South Africa is changed." Brutus, a South African exile, left his
homeland on an "exit permit" in 1966 after having served a term in prison for
opposing apartheid in sport. He was a leading figure in the movement that led to the
exclusion of South Africa from the Olympic Games in Mexico in 1968. Brutus argued
that the United States should exclude South African athletes based on the 1968 UN
resolution calling on all nations to break off sports relations with South Africa. Brums
said he was making his recommendation as the president of SAN-ROC that was
established in Durban, South Africa, in October 1962. He pointed out that South
Africa had been excluded from the Tokyo Games on 1964 and the Mexico Games of
1968 and been expelled from international bodies controlling table tennis, soccer,
weightlifting, boxing, fencing and judo. Brutus referred to Jackie Robinson's support
for the exclusion of South African athletes. Robinson had sent a telegram to the
hearing stating: "I heartily congratulate the committee on its investigation into the
South African racial policies. I support the action and strongly urge the State
Department to bar white South Africans from participating in American professional
events enabling them to win thousands of dollars to be spent in that racist country."47
Brutus said there had been an eight-year campaign to get the ILTF to expel South
Africa but the effort had been blocked because South Africa, a founding member, and
its western allies controlled the commanding votes in the federation while 20 countries
had no vote at all. Brutus said the lack of legislative initiative had led to
unconstitutional protest and civil disobedience at sports arenas around the world. In
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1964 students in Norway had invaded tennis courts and disrupted a match where a
South African was playing. Bags of flour were thrown on the court in Bristol, England
where an all-white team of South Africans was playing. Brutus said there was direct
evidence of the interference of the South African Government in the administration of
sport, thus making the rejection a political as well as racial issue.
Both Ashe and Gowen were against the exclusion of individual South African
athletes from competing in the United States. Ashe said: "my moral conscience tells
me that the United States should not stoop to the low level of the South Africans'
stated policy of racial discrimination because in effect I would be condoning the
premise that two wrongs make a right. 1,48 He also said that several of the players were
friends of his and he would not want them to suffer the same indignities. Gowen said
members of the USLTA "do not believe that South African players as individuals
should be excluded from tournaments in this country. We do not subscribe to the
theory that two wrongs make a right."
Oliver S. Crosby, director for southern Africa, department of state, reviewed
the case and said the state department regretted the behavior of the South Africans but
that there was a limit "to our ability to bring the South African authorities to a
reasonable stance on such matters, as one of the attributes of national sovereignty is
the right of a state to determine for itselfwho shall be allowed to enter its territory."
Asked whether the United States could reciprocate in kind by denying visas to South
African athletes like golfer Gary Player who had recently been granted permission to
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compete in the United States, Crosby said the United States regretted the actions of the
South African government but did not "think it is in our interests to emulate them in
such matters." Diggs pointed out that there had been violent anti-apartheid protests in
England during a tour of South African rugby players and that protests were planned
in the United States if the athletes visited. Given this scenario, Diggs asked, would the
State Department consider denying visas to the athletes as a threat to public safety?
Fredrick Smith of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs agreed that a visa could
be denied if the entrance of certain people was considered a threat. This provision of
the statute, however, was usually reserved for threats to national security. Corsby said
he thought denying a visa to South African golfer Gary Player would be
counterproductive because it would not change South Africa's policies toward black
athletes. Diggs countered that the focus on South African policy was interesting in this
case because South Africans were mad about sports and were growing resentful of the
restrictions being placed on their participation in international competitions. He also
argued that the denial of a visa to a prominent athlete like Arthur Ashe and the lack of
action from the US government was an insult to 30 million black Americans and
would harm relations between the US and independent African states. Diggs also
warned that African nations were becoming very critical of pious pronouncements on
apartheid that were never implemented.
Jim Bouton, a member of the Houston Astros baseball team told the hearing
that in 1968, he had gone to Mexico City on behalf of the American Committee on
Africa "to inform American officials about the problems of racism in South Africa."
179
Bouton said he found that American officials, from the president of the American
Olympic Association to the assistant swimming association representative, "were
actually angry that anyone should want to do something about the problem in South
Africa." When he discussed the issue with them they suggested he must be a
communist and communists were duping civil rights activists. Bouton said he noticed
the Communist countries and nonwhite nations were supporting African calls for
racial equality in South Africa while the United States, Britain, New Zealand and
Australia supported apartheid policies. Bouton also said he thought white athletes in
the United States had a more enlightened attitude toward South Africa. "They seemed
to be entirely divorced from the feelings of the officials," he said. "It was a whole new
breed, a whole new school of people. You had a small handful of officials that had
their own view, and the athletes, themselves, had an entirely different view. If they
had put it to a vote, there would have been no question that South Africa wouldn't
have been admitted to the games at all."
On March 26, protesters disrupted a National Airlines golf tournament
featuring South African players H. Heninig and Gary Player. Although the club had
hired armed guards, the golfers had to be escorted out of the club by police.
49 On May
16 the New York Times announced in a page one story that South Africa had made
history yet again by becoming the first nation to be expelled from the IOC since its
founding in 1 896. 50 The sport boycotts continued to spread, reaching another
milestone with the cancellation of a cricket match in England, South Africa's main
supporter, on May 23. 51 On May 27 the New York Times claimed in an editorial that
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the international sports community was more effective in fighting apartheid than the
political community. 52 In a defiant speech in parliament on June 1, however, Prime
Minister Vorster said South Africa would not give up apartheid for acceptance in the
international sporting community. Vorster vowed that communists and Afro-Asian
nations would not succeed in blackmailing South Africa to give up its traditions.53 On
October 26 Arthur Ashe said in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, that he had no interest in
playing tennis in South Africa and announced that he would give up tennis to oppose
apartheid.
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By August 1972 the South Africans had backed away from their isolationist
position on apartheid sport and were trying to lure black athletes and entertainers to
appear in South Africa. On August 21, 1972, anti-apartheid activists learned that South
Africa had offered former heavyweight champion Muhammad Ali $800,000 to fight
another black American, Al Jones in an exhibition match in Johannesburg. 55 After
discussing the issue with a representative of the OAU in New York, Ali's manager,
Herbert Muhammad of the NOI, said they would not sign the contract. On September
9, however, The Johannesburg Star reported that Ali would fight Al Jones at Ellis
Park in Johannesburg on November 18. 56 The report indicated that the promoters,
Reliable NE Promoters planned segregated seating for a multiracial audience of
80,000 at the Ellis Park rugby ground. In the United States, activists were dismayed by
the news of the upcoming fight. The New York Voice of September 22 reported that
"many persons are shocked the their decision, particularly Ali's, to fight in the racist,
white supremacist African country. Ali is a member of the Black Muslims who stress
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complete separation from Whites." 57 The article noted that many Black community
groups were outraged when they learned of Ali's decision. The Black Concern, led by
Louise Meriwether said, "this is particularly distressing in view of the solidarity
exhibited by American and Caribbean Black athletes in support of their African
brothers during the recent Olympics in Munich." Dennis Brutus said SAN-ROC was
very concerned about Ali's decision and they "hope he would reconsider." Brutus said
Ali was held in high regard in Africa where he was admired not only for his boxing
prowess but also for his courage in standing up to racism. "If he agrees to fight under
conditions dictated by a White racist minority which treats Blacks as subhuman, he
will be doing great damage both to his own image and to the cause of Black
liberation." The paper also reported that two Black Americans (Roy Wilkins and Ertha
Kitt) had traveled to South Africa that year and lived as "honorary whites." A Black
group invited Wilkins while Kitt performed before segregated audiences.
On September 26, Louise Meriwether and Dr. John Henrik Clarke of Black
Concern, launched a campaign to stop Ali from fighting in South Africa. 58 Black
Concern confirmed that Muhammad Ali had signed the contract to fight Al Jones in
Johannesburg on November 18. Representatives of the OAU had met with Herbert
Muhammad twice, on August 18 and September 19, to try to dissuade Ali from going
to South Africa. Black Concern said it supported the position of the OAU to continue
the sports and cultural boycott and sanctions against South Africa until apartheid was
abolished. The organization urged members of the public to put pressure on the Nation
of Islam to stop the fight. On October I, Black Concern again announced that the fight
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had been canceled. The group said that Ali's attorney, Robert Arum, had said he was
canceling the fight because of problems with the promoters. 59 On October 4, the New
York Post reported that the "fight between Muhammad Ali and Doug Jones has been
canceled in the face of heavy opposition from African nations and black organizations
in this country."
60
In a page one story the Amsterdam News of October 6 reported that
the black community, which had been readying itself for massive protests against the
fight, had been informed that the bout was off. 61 The report quoted Ambassador
Mamadou Moctar Thaim, of the OAU who said "if such a renowned black world
figure like Ali agrees to fight in sport-crazy South Africa, he would be providing the
white racist government with the most effective propaganda weapon for breaking its
isolation."
Nevertheless the sports boycott against South Africa continued to gather
supporters around the world. This was true even in the Davis Cup competition where
South Africa was a founding member and had significant support. In 1976, US Davis
Cup officials had even proposed sanctions against countries that refused to play South
Africans following Mexico's refusal to play South Africa in 1975 and 1976. A meeting
of the international Davis Cup organization voted down the US resolution leading to
the withdrawal of the US Tennis Association from the Davis Cup. Britain and France
also announced that they would be withdrawing from the 1977 competitions in support
of the US position. 62
Taking Aim at Corporations
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"In South Africa, to be photographed by Polaroid is instant slavery," Caroline Hunter,
PRWU Founder
Frustrated by the pro-apartheid direction of the United States foreign policy,
African American workers, legislators, students and activists directed their attention
toward US corporations with investments in South Africa in a series of actions against
Polaroid, Shell, Gulf Oil, General Motors and Ford Motor Co. The most dramatic
manifestation of this strategy was the campaign against Polaroid Corporation by black
workers in Boston who demanded that the company close its plants in South Africa
because its products were being used to enforce racist identification ("pass")
regulations. The Polaroid Revolutionary Workers Union (PRWU) campaign was
launched in October 1970 by Ken Williams, a design photographer, and Caroline
Hunter, a 24-year-old research chemist turned radical who was the founder of the
PRWU. 63 The union argued that Polaroid Corporation was participating in the
oppression of millions of Africans because Polaroid cameras were being used to take
pictures that were identification cards called "pass books." These passbooks had been
used to restrict the movement of Africans and had sparked numerous protests and
government crackdowns. After trying to influence Polaroid policies through internal
channels and failing, the PRWM held a rally on 8 October where they presented
Polaroid with three demands: (1) that Polaroid announce a policy of complete
disengagement from South Africa; (2) that the management announce its policy to all
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employees in the United States and South Africa; and (3) that Polaroid "donate the
profits earned in South Africa to the recognized African liberation movements."64
Polaroid responded by firing two black members of the PRWM committee and
releasing a statement that it "abhorred" apartheid. The company created a committee
of black and white workers to study the question. 65 The committee sent four members
of their group (2 black, 2 white) to South Africa to gather information first hand and to
talk to black South Africans. The group returned with the recommendation that the
company stop sales of Polaroid products to the government of South Africa. It was
criticized for interviewing South African workers without seeking the perspectives of
members of the liberation movements. As George Houser put it in a critical article:
"how honest an answer could four foreign visitors get from people in a country riddled
with police informers and undercover agents, a country where the penalty for treason
is a long prison term or death?" 66 On January 13, 1971, Polaroid bought full-page
advertisements in seven major newspapers throughout the United States, as well as 20
black weeklies, to announce its decision to continue doing business in South Africa. In
the advertisements, Polaroid described an "experimental program" where it would
raise the salaries of nonwhite employees and commit a portion of its profits to support
black education. The PRWM (and the Boston Globe) dismissed Polaroid's gestures as
a public relations ploy designed to protect the company's assets in South Africa.
On February 3 members of the PRWM addressed the UN Special Committee
on Apartheid. In their statements, the Caroline Hunter and Ken Williams called for an
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international boycott of Polaroid products and a ban on the purchase of Polaroid
products by the United Nations and its agencies. They also called for the formation of
other grassroots organizations by workers at United States companies doing business
in South Africa. Hunter said the PRWM would "press an international boycott until
Polaroid is forced out of South Africa or South Africa is liberated in the name of
Black South Africa." George Houser, who also addressed the meeting as a
representative of the ACOA, said that the Polaroid experiment was a danger because it
could be seen as a substitute for the sanctions program supported by the United
Nations. "The Polaroid position offers the rationale business is looking for. Its protest
against apartheid is only verbal. But it is a setback in the campaign to stop support for
apartheid and must be challenged." Houser said the ACOA supported the boycott of
Polaroid products. Following their statements, the three answered questions from the
multinational committee members. Asked what the union would do if its demands
were not met, Hunter said they were approaching large organizations that had Polaroid
stock seeking divestment and were working with student and church groups. Williams
said a large meeting had been held in the Roxbury section of Boston where people had
been asked to "act as guerrillas in their own neighborhoods," and demand that store
owners not restock Polaroid products.
The PRWM also organized a protest rally in Cambridge on March 22, the 10th
anniversary of the Sharpeville Massacre which had been designated by the United
Nations as the International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. The
group lobbied Congress where a newly elected Ron Dellums was asked by
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Congressional Black Caucus Chairman Charles Diggs to work with the PRWU in their
efforts to get the Polaroid Corporation to stop doing business in South Africa. 67
Dellums and John Conyers met the Polaroid workers and promised to "take up their
cause within Congress; we also promised to use our good offices to bring their case for
sanctions against South Africa inside the system in any other way we could."68
Dellums, Conyers and the CBC raised the issue of sanctions against South Africa with
President Nixon shortly thereafter, "It was clear that Nixon was not going to act,
however, so we knew we would have to proceed legislatively." Dellums's office then
drafted and introduced the first sanctions resolution to the House that was co-
sponsored by John Conyers. 69 Although it would be a decade before Congress would
approve sanctions against South Africa, the issue had been raised in Congress and the
resolution provided activists with an organizing tool in the struggle for anti-apartheid
legislation in both local and national government.
On July 5, Caroline Hunter went to London where she spoke at the British
Anti-Apartheid Movement's annual African Freedom Day Rally. The British press
welcomed Hunter with a flurry of articles on the US anti-apartheid movement. On July
21, 1971 The Guardian of London reported that the British Anti-Apartheid Movement
was following the lead of the movement in the United States. "Although Britain is by
far and away South Africa's largest investor and has three times more investment there
than has the United States, American churches and American citizens have been much
more active so far in challenging big business support for apartheid."70 The reporter
argued that the US movement was stronger because:
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There (US) it has not been just stockholders who have objected but workers
too. Militant black employees are now making life hard for IBM, Dodge, Ford,
Chrysler and General Electric. But the lead came from Polaroid in Boston,
where a successful boycott was mounted on the issue that the corporation sold
identity cards that the South Africans used to administer the country's pass
laws.
The article reported that General Motors had been left "bruised and battered"
by attacks from the Episcopal Church and the Project on Corporate Responsibility.
GM had appointed Rev. Leon Sullivan a director after a lesser skirmish with anti-
apartheid forces in 1970. At the 1971 meeting however, Sullivan "bit the hand that
paid him" and became the first GM director to vote against management at an annual
meeting. In an "impassioned speech" Sullivan had said that while he was encouraged
by the company's efforts to improve opportunities for blacks in the US, apartheid was
still being underwritten by US industry. 71 The vote was a consolation to the board,
however, as the Episcopal church's motion that GM pull out of South Africa won only
1.29 percent of the 230 million shares voted.
At the conference "Britain and South Africa —Partnership in Imperialism,"
Hunter said: "In South Africa, to be photographed by Polaroid is instant slavery"
because a Polaroid computerized passbook identity system could trace identities
within two minutes." 72 Warning that apartheid "US Style" was spreading around the
world, Hunter argued that the world was approaching a period of "technological
fascism." Hunter called for an international boycott of Polaroid products until the
company's sales to South Africa had been terminated. She said that Polaroid had
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admitted that 20 percent of all pictures taken for passbooks was taken with their
equipment. "These passbooks are apartheid's number one tool to enforce its repressive
laws against blacks," Hunter said. She said that in the first quarter of 1971, Polaroid
lost $4 million in sales due to the boycott. Abdul Minty, secretary of the British AAM
thanked Hunter and assured her that "her struggle and initiative had given the world a
visible target which we can attack." Minty served notice that the British interests of
Polaroid Corporation would be the target of a new campaign by the AAM. Minty
claimed that South African police were being trained in Britain. Hunter visited
Polaroid's factories in Britain and attempted to talk to workers. At one factory she was
told "You can't see or talk to workers here. They're happy and docile. We pay them a
little more than the unions, and give them a bonus. They don't need a union. They're
happy." 73 Hunter reported that none of the Polaroid plants in England or the United
States had unions.
Congressman Diggs and the CBC put the spotlight on the role ofUS
corporations in South Africa with a series of hearings in 1971. In May the House
Subcommittee on Africa convened a hearing on "US Business Involvement in
Southern Africa" to which Diggs invited the heads of corporations to discuss their
companies' policies and investments in South Africa. Thomas Wyman, a Polaroid
Corporation vice president testified that his company was seeking ways to improve the
status of black employees in South Africa. Other heads of corporations refused to
appear at the hearings which nevertheless produced a stream of reports and interviews
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with experts and government officials on the economic ties between the United States
and South Africa.
On February 25, 1971, black legislators urged the Nixon administration to take
a stronger stand against white regimes in southern Africa. 74 Testifying before a
subcommittee on Africa hearing, former ambassador Franklin H. Williams said the US
"should take every possible step short of war" to end apartheid. He urged the US to
recall its ambassador to South Africa; revoke the special sugar quota for South Africa;
and deny visas to South Africa athletes like Gary Player until US athletes like Arthur
Ashe are allowed to play in South Africa. Widemar Neilson of the African American
Institute charged that Black Americans were fed up with resolutions and "pious
discourse." Neilson urged the US to revoke the sugar quota which he said poured
millions of dollars a year into the hands of the white power structure in South Africa.
Neilson also argued that the US should take action against Portugal as an example to
other white supremacist state in the region. Nixon administration officials argued that
sanctions against whites would openly make things worse for the black majority. In a
version of the "states rights" discourse, Assistant Secretary of State Newsome said that
the solution must "ultimately be worked out by the peoples concerned."
In late- 1971 Diggs suddenly received word that his application for a visa to
visit South Africa and Namibia had been approved. Diggs had sought a visa for a
"fact-finding" tour of South Africa for years. In August 1971 he arrived at
Johannesburg's Jan Smuts Airport and learned that the South African government had
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reneged on a promise to allow him unrestricted rights to travel around the country and
the territory of South West Africa. Diggs vowed to cancel the trip and return to the
United States but changed his mind after visiting the black township of Soweto where
he was given a hero's welcome. According to Caroline DuBose, Diggs's press
secretary at the time, the South African press claimed that Diggs was "high-handed"
because he chose to spend time meeting with black laborers instead of mixing with the
elite. Diggs visited several businesses owned by US companies in South Africa where
he was appalled at segregated facilities for black workers. After heated exchanges with
white executives from General Motors and Ford Motor Co., Diggs returned to the
United States where he held a press conference denouncing the activities ofUS
corporations in South Africa. His office sent questionnaires to 300 US firms operating
in South Africa asking them to provide his committee with information on salaries,
facilities and promotion of black workers in South Africa. According to DuBose, the
questionnaire "sent a cold chill through the business community." Diggs also decided
to hold hearings on US business practices in South Africa.
In 1971, President Nixon selected Charles Diggs to serve as a full delegate to
the United Nations General Assembly under US Permanent Representative to the UN
George Bush. In December, Diggs caused a sensation by becoming the first delegate
of the United States to the United Nations to resign during a General Assembly. In an
impassioned speech, Diggs told the UN he could not support his government's
decision to resume the sale of arms to Portugal and South Africa and to break UN
sanctions by purchasing chrome from Rhodesia. Diggs's speech was greeted with a
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standing ovation in the General Assembly. Diggs's outburst was sparked by the
signing of an executive agreement between the United States and Portugal that
authorized the US Export-Import Bank to extend credit/loans to Portugal worth $436
million in exchange for the renewal ofUS leases on the Azores base in Portugal. The
funding was four times the amount Portugal had received between 1946 and 1971 and
was a five-year accord retroactive to 1969. This agreement marked a significant shift
in US policy and directly defied United Nations sanctions against Rhodesia. African
leaders opposed the aid because it opened up other resources for use in Portugal's
colonial wars in southern Africa. They pointed out that NATO equipment had been
used to kill African civilians in Angola and Mozambique. Nevertheless, the Nixon
administration relaxed guidelines on "dual purpose equipment" allowing Portugal to
acquire two Boeing 707s and two 747s for use as military transport planes in southern
Africa. The US also supported Portugal in acquiring twelve Bell helicopters through a
financing agreement with the US Export Import Bank. On October 15, 1971, the
United States had voted to permit importation of Rhodesian chrome despite a
mandatory UN embargo against the white supremacist regime of Ian Smith. 75 The deal
was widely interpreted as strengthening Smith's position in talks with the United
Kingdom from which it had declared independence on November 11, 1965. The US
had also entered into an agreement that had allowed South Africa resume selling gold
to the IMF; entered a series of abstentions and negative votes on UN motions
condemning apartheid, Rhodesia and Portugal; and refused to lobby hard against the
Byrd amendment that allowed the importation of chrome from Rhodesia. These policy
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changes were carried out despite vigorous protests from church, civil rights and
academic groups.
In September 1973 the New York Times reported that Polaroid's year-old
experiment to counter South Africa's discriminatory job and wage restrictions had
been "successfully" emulated by other US-owned companies in South Africa. 76
Polaroid and other US-owned firms like IBM, Gillette, Pfizer, Pepsi-Cola, General
Electric, Mobil and Ford Motor Co. were paying black workers one quarter or less of
what they paid whites for comparable work but they claimed that they were paying
more than the minimums set under apartheid laws. The companies said they were
"working within the system" and providing at least token resistance to racial
separation laws. Although the better-paying and skilled positions were reserved for
whites, company executives said labor shortages were leading to more flexibility in
labor restrictions. Polaroid managing director H. M. Hirsch claimed that the company
had raised the pay of its black workers by 52 percent in the previous two years. He
also said that the company's policies were not charity but based on good business
sense and foresight. By November 1977, however, Polaroid announced the failure of
its experiment and that it was pulling out of South Africa. 77 According to George
Houser of the ACOA, Polaroid's withdrawal from South Africa seven years after
launching an "experiment" aimed at alleviating the effects of apartheid by raising
wages for black employees and providing job training, had failed. The experiment
came apart after anti-apartheid activists told Polaroid that its affiliate in South Africa
had been selling film for passbooks to the South African government in violation of
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agreements reached in 1971. Five days later, Polaroid released a statement saying it
was shocked by the revelations and was taking steps to sever relations with its South
African affiliate. Houser argued that Polaroid had pulled out of South Africa because
circumstances in the region had changed since 1971. Anti-apartheid groups had
provided solid evidence that its distributor was supplying film to the South African
government; Angloa and Mozambique had attained independence; the business
climate in South Africa was unhealthy; and the armed struggle in Rhodesia and
Southwest Africa had escalated considerably. More importantly the student uprising of
1976 had demonstrated the new generation's determination to win freedom by any
means necessary. Despite Polaroid's position, Houser did not think that other US
corporations would follow suit. Instead, he reported that in 1977, over 50 companies
had agreed to comply with six principles drawn up by Leon Sullivan, a General
Motors Board member. South Africa had welcomed Sullivan's principles which, like
the Polaroid Experiment, posed little threat to the system of apartheid but could be
used as leverage in international relations.
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'Randall Robinson of TransAfrica was to address the OAU meting in 1981 on the anti-
apartheid movement in the United States.
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CHAPTER 7
TRANSAFRICA
We condemn the role played by the United States and other foreign
corporations and banks, which by then presence and activities
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t0 f0mUlate^ SUPP°rt a Pro^ssive U"S- PoKcyoward Africa. And we state our opposition to those Blacks who workdirectly or indirectly to support white minority regimes in Southern
African-American Manifesto on Southern
Africa, September 24-25, 1976
On 16 June 1976 the brutality of the South Africa State again shocked the
world with a massacre of unarmed school children protesting against the imposition of
Afrikaans as the language of instruction in black schools. On June 16 12,000 black
primary and secondary school students in Soweto boycotted classes and staged a
march to oppose the apartheid regime's language policy. The students and their parents
felt that the use of Afrikaans would limit the students' ability to grasp math and
science and limit their opportunities because the language was only spoken in South
Africa. They also found it insulting to be forced to use the language of the oppressor.
During the demonstrations, police fired 300 rounds into the crowd of students. By the
end of the day there were 54 dead and 300 wounded. The next day students returned to
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the streets, overturning vehicles and setting fire to school buildings. The skirmishes
continued through July and August.
On August 4 and 5 the students tried to march from Soweto to Johannesburg to
demand the release of youths detained after the initial rebellion of June 16. 1 On
August 5, South African police killed three students and dispersed 5,000
demonstrators in Soweto. 2 Thousands of workers had stayed home in response to
student demands for a boycott. The Times reported a 25% to 75% "absenteeism" rate
in the workforce. The next day, South African police again opened fire on students in
Soweto. The official toll from three days of rioting was four dead and thirty wounded.
By September the rebellions had spread to Kimberly where crowds reportedly stoned
buses and cars on September 8. 3 Cape Town police also reportedly opened fire on
demonstrators protesting the closing of a high school for "coloureds." New flashpoints
emerged at funerals as the skirmishes between the police and students continued. By
Oct. 24, the New York Times was reporting that the official death toll had risen to 377
in the four months since the Soweto uprising began.
4
Black groups disputed these
numbers, however, arguing that the police had killed over 400 in Soweto alone and
that the total death toll at that point was closer to 700.
5
Yet again the South African government responded to the protests with
widespread arrests and detentions of black people. Over 2,400 were detained under
security laws between June 1976 and September 1977. After the murder of Steve Biko
in September 1977, the government banned most Black Consciousness organizations
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including the South African Students' Organization (SASO) and the Christian Institute
headed by Byers Naude. Officials also banned the most widely read black newspaper,
The World, and detained its editor, Percy Quboza. The bannings failed to destroy the
resistance, however, as new opposition groups like the Congress of South African
Students, AZAPO, the Soweto Civic Association, and other associations emerged. At
the same time over 6,000 youths left the country. Many joined ANC schools in
Tanzania and guerrilla training camps Angola.
Anti-apartheid organizations around the world renewed calls for cultural,
economic and political sanctions against apartheid. In July, the OAU released a
statement during its annual Heads of State conference deploring the violence in South
Africa and calling for renewed resistance. "The only effective guarantee for the
African people of South Africa against the repetition of the massacre in Soweto is the
launching of the armed struggle for the seizure ofpower by the people," the report
said.
6
African Americans formed new groups and reorganized old ones to respond to
the outrage. One such group was Blacks in Solidarity with South African Liberation
(BISSAL) formed in Harlem to organize support for liberation movements. BISSAL
was unique in that it was led by entertainers like Dick Gregory. In one of its first
actions, BISSAL called for a demonstration on September 1 1 to condemn the
slaughter of children in South Africa. 7 The group planned to march from Harlem to
mid-town Manhattan to protest the complicity ofUS corporations and their
counterparts in the oppression of "Black, Puerto Rican and other working class
peoples in the Western hemisphere, and the role of those same corporations in
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supporting and maintaining oppression in South Africa." On September 15 the New
York Amsterdam News reported that 400 chanting Africans and African Americans
had marched from Harlem to downtown Manhattan. Among the marchers were many
students and Manhattan Borough President Percy Sutton and Criminal Court Judge
William Booth. Booth, president of the ACOA, had visited Namibia and was able to
provide a first hand report. On September 21, BISSAL organized a "drum rally" for
South African Liberation in front of the United Nations building to coincide with the
opening of the United Nations General Assembly. "The percussionists will dramatize
BISSAL's demand for expulsion of South Africa from the United Nations by
symbolically drumming that country out of the world body."
As the armed struggle in southern Africa continued to escalate, African
American activists and scholars increased their efforts to change US foreign policy
toward the white minority regimes. Encouraged by Diggs and the CBC, this legislative
focus would lead to the formation of the longest-lasting lobby for Africa and the
Caribbean called TransAfrica. Formed and staffed by mainly middle-class
professional and academics with experience in Washington politics, TransAfrica was a
liberal version of the Council on African Affairs. As we shall see in the next chapter,
TransAfrica would succeed where the CAA had failed because of the high level of
black consciousness, the presence of a critical mass of African Americans in
Congress, and the mobilization of black leadership on the question of South Africa.
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According to Willard Johnson, the impetus for the formation of TransAfrica
came from the sustained mobilization of African American groups through the 1960s
and early 70s combined with the dramatic success of the armed struggles in Angola,
Mozambique and Guinea Bissau and the intensification of the struggle in Rhodesia,
Namibia and South Africa. 9 The revolutionary movements in southern Africa had a
major impact on African American activists who were influenced by the ideas put
forth by theorists like Frantz Fanon, Kwame Nkrumah, Sekou Toure, Eduardo
Mondlane and Amilcar Cabral. This resurgence in Pan Africanist thought manifested
itself in the decision by African and African American scholars to secede from the
African Studies Association in 1969 and create the African Heritage Studies
Association. Black scholars had become increasingly frustrated with the elitism of the
ASA. They wanted the organization to engage directly with foreign policy instead of
assuming the more traditional role of organizing conferences and scholarly debates.
10
This group of scholars and activists including Johnson, Ronald Walters, Herschelle
Challenor and James Turner had met in Puerto Rico on 12 February 1972 where they
had decided to focus their efforts on the struggle against white supremacy in southern
Africa. This group of scholars then formed the political action committee of the
AHSA that sought an alliance with the African Liberation Day Support Committee in
an effort to defeat the Byrd Amendment that had allowed the importation of
Rhodesian chrome into the United States despite United Nations sanctions. After
failing to convince Owusu Sadauki to support a drive to repeal the amendment, the
group decided to back the formation of an African American lobby for
Africa and the
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Caribbean. The plan was to create an organizational base through which African
American activists could mobilize public opinion and influence Congress.
These forces came together for the Black Leadershrp Conference on Southern
Africa convened by the Congressional Black Caucus on September 24-25 1976 in
Washington D.C. The meeting was attended by representatives of over 30 black
groups including the churches, fraternities, unions, the NAACP, AFRICARE, PUSH,
Black Economic Research Council, AHSA, National Council ofNegro Women, and
members of the Black Caucus. The conference on Southern Africa supported armed
struggle in southern Africa and criticized the U.S. for supporting white minority rule
in southern Africa. It also endorsed an "African-American Manifesto on Southern
Africa" that called for one-man-one-vote democracy for the people of Rhodesia, South
Africa and Namibia. The ten-point manifesto expressed solidarity with Africans
protesting racism in southern Africa and warned that the intransigence of white settlers
in the region had created "explosive environments which threaten world peace and
raise the specter of an internationalized anti-colonial war which could have an
ominous impact on race relations in America and abroad." 11
The conference challenged the religious community, labor unions, media and
civil society in general to force the government to uphold its commitments to
international peace and security and to "understand that appeasement of South Africa
can only invite an escalated war that will exacerbate racial tensions in the United
States." Finally the conference resolved to establish a black foreign policy advocacy
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chairman of the board. TransAfrica was tncorporated in Washington, DC. on My
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1 977 bnt the organization did not start operating nn.il the spring of 1 978.
TransAirica wonld become the most important lobby for Africa and the
Canbbean ever created by African Americans. The emergence of TransAfrica marked
a turning point in the anti-apartheid movement. It signahad the coming ofage of
African Americans in foreign policy. Like the Counei. on Afnean Affairs, TransAfrica
combined educauonal and d,rec,-aet,o„ techniques to influence foreign policy. Unlike
the leftist CAA, however, African American liberals led TransAfrica although it
included some declared leftists like Congressman Ronald Dellums ofBerkeley,
California.
In his recent autobiography Randall Robinson, executive director of
TransAfrica and founder of the Free South Africa Movement, ascribed his
involvement in the movement to his commitment to "to liberate the black world." 13
His commitment to Pan-African liberation is motivated by a feeling of "kinship" based
on a shared history and experience of racial discrimination. 14 Robinson writes that his
race consciousness emerged in segregated Virginia where he saw his community
receiving second-class treatment. He argues that being treated as a second-class citizen
shaped his decisions and creative energies as an adult (pg. 19). This race
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consciousness led him to retreat "behind the race wall" in a struggle against the white
supremacist system. This struggle is what he calls "defending the spirit" the title of his
book (pg. 20).
I am obsessively black. Race is an overarching aspect ofmy identity. America
has made me this way. Or, more accurately, white America has made me this
way. ...I can no more distinguish the beleaguered black self in me from my
public advocacy than can untold white American policy makers disengage
their racist assumptions from the decades of multifaceted U.S. support for
apartheid in South Africa. 15
Thus his motivation in the antiapartheid movement was a feeling of race
kinship and the conviction that the United States was propping up the racist regime in
South Africa. For Robinson, the plight of black people in the world is very similar: "I
could see no real distinction between my American experience and the painful lot of
Haitians, South Africans, Mozambicans, Angolans, Zairians and Afro-Brazilians."
16
He argues that apartheid was the creation of racist Boers and "kindred spirits" of
American investors, lenders, diplomats, and presidents. Robinson describes how he
became aware of the role of the United States in Africa while a student at Harvard
Law School. Like other African-American activists he was conscientized by the new
black literature and a pan-African sensibility that sparked what he calls a "racial
affinity" with other black people. Echoing other African American internationalists he
claims that African Americans must get involved in foreign policy on behalf of the
"black world." He argues that African Americans have a "responsibility" to influence
U.S. policies in the Caribbean and Africa.
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In 1959, Robinson went to Norfolk State College where he participated in sit
ins at local lunch counters. He served in the Army for three years and then finished his
degree in sociology at Virginia Union University in 1967 and a law degree at Harvard
Law School in 1970. At Harvard, he got involved in anti-apartheid activities with the
Southern Africa Relief Fund and then spent a year in Tanzania as a Ford fellow. Like
Malcolm X, Howard Fuller and Kwame Ture, Robinson was deeply influenced by his
visit to Tanzania, which housed the headquarters of several southern African liberation
movements in exile. When he returned to the United States in 1972 Robinson joined
Chris Neta, a South African student, James Winston and thirty-six black
undergraduates in taking over Massachusetts Hall, Harvard's oldest building and the
office of the president on April 21, 1972. The students demanded that Harvard divest
its $300 million investment in Gulf Oil, a major investor in Angola and South
Africa. 7 This action sparked a nationwide wave of strikes at historically black and
white colleges. In 1975 Robinson went to Washington to work for Rep. William L.
Clay (D-Mo) as an assistant before joining Congressman Diggs's staff where he
immersed himself in foreign policy activity. Robinson's pan-African perspective
recalls African American activists from Martin Delany, to Alexander Crummell, to
W.E.B. Du Bois who urged African Americans to challenge their government's anti-
black activities abroad.
Before officially launching the organization, Robinson, the executive director
and Richard Hatcher, the chairman of the board of directors, spent a year raising funds
and building a membership base in the African American community. The goal was to
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raise $200,000 for the organization's first year of operations
-an ambitious goal
because TransAfrica had decided not to accept donations from foreign governments or
from companies doing business in South Africa. By the time TransAfrica was
officially launched on 20 May 1978, Robinson was confident that they would reach
the goal of $200,000. TransAfrica was launched at a Washington DC conference that
featured speeches by prominent African American politicians and entertainers. In a
position paper released for the conference, TransAfrica called on the United States to
stop using African nations as "pawns" in cold war struggles with the Soviet Union and
instead focus on majority rule, restructuring trade relations and economic aid. 18
Hatcher, who had been mayor of Gary, Indiana, for a decade, argued that there was a
"direct relationship" in the circumstances of Africans and African Americans and that
the liberation of South Africa would make it possible for African Americans and black
South Africans to build business relationships based on South Africa's rich mineral
resources. Hatcher also said that "shutout and distortions" in media coverage was one
of the greatest obstacles that the US anti-apartheid movement had to overcome.
From the outset TransAfrica argued that the plan was to go beyond the
traditional Africanist community and build a mass base. To build this base Robinson
targeted the black church, an institution with a long history in the civil rights and anti-
apartheid movements. According to Robinson, the black church "is a sustaining
institution in black America" with a captive audience receptive to "moral issues" like
majority rule in South Africa. 19 TransAfrica also sought ties with representatives of
African nations in the United States. Robinson had invited ambassadors of Nigeria and
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Zambia to the press conference and received public support from Zambian President
Kenneth Kaunda who told the National Press Club that African Americans should
form a sophisticated lobby for Africa.
Meanwhile the newly elected Democratic President Jimmy Carter appointed a,
African-American civil rights leader, Andrew Young, as the US Ambassador to the
United Nations. Despite this appointment and Carter's human rights rhetoric, however
there was little substantive change in US policy toward the white regimes of southern
Africa during his tenure. The Carter administration continued opposing mandatory
economic sanctions at the United Nations and maintained the traditional "hands off
policy toward private investment. At a press conference to discuss his appointment as
Ambassador to the UN on January 14, 1977, Young said he was prepared to veto any
resolution calling for the expulsion of South Africa although he was an African
American. 20 He even argued that expulsion would not help break down apartheid
barriers. Instead he suggested that South African businessmen and US corporations in
South Africa could become instruments of change.
By March, however, Young's denunciations of South Africa had become
harsher. At a special UN meeting to mark the International Day for the Elimination of
Racial Discrimination, Young said that as long as apartheid is practiced "days without
violence will be no more than intervals in which tensions will grow."21 Young also
presided at the opening of the UN Security Council debate on apartheid that was
expected to be the test of the Carter administration's policy. In May, Young held a
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discussion W» US ambassadors to Afnca in Abidjan, the Ivory Coast, where he
outlined the new policy toward South Africa that would mclude the W1thdrawal of the
US military attache from South Africa; tightening up V1sa requirements for South
Africans; severing Imks between U.S. and South Afncan mtelhgence; and curtailing
Export-Import Bank credits to the Pretona government.- On May 14 media reports
indicated that V1Ce President Walter Mondale was plaiuung to confront South African
Prune Minister John Vorster with a tough new policy opposing apartheid at an
upcoming meeting m Vienna. In a page one article titled "US Toughens Stand on
South Africa" The Washington Post reported that Mondale was planmng to brief
Vorster on the new policy which would resemble the steps discussed by Andrew
Young. The report indicated that the policy change was the result of discussions
involving President Carter, Mondale, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, Young and
other senior diplomats. On May 16, however, The Post reported that Mondale had
downplayed the change in policy while on an official trip to Lisbon. 23 Mondale told
reporters that he was approaching Vorster "with a constructive frame of mind. We
hope for success." This reversal, which was a snub to Young, also indicated the
ambivalence of the Carter administration on the issue of apartheid. As an editorial in
The Washington Post titled "A Mixed-up Africa Policy" indicated, the Carter
administration seemed to have a two-pronged Africa policy with Mondale working the
"white side of the street" and Young working the "black side." 24 Mondale reported
tentative success in his meeting with Vorster but encountered fundamental
disagreement on the issue of apartheid. Young had also met resistance at a
decolonization conference where he had reportedly suggested that nonviolent tactics
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used in the US civ,. rights movement cou ,d overcome ^^
a minority, in southern Africa there was black majoruy w,,h few white aUtcs and
colonial governments that were not restrained hy democrattc structures or ideals.
Young's remarks m Afnca created a wave of resentment m the US media. A
front-page York Times article on 27 May, for instance, damned mat Yonng had
"irritated" African revo.ntlonancs by advocatmg a negotiated solution in Rhodesia and
Southwest Africa and also irritated the South African government by urging economic
boycotts by the black majority.- Young also raised hackles by claimmg (ha, the
presence of Cuban troops in Ethmpia "might not be bad," ifthey could stop the kdling.
Accordmg to the Times this position was »,„ sharp contrast to statements of V,cc
President Mondale and the State Department." The media attacks against Young
continued as he prepared to attend a United Nations anti-apartheid conference in
Lagos, Nigena. Editorials in US newspapers urged Young to support Israel, which had
withdrawn from the conference because of the possib.lity that Zionism would be
equated with racism and apartheid. In an editorial on August 2 1, theAW York Times
urged Young to "expose the hypocrisy that often surrounds discussion of apartheid."
The editorial defended Israel for selling arms to South Africa ostensibly because many
countrtes in the West were also breaking the arms embargo. A, the Lagos conference,
Young announced a possible breakthrough in talks between the liberation movements
and the government of Rhodesia* Young said he and Present Kenneth Kaunda had
agreed to organize a meeting between the British Foreign Secretary David Owen,
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Young, and leaders of five African coumries smounding^ (o m a p[
for majority rule by as early as 1978.
in April 1978 Young and Secre(aiy of SBte^^ embarM^ ^^
day "shuttle diplomacy" tour of the „froM.|me„^^^ Souft Aftjca .
an effort to find a sedlement ,„ the Rhodesian war .^ fte^^^
leaders in Rhodesia to negotiate with b,aek hheration Q„^ „^
and British Foreign Seeretary David Owen met with President Johns Nyerere of
Tanzania, the
.eader of the front-hne states and supporter of the Patriotic Front of
guerrilla groups ied by Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe. Both Britain and the US
had expressed co„eem about the growing presence of the Soviet Union and Cuba in
Ethiopia and the possibility that they wou.d repiace the West m the southern African
region if no settlement was reached in Rhodesra. The two western leaders were
seekmg Nyerere's support for an Anglo-American plan for peace talks between the
Padrone Front and leaders of the white minority and their black aides; Bishop Abe.
Muzorewa, Rev. Ndahamng. Sdo.e and Chief Joseph Ouray. Mamstream media
coverage of Vance's diplomatic maneuvers was firmly on the s,de of Smith and his
"moderate" aides. The Washington Post, for instance, consistently referred to the
Patroitic Front as "Soviet-backed" while the i.legihmate government of Ian Smith was
referred to as a "multiracial government" and its black supporters as "moderates."2 '
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Anti-apartheid groups denounced the Carter administration's decision to meet
with South African officials. The activists felt that move gave legitimacy to the racist
regime and its allies in Rhodesia and put the power of the US behind a dubious
scheme cooked up to keep Ian Smith's white minority government in power. Carter
and Young came under fire at two Africa Liberation Day marches in May organized
by the All African People's Revolutionary Party and the National Coalition to Support
African Liberation Day. The AAPRP march, which was held on May 13, was led
former SNCC worker Stokely Carmichael and former Black Panther Party leader
Booby Seale and featured a contingent of Palestinian Liberation Organization
supporters. Speakers at this march attacked the Carter administration's policies in
Africa and demanded that the United States impose comprehensive economic and
political sanctions on South Africa and support African liberation movements. The
Washington Post, however, focused on the presence ofPLO supporters and the rivalry
between the AAPRP and the ALSC, which planned another ALD march on May 20.
An article by Juan Williams on May 14, for instance, observed that "quoted Bob
Brown, described as "an organizer" for the AAPRP, stating that "We are together in
the struggle against Israel and Rhodesia, Zionism and racism and for an Arab and
African revolution. Williams then states: "The rest of Brown's speech and much of
Carmichael's talk to the crowd were directed against another African Liberation Day
march planned for next Saturday by the African Liberation Day Support Committee."
According to the article the differences between the two organizations was over the
question of identity. The AAPRP believed that "black people in the United States are
not Americans. They are Africans." The group claimed the rally was part of a party
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building effort "so black people here will return to their homeland (Afiica) and
reclaim their land." Members of the NCSALD, however, considered themselves
Americans. At a march on May 20, the group's chairman, Nelson Johnson, argued that
his organization was concerned with "the day to day struggles in this country" in
addition to issues in Africa.28 Organizers said that the largest contingent of marchers
came from New York City although busloads also came from Baltimore, Detroit
Pittsburgh and Boston. The Carter administration was severely criticized for its
southern Africa policy. As they neared the White House organizers on loud speakers
shouted: "Carter is a double-talking hypocrite of the worst kind," "Jimmy Carter, you
damn peanut farmer," and "Carter, Carter, Cut the Jive, Cut the Ties to Apartheid."29
Although media reports provided a superficial analysis of the conflicts that
were keeping the nationalist groups apart, there is no doubt that the ideological strife
had led to the marginalization of the initially promising mobilization of black
nationalists by the ALSC. Nevertheless, the nationalists were able to draw thousands
of activists to annual African Liberation Day marches for most of the 1970s. In the
two major ALD marches held in 1978, for instance, media reports indicated that there
were at least 5,000 demonstrators at the AAPRP rally on May 13 and at least 3,000
who turned up for the rival march organized by the NCSALD seven days later. This
ability to mobilize large numbers of demonstrators in behalf ofAfrican liberation
movements remained in sharp contrast to white-led organizations like the ACOA and
WOA which focused on distribution of information but showed little interest in
grassroots organizing until the Free South Africa Movement of the mid-1980s. 30 The
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""to"H*We 3180 ,0 *°»* -asses i„ contrast to the „ew,y
formed TransArrtca, which was a m.ddle-dass organization tha, focnsed on lobbying
Congress and worked c.ose.y with blaek iegisiators and Demoeratie Party hberals.
TransAfHca's ieaders wonld later form the FSAM as a direet acta arm of the
movement.
TransAfrica's honeymoon with the Carter administration ended in late 1978
when twenty seven US Senators invited leaders of the white mmonty Rhodesian
government to visit the Umted States m defiance ofUN sanctions. 3 ' The invitation
split the State Department where AsS1Stant Secretary of States Rlchard Moose urged
the administration to reject the Rhodesians' V1sa applications while supporters claimed
that the whites should be granted a visa because Joshua Nkomo, an Afncan nationalist
leader, had been allowed to visit the Umted States. Nevertheless Ian Smith and Abel
Muzorewa visited the Umted States in violation ofUN sanctions. TransAfrica
petitioned the Carter administration to push for enforcement of United Nations
sanctions even after Rhodesia held "multiracial" elections on 20 April 1979. "No
election setting aside 28 percent of the parliamentary seats for 4 percent of the
population (whites) solely on the basis of race can be characterized as free elections,"
TransAfrica wrote in a letter to President Carter signed by 185 black leaders including
Harry Belafonte, members of the Congressional Black Caucus, and William Lucy,
president of the Coalition of Black Trade Unionists. 32 The letter urged Carter not to
"legitimate a fraud" by voting to ease sanctions against Rhodesia after the elections.
TransAfrica launched a major effort to persuade President Carter to maintain sanctions
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despite the appointment of a government ied by Bishop Abe. Muzorewa. The groups
bombarded the Carter admmistrahon with
.etters, petitions, appearances before
congressional committees and speeches, making ,he Mo^n sanctions tssne a test
of Carter's commitment to human rights.
Less than a month after the sham elections, the US Senate voted to lift
Sanctis against Rhodes,.- African American leaders were fc^
TransAfrica mcreased the pressure on Carter, warning of a "backlash" if sanctions
were lifted. "If he does (Hft sanctions) he is not going back to the White House,"
Robinson told a thousand people at TransAfnca's second fund-raising dlnner on 30
May.- Richard Hatcher, Mayor of Gary, Indiana and chairman of the board of
TransAfrica warned Carter that "Support for either one of those regnnes is a blow to
black America. We will not tolerate
.. one more hostile act agamst black people."
Andrew Young, who was still US ambassador to the UN, sald he was not discouraged
by the Senate vote arguing that Carter would not lift sanctions. 35 On June 7 Carter
announced that he would maintain sanctions against Rhodesia. 36 At a June 19 press
conference TransAfrica praised Carter for keeping sanctions in place but threatened
retaliation against Senators who voted to lift sanctions. "We want to make it clear that
the black leadership is committed to respond to those to Congress who would embrace
what is nothing more than a racist solution to the problems of Rhodesia," Robinson
said in statement released to the press. 37
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The struggle over Rhodesian sanctions raised TransAfnca's profile in the
Afncan American community and the nafional media. It demonstrated Robinson's
understanding of the foreign policy process and his ability to reframe the discourse
through media events. This media sawy was demonstrated again m the choice of
Harry Belafonte, the legendary entertainer and political activist, as the vice-chairman
of TransAfrica's board of directors. During the 1960s, Belafonte was a fund-raiser for
SNCC and other militant black organizations. As we saw in chapter three, it was
Belafonte who encouraged SNCC activists to visit newly independent African
countries and funded an important SNCC tour of Africa in 1964 that had a radical
effect on the individuals involved and the movement as a whole. At a fund-raiser for
TransAfrica on 20 August 1979, Belafonte praised the new organization for its work
to maintain sanctions against Rhodesia. "If TransAfrica is successful in its task, there's
a lot black people can do to turn this nation around
... we must build and carry forth a
platform of influence so they can't get away with the mischief they would like to
continue to perpetuate in southern Africa and in the West Indies." 38 Belafonte also
used the occasion to blast the Carter administration for removing Andrew Young from
his position as UN ambassador for meeting with Palestinian leaders. "I feel terribly
uneasy about what happened to Andrew Young ... it's safe to say this country has done
itself a great injury not having Andrew Young at the helm of the United Nations." The
demise of Andrew Young demonstrated the African American community's relative
lack of clout in foreign policy when compared to the Jewish lobby. Nevertheless a
group of civil rights and political leaders sought a meeting with Secretary of State
Cyrus Vance to discuss the issue. An angry Robinson told the press before the meeting
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that African American comprised 12 percent of the populate and had a duty to
participate m the formulation of foreign policy. "Foreign policy is not made in a
vacuum
... There's a core in the country that is largely WASP that sees itself as
standard America. They say 'We are American and we make foreign policy." (but)
...
We are as authentically Amencan as they. It's ridiculous to ask what black Americans
are doing getting involved in foreign policy, as if it were made on the moon." 39
By 1980 anti-apartheid sentiment was widespread in the African American
community and quickly spreading to white students and religious groups. In addition
to TransAfrica in Washington, nationalist oriented groups in New York City, Boston
and Seattle continued to use dlrect action to force companies doing business with
South Africa to withdraw. It is these groups that provided the basis for the emergence
of a black-led coalition of anti-apartheid movements to push for US sanctions in the
1980s. On 2 March 1980 the National Black Agenda for the 1980s adopted by more
than 1,000 leaders representing 300 organizations urged the United States to "sever all
economic, diplomatic, political and cultural relations with South Africa. These
measures should include a ban on new investment by United States companies, a
program of tax penalties designed to require withdrawal of current investments, a ban
on new bank loans to South African borrowers, and termination of all exportation to
and importation from South Africa."40 In September 1980 demonstrators picketed the
South African Consulate in New York's Park Avenue where eighty American bankers
and business leaders were meeting South Africa's Minister of Finance Owen
Horwood. Horwood had called the meeting to discuss a $250 million loan
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underwntten by C.tibank ,o "test the credit worthtness" of South Afrfca „ a^^
i« was engaged in a mass.ve crack down on thousands of rebellions students who had
boycotted classes to protest disenmmatory education laws. South African police
officers had already Hied 32 people and detained hundreds. The demonstrators
reminded passcrsby that the same banks that were lendmg South Africa millions of
dollars refused to lend to Black and Latino residents ofNew York.
(DetCnnstrurtiye Engapem-nt. IWn-IQga
This (Reagan) is the most anti-black, pro-South Affican administration
since apartheid was installed in 1 948.
Randall Robinson, 1982
The 1980s were characterized by a turn to the nght in international politics that
sparked renewed anti-apartheid struggles around the world. By 1980, conservative
governments were in power in Britain, Portugal and Australia. The United States
followed suit with the election of Ronald Reagan in a landslide victory on 5 November
1980. Within South Africa, the liberation movements had stepped up resistance
efforts. The ANC bombed two Sasol Oil refineries in late 1979 and student and labor
unrest continued to destabilize the apartheid regime. Tens of thousands of students had
boycotted classes. Workers were on strike in meat packing, auto and rubber industries.
Municipal workers struck in Johannesburg. The Botha regime, which had announced
"neo-apartheid" reforms in 1979, backed away under pressure from the National
Party's hard-liners. In February 1980 Botha told Parliament: "While we must remove
unnecessary and hurtful laws, it is the right ofmy people to protect their schools and
churches." 41 He stressed that the main pillars of apartheid
-the Mixed Marriages Act,
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the Group Areas Act, and the policy
, would remam „^ ^^
was widely interpreted as a retrea, to the narrow laager of Afrikanerdom.N„
warned of a "dangerous new militancy" citing evtdenee that "dissident blacks have
stepped np their terrorist attacks and bombings in recent weeks."" US News and
World Repor, also reportedm „b ,ack tOTor . ts s(aged atacks ^ pote^
Labor strife among blacks is on the rise.
... Students sho,."« The hand-wnngmg in the
ma.ns.ream med,a, however, did not extend to support for sanctions. Instead, the
media seemed to support South Africa's decsion to place the mostly white army on a
war footing. Thts is evident in an assessment of the liberation movement in South
Africa since the Sowe.o uprising mat appeared in a senes ofarhc.es published in The
London Economist of 21 June 1980 titled
"Neo-apartheid will hold for now."
Introducing the series, the magazine's editors dismissed the upsurge in resistance that
had forced the Botha regime to declare a state of emergency and announce
concessions to anti-apartheid forces. The article claimed that two mourns of labor and
student unrest among South Afnca's "colored" population in Cape Town that had led
to 42 deaths were confused "outbursts of frustration" with no connection ,„ organized
struggle. Instead the editors argued that "non-white resistance to the white government
today is still pitifully mute
. ... Debilitated by^ „cst> and factionallsnlj
black South Africa is still far from posing a coherent threat to the white government.
Nor can it expect much support from front-line states who are now heavily dependent
on South African assistance in rebuilding economics ravaged by the twin plagnes of
war and socialism."44 77tc Economist arrogantly dismissed the ANC's sabotage
campaign although its guerrillas had penetrated the interior of South Africa and
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bombed two oil refineries. This growing consensus on the "stability" of white
supremacy in South Africa dovetailed conveniently with the perspective in both the
newly elected Conservative Party government led by Margaret Thatcher in Britain and
in the Reagan camp in the United States.
Even before Ronald Reagan was elected president, there were reports that he
would reverse the arms embargo and tone down the Carter administration's criticism
of South Africa. "I'm frightened at the prospect of Ronald Reagan," TransAfrica's
Randall Robinson said at his organization's third annual dinner attended by over 1 ,000
civil rights and political leaders on June 1, 1980.
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Robinson's apprehension was well
placed. On 12 June, candidate Reagan's foreign policy adviser John Churba said in
Johannesburg that, if elected, Reagan would order a "fundamental re-evaluation" of
South Africa policy and end the arms embargo.46 Churba, who was an Air Force
intelligence officer during the Ford administration, charged the Carter administration
with "criminal neglect" for failing to recognize US interests in South Africa as a
supplier of strategic minerals. He said he would urge Reagan to end the arms embargo,
set up a Navy presence at the Simstown base and provide South Africa with
helicopters and other arms to guard the Cape sea route. Churba had been invited to
South Africa by the foreign ministry and was introduced at the conference by a South
African government official. The American's views were given wide attention in the
South African news media that emphasized his connection with the Republican
candidate in the November election.
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Reagan's massive victory on November 5 was interpreted as a victory for
apartheid forces in South Africa. As the Christian Science Monitor put it the day after
Reagan's election: "The desire to limit Soviet influence in Africa will probably be the
driving principle behind a Reagan administration's southern Africa policy. And that
could translate into a softening of criticism of the white minority government in South
Africa, which is vehemently anti-communist."47 During the campaign, Reagan had
opposed Carter's human rights rhetoric arguing that "the South Africans certainly don't
need us to tell them how to solve their race problems."48 British Prime Minister
Margaret Thatcher, who had been elected on a platform similar to Reagan's in 1979,
"sent a particularly warm message of congratulation." The Christian Science Monitor
noted that Thatcher was "the vanguard of a worldwide trend toward the right, evident
in recent elections in Portugal, Australia, and Jamaica, as well as in the United
States."
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Reagan's choice for Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Chester
Crocker, had an impeccable background as a cold warrior on the African front. While
pursuing a doctorate in African studies at Johns Hopkins University in 1968-69
Crocker worked as an editor ofAfrica Report a CIA-funded magazine published by
the African American Institute. In a 1979 article in Foreign Affairs, Crocker said of
South Africa: "That country is by its nature a part of the West. It is an integral and
important element of the Western global economic system. Historically, South Africa
is by nature part of us." This open support of South African propaganda that it was
part of the West - and should therefore be provided the protection ofNATO alliance
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members- was ,o beeome the basis of .he Reagan administration's pohcy in sonthern
Africa.
Soon after being elected, President Reagan told Walter Cronkite of CBS: "We
cannot abandon a country that has stood by us in every war we ever fought-a country
that is strategically essential to the free world in its production of minerals we must all
have?" 50 Reagan's appalling ignorance of the Nationalist Party's support for the Nazis
in World War II aside, he indicated that he considered South Africa a wartime ally, a
friendly nation and a key supplier of strategic minerals. In March, Reagan
administration officials said that Prime Minister P.W. Botha and a leader of one of the
black "homelands" would be invited to Washington. The administration also tried to
lift a five-year Congressional ban on US support for opposition movements in Angola
and suggested a military pact with South Africa to counter the Cuban presence.
Reagan's approach to terrorism encouraged South Africa to believe that it could use
any means to pre-empt guerrilla attacks. This led to an increase in cross-border attacks
throughout the 1980s. Defending Reagan's embrace of South African whites, The
Washington Post wrote in an editorial "Mr. Reagan is under no obligation to have
black Africans write his South Africa policy for him. He does not have to contribute,
from his side, as Jimmy Carter seemed to from his, to the debilitating notion that the
United States must choose between black and white in Africa. A respect for efforts at
peaceful change within South Africa could have a positive fallout here as well as
there."
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The wording of this editorial was very revealing. It articulated what would
become the cynical mantra of the Reagan administration-that the United States
224
"should not choose between black and white" in Africa while providing South African
whites with loans, guns and legitimacy in international forums.
The Reagan Doctrine of support for apartheid became clear early in the
administration. On March 25 the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Jeane J.
Kirkpatrick, met with South African military officials despite a United Nations arms
embargo that prohibited military involvement with South Africa. A week later, the
South African military bombed civilian targets in Angola. Anti-apartheid groups
immediately called for the resignation of Kirkpatrick for violating international
sanctions. At a news conference called by the Congressional Black Caucus,
Representative William H. Gray III, Democrat of Pennsylvania, said the meeting was
clearly in violation ofUS policies and that "It has removed any effectiveness
Ambassador Kirkpartick might have had at the United Nations." Gray said he found
Kirkpartick's claim that she was not aware of the officials' identities "extremely hard
to believe." The 18-member CBC said it considered the Reagan administration's
actions "a slap in the face of26 million black Americans" and warned that the
rapprochement with South Africa would "isolate us from the peoples, markets and
resources of the third world." The CBC representatives also vowed to introduce a
resolution opposing President Reagan's plan to invite South African Prime Minister
P.W. Botha for an official visit "until that country renounces its policy of apartheid." 52
Nevertheless the US went ahead with plans to invite Botha and representatives
of the illegitimate "Bantustan" regimes created by South Africa. Meanwhile, on April
225
30 198 1
,
.he US vetoed a sanctions resolution a, the Untied Nations Security Couneil
from sub-saharan Africa to be invited to the White House by the new U.S
admintstration. The Whtte House visit was foftowed by two days oftata with
Secretary of State Alexander Haig . The Haig-Botha «aU(s were a major mtiestone in
US-Sou,h Afnca relation On May »?, the Reagan admintstration formaHy announced
its "constructive engagement" policy just days after the mfamous Haig-Botha
meeting " The term "constructive engagement" was taken from a winter 1980-81
^ artiC 'e b" Cr°ckCT he became Secretary of State for
African Affatrs. "Constructive engagement" rested on three assumptions that recalled
Ktssinger's NSSM # 39 : (1) tha, the whites of South Afrtca were there to stay (2) that
the whites were staunch anticommunist a.lies and par, of Western civi.ization, (3) that
the independence of Namibia should be tied to the withdrawal of Cuban troops from
Angola. 54
"The new policy sounds good," The Washington Post declared in an editorial
dated 1
8
May. Arguing that there was a limit to "US capacity to use negative pressure-
to promote change m South Africa, the Post opined that "there are stirrings ofpositive
change among the ruling white minority, and it does make sense for this country to see
what it can do to strengthen the reformers' hand." 55 Thus with a compliant media
cheenng on a wrong-headed administration's view that the Nationalist Party was the
agent of racial reform in South Africa, the Reagan administration plunged into a full-
scale partnership with the racist regime. It increased military and nuclear
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collaborate, eased restrictions on the exports ofUS goods to South Afncan secunty
forces, colluded wlth South Africa against UN Secunty Council Resolut10n 435, and
blocked a censure of South Africa for bombing Angola. 56
According to documents leaked to TransAfrica and subsequently pubhshed m
newspapers around the world, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester
Crocker urged Halg to tell Botha that the United States was "ready to open a new
chapter in relations with South Africa" and work toward a "future in winch South
Africa returns to a place within the regional framework of Western security
interests."57 Washington Post reporter Joe Ritchie, who broke the story on 29 May
1981 after a tip off from Robinson, said US officials had confirmed basic information
contained in the leaked papers. The papers suggested that if South Africa were to
cooperate on an acceptable settlement on Namibian independence, the US would
"work to end South Africa's polecat status in the world and seek to restore its place as
a legitimate and important actor with whom we can cooperate pragmatically."58 A
recurring theme in the papers was the role that South Africa could play in countering
Soviet influence in the southern African region. According to Ritchie, the papers
provided "some of the clearest documentation yet ofhow far the United States is
willing to go to help the internationally isolated Pretoria government attain some
degree of respectability in the world." US officials said the new policy was based on
the notion that officials would have more leverage with South Africa if they
maintained a working relationship called "constructive engagement."
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On returning to South Africa after talks with top US government officials including
Secretary of State Alexander Haig, Botha praised the Reagan administration for its
"pragmatism" on the Namibia question. "All around I found a much greater grasp and
understanding, the ability to look at South Africa in a different light, to see the
importance of the Cape route in a clear way, our strategic mineral and other things."
Botha said his delegation had assured the United States that it was willing to guarantee
access to strategic minerals and naval facilities and protect US investments in South
Africa if the US recognized that there were "no shortcut solutions to the exercise of
political power in South Africa." The South Africans also asked Washington to
Carter's restrictions on nuclear cooperation and approve licenses for the export of
enriched nuclear fuel to South Africa. 59
review
The release of these documents brought worldwide condemnation on the
Reagan administration. African diplomats said that cooperation with South Africa was
out of the question. Nigerian President Shehu Shagari, whose country was the second-
largest supplier of oil to the United States, warned Reagan against tilting toward
Pretoria or funding UNITA rebels in Angola. Randall Robinson and TransAfrica
gained international recognition for the first time. Robinson was invited to address the
Organization of African Unity's Heads of State Summit in Nairobi in 1981, becoming
the first African American to address the OAU since Malcolm X in 1964. 60 The fiasco
also made Robinson persona non grata at the State Department, which had
contemplated legal action against TransAfrica for releasing "stolen" documents.
"Robinson took documents that had been stolen and used them to undermine US
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policy at the OAU meeting, and we consider that reprehensible," said Michael
Wygant, a spokesman for the State Department's Africa Bureau. 61 After the debacle,
Secretary of State Alexander Haig refused to meet any delegation that included
Robinson.
In mid-August South African forces launched the largest invasion into Angola
since 1975 killing 240 people 60 miles into Angolan territory. The New York Times
reported on August 30 that South African Army officers had taken foreign journalists
on a tour of the area "at the invitation of the Defense Ministry." In response to these
renewed killings, the US cast the only veto against a Security Council Resolution
condemning South Africa for the invasion. Assistant Secretary of State for African
Affairs Chester Crocker also released a statement on August 29 reiterating the cynical
"neutrality" of the United States: "In South Africa it is not our task to choose between
black and white... The Reagan administration has no intention of destabilizing South
Africa in order to curry favor elsewhere." 62 Throughout the 1980s the Reagan
administration continued to defend South Africa's colonization ofNamibia and attacks
on Angola and Mozambique on the grounds that it had legitimate security needs
created by the presence of Cuban troops in Angola. This linkage of Cuban troops with
South African withdrawal gave South Africa yet another weapon in its campaign
against Namibian independence.
During his first year in office, Reagan's blatant support for apartheid became a
catalyst for the resurgence of the anti-apartheid movement. "People were
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Sa'd R°Mld Wa,te
-
*«— <*«»
--apartheid active who was
involved with ,he African Iteration Support Committee, and a fonnder
Rainbow Coalifion and TransAfrtca. Walters traces the mobi.izafion of white liberals
students and
.eg.sla.ots to the raca. implicates of the Reagan, open support for
apartheid « This teaetion was the eatalys, fa the etuergence of a b.ack-led ecahtion „f
anti-apartheid activists that resembled the civil rights coalition of the mQs ^
change i„ white hbeta, perspecfives was demonstrated a, a fund-raising meeting called
by Randal. Robinson in , 98, where „ was evtden, that white churches and re.igious
groups lite the American Friends Service Committee were commtttcd to working with
TransAfrica.64
TransAfrica received another boost with the announcement that the World
Council of Churches' Program to Combat Racism had included it among 46 in 75
countnes that would receive a gran, to fight racism in the US and South Africa."
TransAfrica received the $27,000 grant to help ''mob.lize against the Reagan
admimstration's growing partnership with the anti-apartheid regime." Other groups
included in the $587,000 grant were the South West Africa Pcop>es OrganiZafi„„, ,
guerrilla group mat had waged a 15-year war against South African colonization. The
ANC and PAC of South Africa a.so received part of the gran,, which brought the
WCCs Program to Combat Racism grants to $4.7 million since the program started in
1970. Critics accused the WCC ofencouraging violence by funding
"terrorist" groups.
In Angus, 1981 when The In,cma,ional Salvation Army withdrew its membership
from the WCC because of opposition to grants made to Zimbabwe's Patriotic Front.
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WCC officials, however, inststed that the grants were made for specffio humanitanan
projects that were designed to fight racism.46
Other evidence of the emergence of a multi-racial movement was the
pnhhcation of a report titled "South Africa: T.me Running Out," in May ,98, tha,
recommended that the United States maintam its arms embargo agreed to in ,977 and
extend it to subsidiaries ofAmerican corporations to foreign countries that do no,
observe the embargo* „ aiso ca„ed on the US to tmpose an mvestment ban although
i. did no, call on US corporations to wtthdraw their $2 biHion in mvestments in South
Africa. The report was based on a two-year shady funded by the Rockefeller
Foundation and led by Franklin A. Thomas of the Ford Foundation. Thomas pu,
,oge,her a commisston called the Foreign Policy Shady Foundation Inc. made up of
leaders of corporations, umversities, foundations, labor unions and social workers. The
group intervtewed US officiate and South Africans of all races and pu, together a 456-
page report ,ha, was promoted as "the most thorough report as yet on the subject." The
report recommended tha, the United States stockpile induslrial minerals and alloys to
reduce its dependence on South Africa and urged increased aid and private investment
in countries like Zambia, Zimbabwe, Angola and Mozambique to counter South
Africa's destabilization efforts.
The comm,ss,on's report did not support comprehensive sanctions, however,
and was criticized by the more rad.cal black groups associated with TransAfrica.
Robert Browne, an international economist who resigned from the comm.ssion in
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March 1980, argued that the commission's recommendations were "unlikely to bring
about equitable sharing of power within a reasonable time frame." Browne's policy
recommendation, which was submitted to the commission but not included in the final
report, urged active support for the liberation movements. Browne argued that
"violence is an integral and unavoidable feature of the South African scene; that the
means by which the minority manages to retain control in South Africa is daily
violence; and that violence therefore will be required to overthrow that system." This
option would require the United States to provide generous financial and material
support to the liberation movements and collaboration with the front-line states.
Although Browne recognized that this was unlikely in the short-term, he called on
non-governmental organizations to build a constituency for Africa through "an
educational campaign to familiarize the public with the nature of the South African
situation and why such a policy was the preferred one."
TransAfrica and the Congressional Black Caucus launched a concerted
campaign to educate state and local officials and their constituents on strategies for
confronting apartheid. 69 In 1980 TransAfrica had contacted over 70 black legislators
across the country to inform them about its anti-apartheid activities and provide them
with a model divestment bill that they were encouraged to submit. In 1981 the
campaign continued with divestment workshops at an annual conference of the
National Black Caucus of State Legislators. Follow-up conferences and workshops
were held in 1981 and 1983. 70
232
TransAfrica's organizing efforts were aided by the Reagan administration's
determination to support South Africa. In 1982 the Reagan administration officially
announced the termination of the "no-contact with the South African military" policy.
Since 1981 South African military intelligence chief, Lt. Gen. van der Westhuisen, the
commander of South African forces in Namibia and the chief of the South African
Army had visited the United States openly and held talks with top Pentagon and State
Department officials. 71 In 1983 Lt. Gen. Johann Coetzee, Chief of South African
Security Police, was included in an official delegation to the United States that held
secret talks with Reagan administration officials on the topic of Namibia.
On 14 October 1982 the International Monetary Fund and Reagan
administration officials announced that they would approve a $1.1 billion loan to
South Africa. 72 The New York Times reported that the deal would receive approval of
treasury department officials despite "strong objections" raised at the UN General
Assembly by Democratic Congressmen and human rights groups. The Times reported
that South Africa had received the loans because the country was in its deepest
recession in 50 years and its "foreign reserves were not sufficient to cover one week's
imports." The recession had been caused by the plunge in the price of gold and the
lack of investor confidence generated by the sustained violence and labor unrest since
the Soweto Rebellion of June 1976.
Members of the Congressional Black Caucus and Democratic Party allies
announced plans to block the I.M.F. loan to South Africa. The CBC proposed
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legislation that would bar the United States from supporting IMF loans to countries
that violated human rights. Howard E. Wolpe of Michigan, who was the chairman of
the House Subcommittee on Africa, announced plans to call for special hearings
during the pre-election recess. 73 On October 21, thirty-five members of Congress
warned Treasury Secretary Donald T. Regan that: "It is very likely that the question of
US participation in the IMF will be raised during the next session of Congress." 74
Nevertheless, the Reagan administration voted for the IMF loan on November 3,
approving the largest loan in South African history just as the country was declaring
war on students, workers and neighboring countries. Members of the CBC argued that
the loan would be perceived as an endorsement of South Africa's policies and viewed
by the non-white majority as support for an unjust status quo.75 About 50
demonstrators marched outside IMF headquarters to protest the fund's plan to lend
$1.7 billion to South Africa. Washington D.C. delegate Walter Fauntroy, who led the
demonstration, said the CBC had failed to persuade the Reagan administration to delay
or oppose the vote. Randall Robinson claimed the loan was "an indirect subsidy of
South Africa's military campaigns." The vote by 22 executive directors of the IMF
granted the first loan to South Africa since Nixon administration approved a loan in
1975.
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The battle over the IMF vote continued into the next year when a House
banking subcommittee voted to block US support for IMF loans to South Africa.
77
This vote highlighted the Reagan administration's loss of credibility among
Democratic members of Congress. Rep. Stan Lundine (D-NY) said he had come to
234
support the anti-apartheid position reluctantly. Lundine said the committee had been
forced to take the vote because the Reagan administration had refused to grant them an
audience on the issue. The House Foreign Relations Committee also approved
legislation to restrict US bank loans to South African Government, ban the sale of
Krugerrand coins and put official sanctions behind the "Sullivan Principles." The
Reagan administration strongly objected to the legislation.78 These votes won the
support of The New York Times 's liberal commentator Anthony Lewis who wrote
"Americans who watch South Africa see no significant measures to improve the legal
and political status of the black majority."
As the 1984 elections loomed, African American leaders made it clear
apartheid would be an important issue in the campaign. According to Milton Coleman
of the Washington Post, "Black politicians, civil rights leaders and special interest
groups are pitching U.S. policy in the Third World as a potential issue in the 1984
campaign."80 Coleman cited a "People's Platform" endorsed by civil rights leaders that
had called for an African American to seek nomination as the Democratic Party's
candidate for president in 1984. The 1 19-page report criticized US foreign policy as
"bellicose, racist and interventionist." In June 1983, TransAfrica Forum published a
survey of five Democratic presidential candidates who all said they would alter US
relations with Africa and extend diplomatic recognition to Cuba.
81 The candidates
denounced the Reagan administration's actions in Africa as divisive, ineffective and
violent. Senator Hollins of South Carolina said he would support comprehensive
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sanctions against South Africa while the others said they would use comprehensive
sanctions as a threat and discourage investments.
The Rainbow Coalition
By 1984 apartheid had become a major issue in African American politics.
Nevertheless Jesse Jackson, who entered the race for the nomination as the
Democratic Party's candidate for president, was able to "blindside" the other
candidates with the South Africa issue during nationally televised debates.
82 The news
that Jackson would run for the presidency electrified the black community and its
supporters. Jackson's plan was to revive the civil rights coalition of the 1960s and ride
a wave of discontent into the White House.
The Rainbow Coalition and Jackson's campaigns for nomination in 1984 and
1988 were to have a major impact on the anti-apartheid movement. Jesse Jackson's
public statements against South African apartheid date back at least to 1967 when his
name begins to appear in major newspapers as a representative of the anti-apartheid
position.
83
It is Jackson, more than any other civil-rights leader, who carried King's
ideas on foreign policy into the 1970s while transforming them to fit the nationalist
tone of the time. He played a prominent role in rethinking the role of African-
Americans in politics, addressing many of the key black political conventions of the
1970s including the 1972 Gary Convention where he endorsed the Black Agenda that
called for a greater level of black participation in local and foreign politics. He also
condemned U.S. government support for white supremacist regimes in Rhodesia,
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South Africa and Namibia. Like other anti-apartheid activists Jackson condemned
the Nixon administration's southern Africa containment policy encapsulated in
National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger's National Security Memorandum #39
(NSSM) that recommended closer ties with white supremacist governments in Angola,
Mozambique, Rhodesia and South Africa. 85 Jackson's Operation PUSH was also a
prominent member of the Black Leadership Conference of 1976 that endorsed the
"African-American Manifesto on Southern Africa" that led to the formation of
TransAfrica, the African-American lobby for Africa and the Caribbean in 1979. The
meeting supported armed struggle in southern Africa and criticized the U.S. for
"hypocrisy" in its support for South Africa. 86 Thus Jackson was a participant in the
rethinking of the role of Africa in African American consciousness. He played a role
in the early anti-apartheid movement; providing a concrete link between the civil
rights movements in the 1960s and the Pan-Africanist movements of the 1980s.
The emergence of the Rainbow Coalition in 1984 coincided with a violent
uprising against apartheid in South Africa itself that brought into American homes
pictures of daily clashes between unarmed protesters and armed police, reviving anti-
apartheid sentiment in the United States. These images of violence also led to the
reinvention of the anti-apartheid struggle as a mass-movement with a national
following. It brought together single-issue movements like the peace, environmentalist
and feminist movements and created a remarkable consensus on the issue of sanctions
against South Africa. Along with Jesse himself, several other key staffers of the
coalition provided a direct link to the civil rights movement of the 1960s. The chief
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foreign policy advisor in the 1984 campaign was Jack O'Dell, former international
affairs director of Operation PUSH and long-time civil rights activist who had worked
with Martin Luther King on the staff of the SCLC. There was Mary Tate and Ramsey
Clark of the World Peace Council. Ronald Walters, then a Howard University
professor, also served on the platform committees of 1984 and 1988.
Jackson moved into a more prominent position in the anti-apartheid movement
during his campaigns for nomination as the Democratic candidate for president in
1984 and 1988. The Rainbow Coalition took the struggle to a national stage, involving
a multi-racial community in a movement that had been mostly identified with African-
Americans. His campaign also forced the Democratic Party to take an unprecedented
position of condemning the white supremacist regime in its party platforms of 1984
and 1988. Curtina Moreland-Young argues in "A View From The Bottom: A
Descriptive Analysis of Jackson Platform Efforts" that platform politics have been an
important feature of party politics since the Republican Party issued the first platform
in 1832.
87
Moreland-Young, who helped draft the Democratic Party platform in 1984
as a member of the platform committee of the Democratic National Convention,
argues that "party platforms have a high incidence of influencing or becoming national
plans." She claims that the "language on Africa in the Democratic platform is virtually
the Jackson plank." The plank included a commitment to exert "maximum pressure by
banning all new loans; prohibiting sale or transfer of computer or nuclear technology;
withdrawing landing rights to South African aircraft; increasing sanctions against
South Africa until it granted independence to Namibia; and developing trade ties with
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the nations of Africa. Moreland-Young contends that the presence of Jackson
representatives in the platform committee led to the inclusion of the Africa plank in
the Democratic party platform, a significant advance from the 1980 platform where
Africa was discussed but did not receive the attention that it got in the 1984 campaign.
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CHAPTER 8
THE FREE SOUTH AFRICA MOVEMENT
In my 20 years ofworking on this (anti-apartheid), I have never seen
such a ground swell as we are currently seeing. I think one reason is
that the level of resistance in South Africa has never been the way it is
now. I also think there has never been a point at which the black
community and particularly the leadership of the black community has
been as mobilized as they currently are on this issue.
Prexy Nesbitt, Chicago union organizer, 1985 1
On 21 November 1984, four African-American leaders entered the South
African consulate in Washington DC and refused to leave until the South African
regime dismantled apartheid and released all political prisoners. Randall Robinson of
TransAfrica, Congressman Walter Fauntroy, Mary Frances Berry a member of the
U.S. Civil Rights Commission, and Eleanor Holmes Norton, a law professor and
former Carter administration official, had been invited to discuss U.S.-South African
relations with South African ambassador Bernadus G. Fourie. After presenting their
ultimatum to the ambassador, Norton left the room to brief the international press
while Robinson, Berry and Fauntroy remained behind and were arrested. After
spending a night in jail, the three announced the formation of the Free South Africa
Movement and began daily demonstrations outside the embassy. The sit-ins took hold
in more than two dozen other cities, including Chicago, New Orleans, Seattle, New
York, San Francisco and Cleveland with weekly demonstrations at South African
consulates, federal buildings, coin shops that dealt in gold Krugerrand coins, and
businesses with South African interests. Hundreds of celebrities including Gloria
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Steinem, Harry Belafonte, Amy Carter, Detroit Mayor Coleman Young, Coretta Scott
King, Rev. Jesse Jackson, and at least 22 Congressmen were arrested outside the
embassy. 2 The movement, which was a coalition of church, student, civil rights and
women's groups, also spread to hundreds of college campuses across the country
where rallies and sit-ins questioned the investment of university pension funds in
companies that do business with South Africa. Hundreds of students were arrested in
schools like Harvard, Columbia, UCLA, University of Wisconsin, Northwestern
University and the University of Illinois. Over 5,000 people were arrested across the
country in a 12-month period.
Coordinated by the FSAM, TransAfrica and the Congressional Black Caucus,
this upsurge in anti-apartheid activism influenced Congress to adopt the
Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act over President Ronald Reagan's veto in 1986.
Why did the Free South Africa Movement succeed in influencing Congress to impose
comprehensive finance and trade sanctions against South Africa the 1986 where 4
decades of anti-apartheid activism in the United States had failed? Besides the passage
of the Voting Rights Act and the presence of African Americans in Congress, the Free
South Africa Movement stood on the shoulders of the decades of activism on the
question at local and national levels.
The catalyst for this resurgence in anti-apartheid activism was the
retrenchment of racism on both sides of the Atlantic. In South Africa, a new
constitution unveiled on 3 September 1984 gave 800,000 Indians and 2.5 million
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"coloreds" their own legislatures while still excluding the 23 million black majority
from power. This constitution was rejected emphatically by the black people of South
Africa. Residents of Sharpeville met the new constitution with a massive rent strike
and sparked demonstrations and rioting that claimed hundreds of lives. 3 Within weeks,
the regime had arrested virtually all the black trade union leaders. The United Nations
General Assembly deliberated and passed a resolution condemning the arrests.
Although the resolution passed unanimously, the United States abstained. Once again
the anti-apartheid community was outraged at the decision of the United States
government which claimed to oppose apartheid yet continued to protect the regime in
international forums. Robinson, who was then the president of TransAfrica, decided to
launch a direct action campaign to force the United States to impose sanctions against
the apartheid regime. 4
On 21 November 1984 TransAfrica organized the sit-ins at the South African
Embassy. Robinson, Fauntroy and Berry spent the night in jail. The initial reaction to
the sit-ins in the national media was muted. The New York Times put the article on its
national news page (BIO) while The Washington Post put the story on page one. 5 Both
newspapers focused on the most prominent of the three -DC. Congressional Delegate
Walter E. Fauntroy
- in their headlines and leads
-"Fauntroy Arrested in Embassy,"
(WP) and "Capital's Delegate Held in Embassy Sit-in," (NYT). The Post reported that
Secret Service officers removed the demonstrators from the South African Embassy in
handcuffs and charged them with unlawful entry of an embassy, "a misdemeanor that
can draw a penalty of up to six months in jail and a $100 fine." According to a
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statement from the South African Embassy published in the New York Times:
"Congressman Fauntroy, Mr. Randall Robinson and Miss Berry asked for an
appointment with the Ambassador for a discussion on South Africa. After an amicable
discussion it came to our notice through the media's telephone inquiries that they
intended to stage a sit-in until their demands for the release of labor leaders had been
met. Under the circumstances they were asked to leave, winch they refused to do. The
police were then asked to remove them from the premises. No charges were laid."6
"Ours was an act of conscience in response to the repressive action of the
South African government with respect to the noble, nonviolent protests of black
South Africans over the last few months," Fauntroy told reporters after the anti-
apartheid activists were released on November 22. The group announced the
formation of the Free South Africa Movement that Fauntroy said would appeal to the
conscience of grassroots Americans and move the struggle to "a new level."7 Fauntroy
said this shift in strategy was necessary because efforts to persuade Congress to
impose sanctions had failed. Robinson described the goals of the FSAM as threefold:
(1) to win the release of all black political prisoners; (2) to lobby for a power-sharing
agreement between liberation movements and the South African government, and (3)
to compel President Reagan to abandon his "constructive engagement" policy.
Robinson also said that demonstrations would be held daily outside the embassy and
at South African consulates throughout the country. On 26 November Representative
Charles Hayes of Illinois and Rev. Joseph E. Lowery of the Southern Christian
Leadership Conference were arrested after refusing to leave the South African
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Embassy. To broaden the protest, FSAM issued an appeal to white trade unionists
whose interests would also be hurt by "slave labor" in South Africa.
Soon, reporters began to compare the sit ins to the civil rights movement of the
1960s. Eight days after the first sit-ins, The Washington Post wrote:
The reelection of Ronald Reagan and concern about increased repression of
blacks in South Africa led American black leaders to revive some of their old
civil rights protest tactics from the 1960s and apply them to a new civil rights
struggle, organizers of recent demonstrations outside the South African
Embassy said yesterday. 8
The article also said that the Free South Africa Movement planned to expand
the protests to South Africa's thirteen consulates in the United States. The reporter
marveled at the size of the demonstrations. "The anti-apartheid movement, in the
space of a few weeks, appears to have galvanized black support like no other social
issue since the civil rights movement of 20 years ago." The demonstrators said that
among the issues that had re-ignited the movement was Reagan's "constructive
engagement" policy that had intensified the exploitation of South Africans. "We saw
oppression directly intensified as a result of the reelection of Ronald Reagan," Randall
Robinson of TransAfrica told the press: "It was almost pegged to the reelection. All
the black township invasions intensified, the killings." The activists said they had
started planning the sit-ins after the reelection of Reagan and Sen. Jesse Helms (R-
N.C.) on November 6. They argued that "slave wages" had made South Africa
attractive for US corporations and blamed Reagan for the defeat of the Gray
Amendment that would have prevented US companies from investing in South Africa.
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Time magazine also compared the anti-apartheid demonstrations to the civil
rights movement of the 1960s. "It could have been a scene from the civil rights
movement of the 1960s: a large crowd of demonstrators, most of them black,
marching in peaceful protest down an avenue in Washington, chanting slogans and
carrying signs. But the series of rallies that have been taking place on Embassy Row
during the past two weeks are against racism in another country; the apartheid
government of South Africa."9 The FSAM garnered attention in California, where the
San Diego Union-Tribune reported that crowds were still growing after a week of
protests outside the South African Embassy. The paper reported that Mayor Richard
Hatcher of Gary had joined 250 people in the largest demonstration outside the South
Africa Embassy. Those arrested included Yolanda King, daughter of Martin Luther
King Jr., and the first white person to be arrested, Gerald McEntee, president of the
1 .
1
million-member American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees.
McEntee pledged the support of his union to the movement and said that black trade
unionists in South Africa deserved support because they were the "only moderate
force for change" left in the country. According to the Union-Tribune, "The marches
have attracted new protesters daily and held the media's attention in a city where
demonstrations are as common as long-winded political speeches. More than three
dozen reporters and cameramen were on hand yesterday."
On 27 November, the Washington Post upheld the right of Americans to
demonstrate against apartheid but argued disingenuously that "No administration's
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policy is going t0 satisfy the Amencan ,s mos(^ rf^ ^^
apartheid." The edttonal also equated *e Reagan admi„lstratl„„, policy with^
apartheid activity by claiming ,ha
, both the Reagan administration and anti-aparmeid
gronps were committed to nonviolent change and only disagreed over tactics. The
Reagan administration hi, a similar note by insistmg that ,,s constructive engagement
poltey was really an anti-apartheid policy and tha, it was getting results. In i, firs,
official reaction to the protests on Dumber 3, Assistant Seeretary of S,a,e for Africa
Chester Crocker said the administration had eondemned apartheid as morally wrong
and insisted mat the rote of the United States was to ensure tha, change came about
peacefully.
»
Crocker called charges tha, constructive engagement constituted taeit
approval of apartheid "rubbish." Crocker said the administration supported the righ, of
Americans ,o demonstrate bn. had decided no. to charge the ae.ivists in court.
Demonstrators had accused ,he Jus.ice Department of denying them a forum ,o
express their views by first arresting 16 protesters and then dropping all eharges.
Meanwhile ,heAW York Times reported ma, apartheid had become a major issue in
Washington and tha. Mr. Crocker himself had taken the time ,o address me ,ssne a, his
daughter's social studies class at Sidwell Friends School.
The Tutu Fartrtr
Meanwhile, Bishop Desmond Tutu, who had been awarded the Nobel Peace
Prize of 1984 for his anti-apartheid activism, said he wanted a face-to-face meeting
with President Reagan to discuss the sanctions issue. Tutu had received a highly
unusual standing ovation from members of the bi-partisan House Foreign Relations
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subcommittee on Africa after his testimony at a hearing on apartheid.
11
At the hearing,
Tutu called Reagan's constructive engagement policy "immoral, evil and totally un-
christian," and accused the United States of being "an accessory before and after the
fact" of apartheid. Tutu indicated that he would no longer meet with administration
officials below the president and secretary of state because he had failed to persuade
Chester Crocker that "constructive engagement has worsened our situation on
apartheid."
On December 6 the White House announced that Reagan would meet Bishop
Tutu to discuss the administration's policies toward South Africa. During the
December 7 meeting Reagan assured Tutu that the United States was against apartheid
but rejected calls for sanctions. Some minutes into the meeting, the South African
12
Government announced that it had released 1 1 prisoners and five others on bail.
Reagan immediately took credit for the release saying "I don't think we are being too
bold in taking credit for this." He also said there was no evidence that the
demonstrations at South African embassies and consulates around the country had
secured the release. Reagan said that those who were criticizing US companies for
doing business in South Africa were acting out of "ignorance."
After the meeting Tutu said "it was quite clear that we are nowhere nearer to
each other than before I entered the White House." He said that the administration's
constructive engagement policy had not proven effective and that things had worsened
for South Africans. President Reagan disagreed. "I have to disagree with him that the
253
situation has worsened," said the president. "We have made sizable progress there in
expressing our repugnance for apartheid and in persuading the South African
Government to make changes. And we are going to continue with that policy." Tutu's
Nobel Peace Prize and his meeting with President Reagan raised the visibility of the
ongoing anti-apartheid protests to new heights. By the December 7 meeting, 27
protesters had been arrested in Washington. Five days of continuous protests in New
York City had brought the arrests of Rep. Charles Rangel, D-Manhattan; Rep.
Edolphus Towns, D-Brooklyn; Victor Gotbaum, executive director of District Council
37 of the American Federation of States, County and Municipal Employees, and Jack
Sheinken, international secretary of the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers
Union. Also arrested for blocking access to the South African consulate at 425 Park
Avenue were Haywood Burns, co-chairman of the National Council of Black
Lawyers, and Barbara Dudley, president of the National Lawyers Guild.
Meanwhile, Reagan was under pressure from his own party as 35 conservative
Republicans warned that they would vote for sanctions if South Africa did not change
its policies.
13 The warning was contained in a letter delivered to South African
Ambassador Benardus Fourie. "We are looking for an immediate end to violence in
South Africa accompanied by a demonstrated sense of urgency about ending
apartheid," the letter said. Although the congressmen did not attack the Reagan
administration's constructive engagement policies members of the Congressional
Black Caucus hailed the move as a significant shift in the mood on Capitol Hill for
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tougher policies toward South Africa. Rep. John Conyers (D-Mich) called the letter a
"first step in making this a bipartisan or nonpartisan issue."
By mid-December hundreds had been arrested around the country and the
movement gaining momentum in colleges and universities. In Washington, New York,
Boston, Chicago and other cities, politicians, labor leaders, civil rights activists and
students provoked arrest by crossing police lines at South African consulates and
companies doing business with South Africa. The increasing pressure for sanctions
was evident in the statements of political leaders from both the left and right. On
December 9, for instance, Sens. Richard G. Lugar (R-Indiana) and Daniel Moynihan
(D-New York) appeared on NBC's "Meet The Press" where they both called for
stronger action against apartheid. Lugar, who was chairman of the House Foreign
Relations Committee, called on Reagan to denounce apartheid "more sharply and
more often." Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-NY) said the US should "have nothing
whatever to do with the South African government." Lugar, however, said limiting US
investments would have a "minimal effect" on South Africa's policies. Even Rep.
Newt Gingrich (R-GA.) warned, "the United States in the end is not going to be on the
side of the current governing force in South Africa."
14
Republican Senators Lugar and
Nancy Kassebaum, chairperson of the House Foreign Relations Subcommittee on
Africa, sent a letter to Reagan urging him to speak out more forcefully on apartheid.
The senators said the US had failed to attack the "evils of apartheid and the human
rights violations in clear and understandable manner." The FSAM scored again with
the announcement that representatives of 120 US companies operating in South Africa
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had agreed to go beyond the Sullivan Principles and improve pay and working
conditions for the black employees. 15 Rev. Leon Sullivan, author of the principles, told
the Financial Times after the meeting: "This is the first time American companies
have entered the political arena in South Africa and pushed for an end to apartheid."
On December 1 1 the pressure began to show as Reagan denounced apartheid
calling on Pretoria to "reach out" to its black majority in a speech marking
International Human Rights Day. Reagan said his administration wanted South Africa
to end forced removal of Africans from their communities, detention without trial and
lengthy imprisonment of black leaders. 16 President P.W. Botha remained defiant,
ruling out any change in the basic structures of apartheid. "No quiet diplomacy or hard
shouting will keep us from seeking the road ofjustice," Botha said in reference to
Reagan's suggestion that South Africa had released 1 1 detainees because of pressure
from the United States. Eight of the detainees were quickly re-arrested and charged
with treason for campaigning against the new constitution that disenfranchised 22
million people of African descent. 17
The New York Times also changed its tune and came close to calling for
sanctions by endorsing Rep. Stephen Solarz's bill that would have blocked nearly $400
million in US bank loans to the South African Government. 18 The Times also noted
that FSAM "protests, more than quiet diplomacy, account for the release in recent
days of more than 20 black political detainees. Now the demonstrations appear to have
changed Mr. Reagan's tone as well." The reaction from the anti-apartheid community
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was skeptical: "President Reagan's moral condemnation of South Africa must be seen
as a change in rhetoric and, one hopes, a change in direction. But it's important that the
change be taken to its logical conclusion. South Africa can stand one more moral
condemnation but it cannot stand diplomatic and economic reinforcement of that
condemnation. We didn't just condemn Poland or Cuba, but we put our political and
economic muscle behind it. We must do the same thing with South Africa." 19
Reagan's unusual utterance was seen as a sign that the demonstrations, and the
extensive coverage they were receiving worldwide, were having an effect on the
administration. Time reported on December 24 that "there was widespread suspicion
that Reagan was bowing to a wave of anti-apartheid protest that continued to grow
...
in the capital and at least 13 other US cities."20US officials quickly denied that
anything had changed, insisting that Reagan's remarks were "fully consistent" with
constructive engagement. The article concluded, however, that the administration
"may be right that
... hopes and expectations for reform in South Africa are unrealistic,
and that even drastic punitive action, such as pulling all U.S. investment out of South
Africa, would be unlikely to change that unpalatable fact. The US can in fact claim
some success for helping persuade South Africa to sign recent agreements with its
neighbors." Time went even further claiming that South African reforms "are more
significant than critics care to admit." On the same day, the US News & World Report
described the exchange between Reagan and Botha as a "careful duel" that "masked a
strong determination by leaders of both countries to damage relations as little as
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possible." The paper also reported that "Reagan was unlikely to bend to demands from
• 21
inside and outside Congress that he step up criticism of Pretoria."
Meanwhile Senator William Proximire, a Democrat from Wisconsin,
announced that he would introduce legislation to impose economic sanctions on South
Africa. Proximire, who was described by the Financial Times ofLondon as "a man
who is sometimes accused of playing too readily to the gallery of public opinion," said
if the Senate were allowed to vote on the sanctions measure it would pass because
"there is growing bi-partisan support for action on this matter."
22 The Financial Times
also noted that the Reagan administration was beginning to respond to the "change of
mood" on the issue of apartheid, citing Reagan's meeting with Desmond Tutu and the
president's critical remarks on Human Rights Day.
In January, conservative periodicals like The Wall Street Journal and The New
Republic poured scorn on the anti-apartheid activists. Suzanne Garment of the WSJ
wrote, "We know some black leaders involved in this South Africa campaign have
turned back to an old civil rights-style moral issue because they do not have a
pornographer's chance in Iran of succeeding in today's political climate with the newer
agenda of quotas and ever expanding social programs." After quoting Garment
approvingly, TNR went a step further, telling African Americans to stay out of foreign
policy and "turn their attention back home" because "agitation against South Africa is
no substitute for the reckoning that American blacks must make with their own
political mistakes."
23 Among the "mistakes" mentioned were Jesse Jackson's run for
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the presidency and the "wretchedness of black inner-city indigents." Nevertheless, the
editorial supported the action of Republicans who had urged Reagan to condemn
apartheid more openly while maintaining the conservative position that the United
States had little leverage over South Africa. "Indeed language may be our strongest
weapon," TNR declared.
Meanwhile Senator Edward Kennedy, Democrat of Massachusetts, embarked
on a stormy eight-day tour of South Africa during which he embarrassed the South
African government by staging a dramatic protest against the refusal to let him visit
Nelson Mandela in a Cape Town prison.24 He also met Winnie Mandela in the small
town of Brandford, where she broke a banning order to meet the US senator. Later,
Kennedy demanded that the Reagan administration put an end to its constructive
engagement policy and vowed to introduce legislation to disengage the US from the
white minority in South Africa. "Only a few extremists in my country still defend the
government of South Africa. Patience is running out across the political spectrum. Not
only Democrats but Republicans and President Reagan even are speaking out against
apartheid."
The South African government denounced Kennedy with two cabinet ministers
complaining that Kennedy had reneged on a deal to examine both sides of the
"extremely complicated" issue. Gerrit Viljoen, minister for community development
and Chris Heunis, minister for constitutional development, said they viewed
Kennedy's trip with "amusement, disgust and doubt." Viljoen and Heunis claimed the
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ongoing political reform would eventually give Africans some power but that
apartheid's "separate development" policies would remain in effect.
Both The New York Times and The Washington Post published critical
editorials on Kennedy's trip. The Times described the trip as "Troublemaking in South
Africa" and argued that the trip, and sanctions, was not likely to do any good.25 The
Post called Kennedy's tour a "striking media event" but also claimed it would have
little effect beyond raising Kennedy's profile. The Post's editorials also questioned the
ability of the US to change South Africa. It claimed that "constructive engagement"
had been the policy of successive governments since the 1960s and that no
administration had "much dented events within South Africa in the last 25 years." 26
Back in the United States, Kennedy met with leaders of the Free South Africa
Movement and announced that he would support legislation imposing sanctions on
South Africa. He praised the FSAM for bringing the issue of apartheid "home" and
declared Reagan's "constructive engagement" policies a failure. He also warned
Pretoria that it would be a serious mistake to think the only action against apartheid
would be in Congress because many cities, states and colleges were taking their own
steps to divest themselves of any business interests in South Africa. Although
Kennedy's statements worried US firms in South Africa, none of the 350 companies
acknowledged reducing South African holdings because of the pressure for
divestment. Many US firms continued to insist that their presence helped black
workers because of their voluntary adherence to the Sullivan Principles. "Frankly we
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are proud of what we are doing," a Citibank official told The U.S News & World
Report that added, "Virtually every other American firm in South Africa reacts in
similar vein."27
ice
On 22 March, the 25th anniversary of the Sharpeville Massacre, a group of
black South Africans near a town called Langa defied a government ban on public
gatherings to hold a funeral procession for three people who had been killed by poli
the previous weekend. As the procession strode towards the white town of Uitenhage,
their path was blocked by armed policemen who opened fire, killing 19. On the same
day, President Reagan suggested that the "rioting" marchers were to blame for the
massacre pointing out that "some of those enforcing the law and using the guns are
also black." He added that his administration would not change its policy of
"constructive engagement." These statements led to an international outcry. In South
Africa, leaders of the United Democratic Front said they were "outraged and
disgusted" and refused to meet with Assistant Secretary of State Chester Crocker who
was in South Africa for talks with government officials. "I was not proud ofmy
president last night," Rep. Mickey Leland (D-Texas) and chairman of the
Congressional Black Caucus said. Leland called Reagan's comments "racist
statements." Rep. Charles Rangel (D-NY) said it was clear that "the president has a
double standard when it comes to people of color." 28
The Nation published an editorial condemning the massacre at Langa and Reagan's
reaction. "To be consistent he might have agreed with Hitler that because Jewish
Communists provoked the uprising in the Waswaw ghetto, the crackdown was
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justifiable." The editorial also noted the irony of the "reformist" Botha government
opening fire on unarmed civilians on the 25th anniversary of the Sharpeville massacre.
This time around however, the liberation movements responded in kind with the city
of Uitenhage paralyzed by a general strike of black workers and guerrillas of the
African National Congress clashing with the South African Army in Transvaal.
"Sharpeville signaled the end of nonviolent protest; the events of last week may signal
the beginning of liberation war."29
Rev. Jackson continued to raise the issue of South Africa between his two
campaigns for nomination as the Democratic Parry's candidate for president. On 12
March Jackson was arrested at the South African embassy in Washington DC along
with his two sons, Jesse Jr., 20, and Jonathan, 19, during a Free South Africa
Movement protest rally.30 On April 20, 1985, at a rally for peace, jobs and justice in
Washington DC, Jackson presented "A Moral Appeal to Resist Fascism" that focused
on Reagan's embrace of South Africa and the U.S president's visit to a German
cemetery where members of the Nazi SS are buried. The speech was a stinging
indictment of U.S. foreign policy that was to characterize Jackson's statements in the
next few years:
We learned in 1945 that the logical conclusion of the Third Reich was
genocide. In 1985, South Africa is the Fourth Reich, built on race supremacy.
The same ethical standards that applied to Hitler's Germany must apply to
South Africa; South Africa cannot stand alone. South Africa needs U.S.
investment, strategic military planning, university and church credibility,
diplomatic support and the conspiracy of Western democratic allies. For the
record, South Africa is not standing based on Soviet investment and
markets. The credibility of free democracy is jeopardized by the South African
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partnership. We must put ethics over expediency, and as a superpower we
should convene Great Britain, Israel, West Germany, France, Holland,'japan
and Belgium and together move against apartheid and for the people and
maintain our self-respect. 31 '
By June 1985, Time was reporting that "The issue of divestment has really
caught fire" and that "divestment had become a new buzz words social protest on
college campuses, at stockholders' meetings and in legislatures across the country."32
The magazine reported that New York Governor Mario Cuomo gave the movement a
big boost by proposing the state's pension fund withdraw over $4 billion invested in
companies doing business with South Africa. The governor cited Bishop Tutu's moral
authority in calling for divestment and raising the interest of ordinary Americans. In
Los Angeles, Mayor Tom Bradley ordered his city's pension fund to sell $700 million
in stocks with companies doing business with South Africa. By 1985, six states,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Connecticut, Nebraska and Marland and Iowa, had passed
some sort of divestment law. Fourteen other states were considering similar laws.
A major breakthrough for anti-apartheid forces came on 5 June 1985 when the
House voted overwhelmingly for sanctions legislation sponsored by Representative
William Gray of Pennsylvania. 33 The 295 to 127 vote came after the Democratic-
controlled House rejected two Republican attempts to delay the vote and a proposal by
Rep. Ron Dellums (D-Calif.) to make the measures more stringent. 34 Nearly one-third
of the Republicans, 56 members, joined Democrats in approving the sanctions bill.
Earlier, a Republican-controlled Senate Foreign Relations Committee had passed
legislation similar to the House measure which banned new loans to and investment in
263
South Africa, stop the sale of computers and computer parts to the government and
halt the importation of gold corns from South Africa. The measure also imposed stiff
penalties for violation of sanctions including a $500,000 fine and five years in jail for
individuals and $1 million in fines for corporations. Yet questions remamed about the
efficacy of sanctions. Rep. Newt Gingrich, who was one of 35 conservative
congressmen who had urged Reagan to increase his criticism of apartheid, said that the
US would lose if it pulls out because other countries would step in to fill the gap.
Chester Crocker said sanctions were "a show of impotence." While The Johannesburg
Star claimed that the threat of sanctions gave the South African government
unjustifiable domestic support. Another pro-government newspaper, The
Citizen stated: "We have news for Congress. It will not force South Africa to do
America's bidding." 35
In mid-July the Senate passed a watered-down version of the House bill by a
vote of 80 to 12. The bill proposed to ban new loans to South Africa, stop nuclear
trade, prohibit sale of computers to the South African government and deny federal aid
to companies that do not follow the Sullivan principles. 36 Although this was a major
victory for anti-apartheid forces, they vowed to continue demonstrations until
Congress passed comprehensive sanctions. The protests were fueled by images of
increasing violence in South Africa's black townships where police had killed 400
youths in less than a year. Demonstrations in the United States kept pace with the
escalation of violence in South Africa. The protests outside the South African
Embassy on Massachusetts Avenue in Washington DC had continued every weekday
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for eight months. By August, DC police had arrested over 3,000 demonstrators in what
Stanford University President Donald Kennedy called "chic arrest by appointment."
Among the luminaries arrested "by appointment" were 22 US Congressmen, former
first daughter Amy Carter, two of Robert Kennedy's children and Coretta Scott King,
widow of Martin Luther King. According to Randall Robinson, "Many Americans
knew nothing about apartheid before the demonstrations began. Now there is an
understanding of South African repression." 37 Even The New Republic a conservative
magazine that opposed sanctions from start to finish, admitted in August 1985 that "In
a period of eight months—late November 1984 to late July 1985—the administration
had lost control of American policy toward South Africa, completely and probably
irrevocably."
President P.W. Botha dealt Reagan's "constructive engagement" policy yet
another blow on 15 August when Botha reneged on his promise to "cross the
Rubicon." Instead Botha's speech was a major disappointment. "I am not prepared to
lead white South Africans and other minority groups on a road to abdication and
suicide," Botha declared. Bishop Desmond Tutu said he was "devastated" by the
statement adding, "I think the chances of peaceful change are virtually nil."
38
Botha's
intransigence continued into September when he told 4,000 students at the University
of Pretoria: "We shall not be stampeded into a situation of panic by irresponsible
elements. We shall not be forced to sell out our proud heritage." In the United States,
press reports indicated that President Reagan was preparing to match Congress's
sanctions bill by an executive order that would forestall a public battle between the
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White House and Congress. On 9 September 1985 Reagan signed Executive Order
12532 which banned the sale ofUS computers to South African government agencies,
prohibited nuclear cooperation and banned Krugerrands. Most of these actions were
superfluous and clearly designed to save face for the White House and forestall
congressional action.
Members of the Congressional Black Caucus reacted with anger at the news of
Reagan's duplicity. In three days of panel discussions and hearings at the Black
Caucus's 15th annual weekend, CBC Chairman Rep. Mickey Leland of Texas spoke of
an increase of racism in the United States and deplored Reagan's attacks on
affirmative action. On September 27 members of the CBC led hundreds of
demonstrators on a march through downtown Washington that ended in a candlelight
vigil to protest apartheid.
40
Jesse Jackson had earlier addressed 1,000 people at George
Washington University where he had called for more pressure on the Reagan
administration. Jackson urged the Teamsters and International Longshoremen not to
unload cargo from South Africa. Randall Robinson said TransAfrica was circulating a
Freedom Letter to collect a million signatures to be presented to Bishop Desmond
Tutu in Soweto or Zambia. CBC chairman Mickey Leland said the caucus had made
apartheid a major theme of the conference to impress upon black politicians the
importance of the anti-apartheid movement.
Despite Reagan's executive order of September 1985, his administration
continued to provide direct support to South Africa by opposing sanctions at the
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United Nations Security Council and also lobbied to repeal the Clark Amendment that
had prohibited the United States from providing aid to Union for the Total
Independence of Angola, a rebel Angolan group funded primarily by South Africa. On
15 November 1985 the United States and Britain vetoed mandatory sanctions against
South Africa during a Security Council meeting. The United Nations Special
Committee Against Apartheid condemned the vetoes in a statement released after a
"strategy session" with 29 international anti-apartheid organizations on 25 and 26
November.41 The committee called on anti-apartheid and solidarity movement in the
United States and the United Kingdom to intensify their campaigns to expose the role
ofWestern powers in "protecting apartheid South Africa in the United Nations
Security Council as well as other major opponents of sanctions such as the Federal
Republic of Germany." Joseph N. Garba, chairman of the SCAA reported to the UN
on 19 December 1985 that the situation in South Africa was desperate. Killings,
detentions and torture had intensified. The extent of repression had been hidden from
the world by media censorship. The Special Committee called for the immediate
release of all political prisoners and the withdrawal of death sentences imposed on six
black activists on 12 December 1985.
Meanwhile, Rev. Jesse Jackson continued to play an important role in the
movement. On April 4, 1985, he spoke at an anti-apartheid rally at Harvard University
commemorating the anniversary of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.'s assassination.42 On 23
April, Jackson addressed several rallies at universities in the Northeast calling on
students to continue their pressure on colleges to divest their funds from companies
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that do business with South Africa.43 He spoke to a group of students participating in a
13-day sit-in at Rutgers University in New Jersey and called on students not involved
in the sit-in to "abandon the selfishness and self-centeredness and materialism of
Yuppie-ism. Don't gain a degree and lose your soul," he told the students, calling the
anti-apartheid movement the "highest calling of our day." He then traveled to
Princeton where another sit-in was in progress and attacked the university
administration for refusing to divest. "Princeton should be ashamed about this
partnership with South Africa," he told a crowd of^OO.44 The student divestment
campaigns epitomized Jackson's role as an exhorter and a motivational speaker. His
appearance at the sit-ins brought much needed attention to the student initiatives while
providing moral and spiritual legitimacy to the struggle. Thus although Jackson did
not start the movement, he was intimately involved and served as an inspiration and a
role model to the young students who participated in the demonstrations.
Jackson was also a regular feature in international anti-apartheid circles. He
regularly addressed the United Nations on Namibia, South Africa and the proxy wars
in Angola and Mozambique. On Nov. 2, 1985, for instance, Jackson and Oliver
Tambo, president of the African National Congress, led what the media described as
the "biggest anti-apartheid rally" in London, England, that police estimated was
attended by 30,000 people. 45 In 1986 Jackson was invited to the UN International
Seminar for Sanctions against South Africa in Paris, France, were he was a major
speaker. During the conference, Jackson held a meeting with African foreign ministers
where he was invited to tour the Front-line States.46 The ministers believed that he
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could popularize the issue of sanctions and raise awareness about the impact of
apartheid in southern Africa. The tour was billed as a fact-finding mission that would
collect information that could be used to influence U.S. policy toward South Africa
and build momentum toward the passage of the 1986 sanctions bill. The 18-day, 8-
nation tour took Jackson and his delegation to Nigeria, Congo, Angola, Botswana,
Mozambique, Zambia, Tanzania and Zimbabwe between August 13 and 28, 1986.
Participants met with presidents of six Front-line States and with Oliver Tambo, exiled
leader of the African National Congress and Sam Nujoma, leader of SWAPO. Karin
Stanford argues that Jackson's Africa mission of 1986 helped him gain insight into
South Africa's role in the region; open lines of communication to a region often
ignored in the United States; establish personal relationships with leaders in the
region; issue joint communiques with each of the leaders; and gain credibility in the
region.
47 Upon his return to the United States, however, Jackson was unable to
persuade the Reagan administration to abandon its "constructive engagement" policies
or meet with leaders of the "front-line states." On Sept. 8, 1986, for instance, he led a
rally of 300 people in a Washington DC park across from the White House where he
renewed his call for a summit between President Reagan and leaders of the "front-line
states." He called South Africa the headquarters of an "evil empire" and spoke of the
deaths, imprisonment and torture perpetrated by the apartheid regime in the southern
Africa region.48 Stanford argues that Jackson's efforts played an important role in
putting pressure on Congress to pass the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986.
A modified version of the bill was passed over President Reagan's veto on October 2,
1986 marking the first time that the U.S. Congress supported comprehensive sanctions
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against South Afnca.However, the key figures in this legislative struggle were Ron
Dellums and his colleagues in the Congressional Black Caucus.
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CHAPTER 9
RACE FOR SANCTIONS
During
... my first year in Congress
... I attended a meeting of the CBC
that set me on a path toward what I consider to be my single most
important legislative victory: The imposition of sanctions against the
racist apartheid regime in South Africa.
... I had not gone to Congress
in 1971 to take up the banner of ending apartheid, but I had been swept
into the fight. More than two decades after introducing that first
disinvestment resolution, I could see the worth of the long-distance run
that had begun with that effort.
Rep. Ronald Dellums, D-California
On 9 April 1986 Rep. Ron Dellums (D-Calif.) launched a new sanctions
offensive by reintroducing his 1985 bill which had received 100 votes before being
overtaken by a more moderate version sponsored by fellow black Democrat Rep.
William Gray of Pennsylvania. Dellums had been trying to get a disinvestment bill
passed for over a decade. This time around, however, Dellums was set for a
spectacular victory in what he called a "long-distance run." In his recent memoir of his
years as a US Congressman, Dellums argues that the sanctions bill was his proudest
accomplishment. The so-called Dellums Bill had been 13 years in the making. It had
emerged during Dellums's first year in Congress when he promised to support the
Polaroid Revolutionary Workers Movement in their struggle to get Polaroid
Corporation to pull out of South Africa (see chapter three). After receiving a petition
from the PRWM activists, Dellums and the CBC urged President Nixon to discourage
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US investment in South Africa without success. Dellums then asked his staff to draft a
disinvestment resolution that he introduced for consideration by the House in February
1972. Fellow Black Caucus member Rep. John Conyers cosponsored the measure.
Although the Black Caucus did not expect the disinvestment resolution to pass
overnight, the legislators felt that they had raised the issue before Congress and
provided activists with an organizing tool with which to pressure the local and state
representatives. According to Dellums:
For me, the meeting with the Polaroid workers also drove home the point that
while the Black Caucus as a group and I as an individual representative could
provide such a rallying point for issues brought to us by constituents, above all
I was --we were- now in a position to do something legislatively to advance
their concerns. They were not coming to the CBC to ask us for help with
community organizing; they were asking us to legislate on their behalf. In
doing so, they helped us define our mission in those early days. 1
Thus the CBC was responding to pressure from radical grassroots anti-
apartheid organizations in proposing the first sanctions resolution in Congress. By
taking on the cause of the PRWM, a radical black organization that was heavily
influenced by the left/nationalist perspectives of the 1970s, Dellums was representing
the interests of a group of people that had never been considered in the formulation of
foreign policy before. Dellums was particularly suited to this role as "people's
representative." He had been recruited into politics to represent what was known as the
"people's republic" of Berkeley and was immediately branded a "left-wing radical" by
the Southern barons of the Democratic-controlled Congress. When Dellums was
nominated for the position, Vice President Spiro Agnew called him "an out-and-out
radical" who needed to be "purged from the body politic."2 According to Dellums:
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When certain political leaders and much of the establishment press looked at
me they did not see Ron Dellums, a member of Congress the equal of all others
under our system, where districts grant mandates to representatives through the
ballot --they saw Ron Dellums, representative of that "commie-pinko leftwing
community of 'Berzerkely'" and a person whose ideas belonged outside the
legislative chamber, if anywhere. 3
Dellums's experience in Congress was path breaking in many ways, but it is his
sophisticated use of the legislative machinery and what Jesse Jackson referred to as
"street heat" that demonstrated his vision as a long distance runner. By 1980 Dellums
had shifted his anti-apartheid strategy from submitting the disinvestment proposal for
consideration of a resolution —largely a rhetorical device— to "crafting a bill that
would impose statutory requirements for disinvestment, economic sanctions, and other
prohibitions against doing business as usual with the regime."4
After Reagan's election in 1980, Dellums moved the issue of South Africa to
the top of his agenda, bringing a sophisticated understanding of the legislative process
to the movement. Dellums and his staff created a wish-list of sanctions including
termination of airplane landing rights, a ban on the sale of South African gold and
gold coins called krugerands, prohibiting intelligence cooperation, ending bank loans
and credits, compelling disinvestment and forbidding trade. Throughout the process,
Dellums's office cooperated with other members of the Black Caucus and included
provisions suggested by CBC members in other committees —Foreign Affairs,
Banking, Ways and Means, and Commerce -who used their positions to promote the
anti-apartheid cause.
5
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By 1985 Dellums and the Black Caucus were ready to fight for the "Dellums
Bill" which had become a ngorous piece of legation that required the United States
to sever all ties with the white supremacist regime in South Africa. The bill (H.R. 997)
was written to manifest the demands ofArchb1Shop Desmond Tutu and representatives
of the African National Congress. The anti-apartheid movement, however, was split
between those who supported Rep. William Gray's more moderate bill that would only
prohibit new investments, and Dellums's Bill, which sought complete withdrawal of
US firms or disinvestment. Although the CBC stood behind the Dellums Bill, its
members also co-sponsored the Gray Bill to move the debate forward. Dellums argues
that although he was loath to split the movement, he felt that it was necessary to
maintain pressure on Congress from the left. 6 When the Gary bill was eventually
brought to the House floor for a vote, Dellums offered his bill "in the nature of a
substitute" to the Foreign Relations Committee bill. Although both the House and
Senate passed weaker bills, both versions included language similar to the Dellums
initiative like a ban on computer and nuclear technology transfers and prohibition of
new loans. Through various shenanigans engaged in by Senators Richard Lugar,
chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Jesse Helms (R-North Carolina) and
Malcolm Wallop (R-Utah) the bill was delayed until Reagan signed an executive order
implementing some of the sanctions in the bills.
During the 99th Congress, both the Gray and Dellums bills were still active. At
a House hearing on the new call for sanctions, Chester Crocker argued against
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extens10n of sanctions because they would worsen South Africa's economic situation
and cost the US between $ 1 and $2 billion in exports while creating a windfall for
RusS1a. Despite this opposition, the Gray Ml again salad through the process and was
brought to the floor for a vote. The result in 1986 was very different, however. When
the Gray bill came up for a vote on 19 June 1986, Dellums again presented his bill as a
substitute and it was entered m the Rules Committee as an amendment but granted
only one hour for debate in the ten hour period allocated for Gray's bill. Dellums,
however, was satisfied because they gave him a chance to push the debate to the left
and provide an organizing tool for anti-apartheid groups. When the chairman called
for a vote on the amendment, a temporary majority ofDemocrats in the House carried
the day in a voice vote. "The ayes have it," the chair announced, sealing Dellums's
fate.
Passage of the bill stirred a storm of protest and debate over sanctions. Press
reports puzzled over why the Republican House Manager had not called for a recorded
vote suggesting that opponents had not wanted to go on record as supporting
apartheid. This strategy backfired, however, because there were more Democrats
present at the time the vote was called. Nevertheless, Republicans and media
commentators were convinced that Dellums's victory would not last. The Oil Daily,
for instance, explained on 20 June that:
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Republican leaders say the Dellums substitute is so extreme in its impact on
US companies that the Senate probably won't attempt a bill at all. Realizing
this the Republican opponents decided to let the bill go forward on a voice
vote, confident that this would speed the Dellums measure into oblivion
without their having to vote against it. It also freed them from having to cast a
vote that could be construed as soft on apartheid, or actually in favor of it. 7
Supporters, however, argued that by passing the Dellums bill, the House had
sent a message to the Republican-controlled Senate that it was serious about imposing
sanctions on South Africa. The expectation was that the seriousness of the challenge
would prompt Senators to pass a stronger bill than they might have done otherwise.
Dellums himself argued that "nothing will be the same again." He observed that
neither the Democrats nor the Republicans wanted to be seen as supporters of
apartheid. He argued that the bill had placed a marker below which the House of
Representatives would never sink. The vote had also placed pressure on the Senate
Q
because the anti-apartheid movement would demand the Senate match the House bill.
Dellums's strategy of presenting a radical substitute to push anti-apartheid legislation
to the left had worked.
As Dellums had predicted, the Senate passed a sanctions bill sponsored by
Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Richard Lugar and colleague Senator
Nancy Kassebaum. Lugar made it clear, however, that he could not guarantee a report
out of the Senate if the House forced a conference on the Dellums bill. Shortly after,
the Black Caucus met with members of the Foreign Affairs Committee, supporters of
the anti-apartheid legislation in the Senate and representatives of anti-apartheid groups
where it was decided that the CBC should accept a compromise. Despite his deep
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disappointment, Dellums agreed to compromise: "My role has been to advocate the
position of the grassroots movement on behalf of the people of South Africa, and to
put that advocacy into legislative form. That is what I have tried to do. If it is the
collective wisdom in this room that it is not advantageous to go forward now, I will
not press the point."
On 12 September 1986 The Washington Post reported that "House Democratic
leaders agreed yesterday to accept the Senate's version of legislation imposing
sanctions on the white minority government of South Africa." The report said the
Black Caucus had agreed to go along to assure passage over a presidential veto. "We
want very much to see this legislation move forward," said Mickey Leland (D-Texas)
chairman of the Black Caucus. The Senate bill prohibited new investment in South
Africa, banned imports of steel and other products, denied landing rights to South
African Airways, and imposed restrictions on government and commercial ties. In
contrast, the Dellums bill would have banned all trade ties between the US and South
Africa and required complete withdrawal ofUS companies from South Africa —
disinvestment.9
On September 23 the White House announced that Reagan would veto the
sanctions bill despite a warning from Senator Richard Lugar that "his own personal
world leadership on this issue is really at stake. We really need to be on the right side
of history in this case."
10 Reagan vetoed the measure anyway on September 25. On the
eve of the Senate's vote to override the president's veto, South Africa's Foreign
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Minister Reolef Botha called several conservative senators and warned them that
South Africa would stop importing grain from the United States if Reagan's veto was
overridden. Lugar denounced Botha's calls as an act of "bribery and intimidation"
calculated to influence the vote on sanctions. Media reports indicated that the calls
might have pushed some senators to vote for the override because they felt Botha was
trying to intimidate them and interfere in US affairs. Senators saw the long-distance
lobbying effort as a last-ditch, "go-for-broke" effort to prevent the United States from
imposing economic restrictions. 11 On October 3, The Washington Post reported that:
"The Republican controlled Senate yesterday completed a yearlong revolt against
President Reagan's policy toward South Africa, voting by a wide margin to override
Reagan's veto of legislation imposing new economic sanctions against the white
minority regime in Pretoria." The 78 to 21 vote was the most serious foreign policy
defeat for Ronald Reagan and the first time Congress had overridden his veto.
In Johannesburg, the South African Broadcasting Corporation said in a
commentary on the Senate vote that South Africans wished to "serve notice that they
will map out their future not as outsiders with but as they themselves decide through
negotiation." South African Foreign Minister Botha described the Senate vote as
"thoughtless" complaining that "It was clear to me that the decision was taken
regardless of our reform program, and no reason or argument could stop this
emotional wave." 12 Anglican Archbishop Desmond Tutu welcomed the sanctions as "a
moral decision" that was "not anti-South Africa ... it is anti-injustice, anti-apartheid."
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In the United States, members of the Congressional Black Caucus were
ecstatic. "This is probably the greatest victory we have ever experienced," Rep.
Mickey Leland, chairman of the Black Caucus said. Leland said members of the CBC
were jubilant despite the fact that the bill had been "compromised." Randall Robinson
struck a similar note after receiving congratulations from the crowd watching the
Senate vote from the galley. "Our jubilance is tempered by the fact that we understand
this to be the beginning not the end." 13
In London, The Guardian's Alex Brummer argued that President Reagan had
"badly underestimated the strength of ethnic identity." Brummer argued that the
president's "myopia 1 was clearly to blame for the debacle. "All around, from the
President's own state of California which divested this summer, to trade unions in
Chicago and his own friends in the business community, the nation has been waking
up to the moral force of Black ethnic politics. But Mr. Reagan was dozing in his
cocoon of white advisers. 14 These advisers continued to claim that sanctions would
hurt Africans and that they would not change Pretoria. The National Review, for
instance, editorialized on 6 June 1986 that "Capitalism has been the principal lever of
amelioration in the lives of black South Africans. Bishop Tutu and the shanty-of-the-
week set have their program for South Africa's future, but there can be others." George
F. Will claimed that "South Africa needs more ofwhat sanctions will diminish. It
needs foreign capital operating under the rules of foreign justice." On 10 December
1986 The Wall Street Journal said anti-apartheid activists were not interested in
reform but in revolution: "they know the U.S. civil rights techniques of20 years ago,
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in which you pressed a little harder and got a little more. The effect in South Africa
scarcely matters: the point is to enact the ritual." In a July 1987 Commentary article
titled "Fantasies About South Africa," P. Berger and B. Godsell declared that "people
in the West who have used South Africa as their ventilation valve for their own moral
and political frustrations, finding in it a convenient surrogate or an easy analogy for
issues at home whose complexity has rendered them intractable."
This conservative backlash against sanctions continued into December with a
New York Times commentary by Heramn Nickel, a former US Ambassador to South
Africa titled: "The Anti-apartheid Act Boomerangs." Nickel, who was ambassador
between 1982 and October 1986, expressed the administration's position that the South
African Government had become more truculent after sanctions. "Pretoria is no longer
prepared to even listen, let alone respond positively to American pleading." Nickel
insisted that sanctions were bad for black workers in South Africa, concluding "the
unique realities of South Africa demand accommodation." 15 The Washington Post also
expressed doubts about sanctions in an editorial on 12 December titled "Have
Sanctions Already Failed?" The editorial reviewed questions raised by opponents
about the South African government's suggestion that sanctions had led to an increase
in violence and that it was costing the United States what little influence that it had on
South Africa. "Many had hoped for a quick shock effect .. Now real people are losing
real jobs." Despite the doubts, the editorial concluded, "there is reason enough to
dismiss early declarations that already the law has backfired and proved itself a
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failure." Nevertheless the Post argued that the United States should proceed with
caution and "watch what happens." 16
Meanwhile South Africa launched a major offensive against anti-apartheid
protesters. In a pre-dawn raid, the government rounded up dozens of black activists,
labor officials and student leaders. Also arrested in the raid was Zwelakhe Sisulu,
editor of the black newspaper New Nation and son of imprisoned ANC leader Walter
Sisulu. President P.W. Botha announced that the crackdown was necessary to counter
what he called a bloody terrorist campaign by ANC guerrillas. "Our security forces
have .. been compelled to conduct certain preventive security measures (against) the
terrorist alliance," Botha said on television hinting that cross border raids would
resume. The government also issued orders prohibiting protests against the six-month-
old state of emergency, the release of political prisoners or the withdrawal of troops
from black neighborhoods. New censorship regulations also prohibited reporting of
security forces operations.
17
This new crackdown led to a subtle shift in US policy when Secretary of State
George Shultz announced that he was planning to meet with Oliver Tambo, the exiled
leader of the ANC. The Shultz-Tambo meeting would be unprecedented in the Reagan
administration, which had hitherto referred to the ANC as a terrorist organization. This
meeting would also mark a change in the "constructive engagement" policy of seeking
change through the white minority regime. This political recognition by the United
States was cautiously welcomed by the ANC, which had also met with British Foreign
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Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe in September. As one ANC official put it: "South
Africa's closest allies -the United States and Britain-now talk to the ANC." The
officials said however that the meeting should not be seen as a tilt toward the United
States, "there are still a number of points on which we disagree ... Most importantly,
we re on different wavelengths over how far they should go to pressure this (South
African) regime." 18
During the presidential campaign season in 1987/88, TransAfrica kept the
issue of apartheid alive by rating presidential candidates according to their votes on
the South Africa sanctions bill in what TransAfrica called the "Faces Behind
Apartheid" campaign. Launching the campaign, Randall Robinson said the aim was to
make US policy toward South Africa a "litmus test" for presidential candidates
seeking the black vote. "If a candidate does not see the importance of this issue as an
indicator of a candidate's sensitivity on race relations, then that candidate does not
understand black America," Robinson said. The plan was to identify one public figure
a month for the "honor." The first two targets were Sens.. Bob Dole and Sen. Jesse
Helms of North Carolina.
As soon as Senate Republican leader Robert Dole (R-Kansas) made his
candidacy official, TransAfrica singled him out as "a friend of apartheid." TransAfrica
bought newspaper advertisements in Dole's home newspaper The Wichita Eagle
Beacon on 5 March 1987 claiming that Dole was "one of the faces behind apartheid."
citing his opposition to the Senate's successful override of President Reagan's veto of
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sanctions legislation against South Africa. TransAfrica also charged that Dole had
made matters worse by hiring John Sears, a registered lobbyist for South Africa, as his
campaign adviser. The New York Times confirmed that Sears had received $506,824
from South Africa as a paid lobbyist in 1985 according to the Justice Department,
which reported that Sears "communicated the foreign principal's opposition to
economic sanctions against South Africa to members of Congress." 19 Justice
Department records also showed that Sears had received over $3 million from South
Africa between 1981 and 1985. Robinson said stronger US sanctions were needed
because the existing measures were "circumventable." Dole initially dismissed the ads
as "a fund-raising gimmick" sparked by his high visibility. Nevertheless he found
himself answering question about the ads repeatedly in the first few days of this
campaign. On March 7 he defended his civil rights record "with a hint of annoyance"
in an interview with The New York Times. As Dole launched his campaign,
TransAfrica ran the ad to coincide with the candidate's appearances on various
campaign stops. The result was that reporters asked Dole about the ads at every stop.
In Iowa, TransAfrica ran the ad in The Des Moines Register to coincide with Dole's
visit. Asked about the ad Dole angrily told United Press International that Robinson
was "a big-lipped liberal Democrat" adding that his civil rights record was "spotless"
and that he would not be "intimidated" by Robinson. In response, Robinson said
Dole's ad hominem attack that is unresponsive to the issue raised is really unbecoming
of a presidential candidate and raises serious questions about his worth for high
office." Robinson also ridiculed Dole's defense of his civil rights record, which,
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Robinson said, was irrelevant to the discussion over sanctions, a foreign policy issue
where Dole's role in trying to block sanctions had been deplorable.20
In June, TransAfrica celebrated its first decade of existence at the pinnacle of
success. The stunning victory in passing the sanctions legislation in Congress had
raised the organization's profile. Robinson had hired a staff of 15 and raised more than
a million dollars for an endowment fund and was planning to buy an office building to
house its offices and library. Despite these signs of institutionalization, TransAfrica's
10th anniversary gala resembled a call to arms. Robinson attacked presidential
aspirant Robert Dole for calling him a "big-lipped liberal." He also skewered Rep.
Dick Gephardt (D-Mo) for calling a meeting of African Americans without consulting
with leaders of the CBC and TransAfrica. Robinson served notice that African
Americans would not be taken for granted in the 1988 election asking why none of the
presidential candidates, with the exception of Jesse Jackson, had accepted invitations
to attend the gala.
21
In an assessment of the effectiveness of sanctions a year after they were
passed, David Newsom, a former assistant secretary of state for African affairs, argued
that expectations that US sanctions would lead to the dismantling of apartheid had
proved "highly unrealistic." Instead, the South African Government had shifted to the
right and reversed some moderate reforms. "Those who argue that sanctions have
'backfired' and have slowed down the pace of reform have logic on their side,"
Newsom wrote. He noted, however, that for black radicals, the intent of sanctions was
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not to reform apartheid but to dismantle the system entirely. For these groups,
sanctions and disinvestment were a success because they were designed to isolate
South Africa, not influence the white supremacist government. This group saw the
withdrawal ofUS companies and the meeting between Secretary of State George
Shultz and Oliver Tambo of the ANC as a breakthrough. Newsom warned that the
polarization of attitudes made moderate proposals remote.22
In November, TransAfrica again sponsored newspaper ads in Iowa attacking
presidential candidate Bob Dole for his efforts to block sanctions against South Africa.
In an angry response Dole said: "These phony attempts to distort my record aren't
going to fool anyone." He attacked TransAfrica's Randall Robinson as someone "who
uses tactics that every responsible civil rights leader would reject." The ads showed
footage of violence in South Africa with a voice over charging that "While thousands
of black are brutally jailed, Bob Dole just votes to looks the other way." "We don't
want a president who will do business with racists in South Africa," the voice-over
continued as a "White Only" sign flashed on screen. The ad reportedly cost $1,500 to
produce and ran 100 times in Iowa, a key state in the 1988 campaign. Dole released a
statement defending his civil rights record and claiming to be a staunch opponent of
apartheid. Meanwhile Dole attacked the timing of the ads: "Randall Robinson spewed
out this venom once before but his effort fell flat. Now he thinks he'll get a bigger
audience, and maybe raise some money, by trying to exploit my announcement."23
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Unfortunately 12 Iowa television stations rejected the ad as too controversial h
November. Two months later, however, WNEV and WCVB, Boston's CBS and ABC
affiliates, accepted it. The ads were also accepted in New Hampshire where
TransAfrica was also planning a demonstration at Dartmouth College, the location of
the Republican Party debate involving six candidates.24 In February, TransAfrica
found a new target in Pat Robertson who had told South African television on 10
February that African Americans view the struggle against apartheid as "an extension
of the United States civil rights movement. I think they don't understand what they
dealing with, really, in this South Africa thing. And so, it becomes an American
political issue to say ifyou want support among American blacks for American
political office, you have to bash South Africa. I think that's wrong." Robinson said
the remark belittled African Americans and their understanding of foreign affairs.
"One is unsettled by this only because he is being seriously taken by the voters. I can't
say I'm surprised by this kind ofremark that comes from a racist, redneck
fundamentalist."25
are
On March 8 the United States and Britain vetoed a Security Council resolution
that called for selective mandatory sanctions against South Africa after its crackdown
on anti-apartheid activists and the banning of black newspapers. The vote was 10 in
favor and 2 against. The vote came at the request of African states that sought
condemnation of South Africa for imposing a total ban on the activities of 17 anti-
apartheid groups. Meanwhile, Congress and the White House renewed their battle over
sanctions as House members introduced bills to broaden anti-apartheid legislation
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passed in 1986. Ron Dellums and 95 other members introduced the most
comprehensive bill. Like the 1986 version, Dellums's bill called for total
disinvestment, a trade ban and end to military and intelligence cooperation. This time
around Dellums believed that there was a much greater chance of success because of
the daily reports of repression emanating from South Africa. "I believe that it is a
moral and political imperative that the government of the United States make a
powerful, clear, clean, unambiguous, uncomplicated, unequivocal statement about the
deteriorating situation in South Africa," Dellums said. Harold Wolpe (D-Mich) who
was the chairman of the House Subcommittee on Africa argued that South Africa's
intransigence had created a "broad bipartisan consensus in the House ... for stronger
economic sanctions and for presidential leadership of an international campaign of
economic and diplomatic pressure to end apartheid." Although Wolpe was right on the
first count, he would be proved wrong on the second. Reagan and his advisers had no
intention of changing their minds on South Africa. Instead the administration sent four
assistant secretaries of state to register strong opposition to the Dellums bill during a
House Foreign Affairs hearing.26
Nevertheless the bill survived the dreaded committee process. By 1988 the
Dellums bill had become the House bill with the full support of the Foreign Affairs
Committee. Although still known as the Dellums Bill, Harold Wolpe, chairman of the
House subcommittee on Africa, managed it on the floor. In April, the House Foreign
Relations Committee approved legislation patterned on Dellums's bill banning all U.S.
trade with and investment in South Africa. "The situation in South Africa has
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continued to deteriorate, and we have a obligation to continue the pressure," Dellums
said, adding that he hoped the renewed debate over sanctions would make apartheid ar
issue in the 1988 preputial elections. Despite the House action, Republicans and
administration officials continued to oppose the bill. Sen. Richard Lugar (R-Ind)
claimed that the Dellums approach was too radical: "A manifesto that all is lost so you
simply cut off every tie." Lugar argued that the United States should reward P.W.
Botha for suggesting that Africans could be given a limited role in the selection of the
next president.
The sanctions legislation provided US corporations one year to dispose of their
holdings in South Afirca. It also banned direct and indirect trade, shipment of
petroleum products to South Africa in US vessels; intelligence cooperation between
US and South African intelligence and military agencies; required the US to impose
sanctions on countries that take advantage ofUS sanctions; and authorized $40 million
to assist black people in South Africa. These provisions brought a flood of criticism
from conservative journals. The US Journal ofCommerce for instance published a
piece by Donald deKierffer titled "Aiming right for the briar patch" which ridiculed
the House debate on the Dellums bill as "a circus sideshow" and praised business
interests for refusing to testify because "any corporate witnesses would have wound up
as the entree of a cannibal feast."27 The writer went on to argue that the bill's effects
would "include the biggest windfall for the South Africa economy in the past 50
years."
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The Jackson Doctrine
Meanwhile, however, Jesse Jackson had taken the anti-apartheid struggle to the
national stage in his campaign for nomination as the Democratic Party's candidate for
president in 1988. During his 1988 campaign, Jackson's position on the apartheid
question was informed by his now extensive contacts with leaders in the southern
Africa region. His campaign also coincided with the climax of the anti-apartheid
movement which had won significant victories in Congress, universities and colleges
throughout the country and in influencing states and major cities to place sanctions on
corporations that continued to invest in South Africa. The Rainbow Coalition's South
Africa plank was part of an overall foreign policy platform called The Jackson
Doctrine on the Third World that was developed in opposition to the Reagan-Bush
doctrine. In the case of South Africa, Jackson opposed "constructive engagement" that
emphasized the role of South Africa as a bastion against anti-communism in Africa
and its importance as a NATO ally. In a speech to the American Society ofNewspaper
Publishers in Washington DC. On April 14, 1988, Jackson argued that Reagan's
policies were "based on a fundamental misconception of the world. The countries of
the Third World are not drawn to communism ... They tend towards non alignment,
for they seek aid and investment wherever they can find it."
28 The Jackson Doctrine
called for support for international law, self-determination, human rights, and the
promotion of economic development and justice in the Third World. It called for the
United States to take the lead in the struggle against apartheid by convening a "summit
of the Front-line states;" offering military assistance to these countries so they could
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defend themselves against South African aggression; work to get both South African
and Cuban troops out ofAngola and to free Namibia.
In an "Issue Brief on the South African question, Jackson condemned the
Reagan administration for continuing to ignore the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid
Act of 1986 which had required South Africa to make significant progress toward
ending its system of apartheid or face full economic sanctions. The legislation required
the repeal of emergency laws; respect for the principle of equal justice before the law;
the release of black political prisoners; and the right of the black majority to
participate in the political process. Jackson argued that none of these goals had been
met and accused Reagan of ignoring the law by continuing with the "constructive
engagement" policy. He proposed that South Africa be declared a terrorist state to
allow the implementation of comprehensive sanctions; a summit of the Front-line
States, the United States and European community; implementation of comprehensive
sanctions and a complete ban on trade with South Africa and a date by which all U.S.
corporations are forced to withdraw from South Africa; aid to the Front-line states to
free them from South African domination; and an end to the United State military aid
to UNITA rebels in Angola and tactical support to RENAMO guerrillas in
Mozambique.29
In an interview published in Africa Report of May-June, 1988, Jackson
explained that his Jackson Doctrine:
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Calls for the total redefinition of our relationship to Africa. It calls for U.S.
goals and interests to be more in line with those of African leaders and their
peoples. It calls on the U.S. to recognize that African economic, political and
social goals are based on fundamental realities of their people and not on rigid
11 30
ideological lines."
Jackson backed progressive or "third world" positions on foreign policy like
\
increased development aid to countries in sub-Saharan Africa; debt restructuring;
increased trade; the strengthening of sanctions against South Africa; freedom for
Namibia; and the end of aid to UNITA and other right wing movements and regimes
in southern Africa.
31
This has led scholars like Karin Stanford, Beyond the Boundaries
Jesse Jackson and International Affairs , to argue that Jesse Jackson advocated a "third
world" approach to international relations.
32 She argues that this approach is based on
his experience in the United States that he describes as a "Third World experience
right here in America."
In contrast, a survey of the Investor Responsibility Center (IRC) found that all
Republican candidates from Sen. Bob Dole to Pat Robertson, and Vice-President
George Bush opposed new sanctions against South Africa. Robertson favored
eliminating sanctions already in effect. The Republicans also supported Reagan's
continued aid to UNITA in Angola. Dole and Robertson called for sanctions against
Angola and the withdrawal of U.S. companies and also support Renamo guerrillas in
Mozambique. George Bush was also reported to have made some contact with the
South African-backed Renamo rebels while Robertson wanted to recognize the group
as "freedom fighters" and provide them with military aid.
33 The survey showed that all
the Democratic candidates supported new sanctions although Dukakis opposed the
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imposition ofnew sanctions unless the European community agreed to the proposal.
Democratic Party nominee Michael Dukakis finally agreed to adopt Jackson's South
Africa plank which supported the Dellums Bill and declared South Africa a terrorist
state, called for comprehensive sanctions, a deadline for the withdrawal of U.S.
corporations, Namibian independence, assistance to Mozambique and an end to the
support for UNITA rebels in Angola.34
On 1 1 August 1988 the House passed the Dellums bill imposing new, tougher
sanctions on South Africa. The Los Angeles Times described the bill in a front-page
story as "far more radical than the sanctions that Congress imposed against South
Africa two years ago over President Reagan's veto" and as a bill that would "virtually
halt trade and cancel all U.S. investments in South Africa." Republicans opposed the
measure on grounds that it would hurt black South Africans and increase the
determination of the white minority to remain in power. The bill forced U.S. oil
companies to dispose of their investments in South Africa; required US companies to
divest in 180 days and imposed an import ban on all South African goods except
strategic minerals. Rep. William S. Broomfield (R-Mich) was even quoted saying that
"This is a Dukakis-Jackson foreign policy initiative." 35 Thus Jackson's influence in
the Democratic Party's Africa policy was clearly felt on both sides of the Congress.
This admission of his influence in the Legislature demonstrates the impact of Party
platforms on voting patterns in Congress.
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The Washington Post described the bill as "a declaration of economic war" that
would also require retaliation against the EEC and Japan if they took advantage ofUS
measures. It would also force oil companies to choose between trading with South
Africa and receiving any new coals, oil or gas leases from the United States. The
House Foreign Relations Committee reported that US companies held $1.4 trillion in
direct investments and $2.5 billion in indirect investments in gold-mining companies
in 1986. The US had also provided South Africa with $2.95 billion in bank loans as of
September 1987 and $200 million in taxes paid to the South African government by
US corporations. 36
According to the Post, "The most emotional moment came during a speech by
Ron Dellums who came to Congress two decades ago as an activist firebrand and who
grew gray-haired and into the House establishment." Dellums received a standing
ovation for his speech that included even some Republican members. The passage of
this bill was a major victory for Dellums, who had introduced the first sanctions bill in
Congress in 1971 and had seen some provisions of the bill pass into law in 1986. The
1988 bill, however, included broad new restrictions including:
(1) A ban on US investments in South Africa and a requirement that American
companies and individuals rid themselves of investments there
(2) A prohibition against all imports from South Africa except strategic
minerals and publications
(3) A ban on all exports to South Africa except for farm products
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(4) A ban on new federal coal, gas and oil leases to US subsidiaries of
companies that export oil to South Africa
(5) A requirement that US ships do not carry oil destined for South Africa
(6) A ban on intelligence and military cooperation with South Africa
Despite the major victory in the House, conservative Republicans blocked the
measure in the Senate. President P.W. Botha of South Africa called the sanctions vote
"reckless." Nevertheless, black leaders argued that the threat ofmore sanctions forced
the South African regime to the negotiating table on the issue ofNamibia. On a trip to
the United States in January 1989, for instance, United Democratic Front leader, Allan
Boesak said sanctions had played a role in South Africa's decision to settle conflicts in
Namibia and Angola. Boesak also said sanctions had slowed down South Africa's
economy and made it harder to maintain the armed forces. 37
Meanwhile black church leaders launched a campaign to mobilize support for
sanctions. Leaders of the African Methodist Episcopal Church, AME Zion Church,
Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, Church of God in Christ, National Baptist
Convention of America, National Baptist Convention U.S.A. and Progressive National
Baptist Convention pledged to mobilize their collective membership of 19 million for
the anti-apartheid cause. In a statement, the church leaders said they were motivated
by "The intensifying brutality of the Pretoria regime -death and detention of children,
attacks against the churches and church leaders - and the war against South Africa's
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neighbors compel us to speak out as one united voice for an end to the pain being
inflicted upon our sisters and brothers."38
ion
The church initiative emerged from a challenge from Rev. Allan Boesak in
September 1987 when he called on black churches to mobilize support for sanctions.
In September 1988, a delegation of black church leaders visited southern Africa and
met with church leaders and leaders of the African National Congress. The delegat
was denied entry into South Africa. After the tour, the group resolved to support
stronger sanctions as contained in the Dellums Bill; economic aid for front-line states;
an end to US support for UNITA rebels in Angola; and an international boycott of
Shell Oil. Bishop Ruben Speaks of the AME Zion Church said at the meeting that
there was no consensus on whether to support the ANC which "had been accused of
terrorism." Others, however, voiced support for the ANC "We do not agree with
others who have called them terrorists and communists," said Rev. Mac Charles Jones
of National Baptist Convention of America.
By May, mainstream Protestant denominations and the U.S Catholic
Conference had joined the church leaders, who called themselves the "South Africa
Crisis Coordinating Committee." On 17 May the group launched a nationwide
ecumenical campaign to protest apartheid. The committee called for a day of fasting
on May 26. It also organized a series of speaking tours by US and South African
clerics between June 1 and June 15 followed by a day of lobbying at the Capitol on
June 16. The committee called on supporters to sign a "covenant" stating: "The time
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has come for the faith, prayers, energy of the worldwide church of Jesus Christ to be
clearly focused on bringing an end to the diabolical system known as apartheid. We
hereby make a covenant with the church and the people of South Africa until South
Africa is Free."39
In May, TransAfrica hosted a meeting between South African clerics and 80
top U.S. government officials and corporate and civic leaders brought together in
Washington D.C.40 The summit culminated in the delegation meeting with President
George Bush at the White House. No breakthroughs came from this first meeting
between the representatives of South African blacks and a U.S. president. Bishop
Desmond Tutu, the leader of the delegation described the meeting with Bush as
follows, "He said he didn't want to give the impression of benign indifference, that he
wanted to be a catalyst for change
... As the first black South African delegation to be
received, we obviously were looking for signals... It may come to nothing. Pray God it
doesn't."
41
In June President Bush invited members of the CBC to the White House for
the first time in years. During the meeting Ron Dellums, chairman of the CBC, pushed
Bush on sanctions and other issues for over an hour. Afterwards Dellums said that
although Bush was against sanctions, he thought the new president might take a
different approach from Reagan's. Bush quickly signaled a change in policy by
inviting Albertina Sisulu to the White House. Sisulu was both the wife ofjailed ANC
leader Walter Sisulu and co-chairman of the United Democratic Front. Because Sisulu
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was banned, South Africa had to relax restricts to allow her to travel to the United
States for the meeting. Activists hailed this flexibility on both sxdes of the Atlantic.
Meanwhile Dullums continued with efforts to pass stronger sanctions
legislation. In response, the Bush administration reversed itself and began to admit
that sanctions were having a positive effect on South Africa. Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs Herman J. Cohen told the New York Times's Anthony Lewis he
believed that there was "new thinking" on both sides. "Sanctions have had a major
impact on the thinking of the white community. There is no capital inflow. There is
disinvestment. People worry about the future. They say to themselves 'this is
preventing us from having the kind of economy that will maintain living standards for
our children.' So sanctions have had a positive effect, though I think further sanctions
would not." Cohen said the future of South Africa would depend on the black
community and the international community coming together to force the apartheid
regime to the negotiating table.42 The White House also indicated that it would invite
F.W. de Klerk, the head of the National Party, to meet the president later in the year.
The invitation was hastily withdrawn after 100 Congressmen sent the president a letter
of protest.
Nevertheless rumors of a negotiated settlement continued to spread.
Throughout 1987 media reports had suggested that Mandela had softened his position
on negotiations with the National Party. He had talked secretly with at least four
Cabinet ministers and agreed to a meeting with Botha who had told his fellow whites
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to "adapt or die" as far back as 1979. On 5 July Nelson Mandela met with President
P.W. Botha for tea and what he called "talks about talks."43 The controversial talks
were met with confusion on both sides. Afrikaners called Botha a "traitor" for meeting
with their longtime foe while the ANC, which had rejected any contact with the whites
until Mandela was released, remained tightlipped. Rev. Frank Chicane and Winnie
Mandela immediately released a statement claiming the talks were not supported by
the ANC. Mandela himself released a counter-statement arguing that "dialogue with
the mass democratic movement, and in particular with the African National Congress,
is the only way of ending violence, and bringing peace."
Anti-apartheid groups saw this movement toward negotiation as a result of
sanctions. Randall Robinson argued "South Africa is in a tough way and it is in a
tough way in large part because of sanctions, if the effect has been limited, that is
because the sanctions are themselves limited." Robinson argued that sanctions had
blocked economic growth, reduced business confidence and led to a flight of foreign
investment capital. Sanctions had also sparked disinvestment by US companies. In
April 1989 Mobil Corp., the largest US company still in South Africa had announced
that it was pulling out of South Africa because of a 1987 change in tax law sponsored
by Congressman Charles Rangle ofNew York which banned US companies from
claiming an American tax benefit for taxes which their South African operation paid to
the South African government. Mobil had 400 million in assets and nearly 3,000
employees. According to the Investor Responsibility Research Center, 28 companies
had withdrawn in 1988, 56 in 1987 and 52 in 1986.
44
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The momentum for reform was increased with the resignation ofP.W Botha
and his replacement by Frederick W. de Klerk, who, The Economist said, "smiled
rather then snarled when the old chief barked." Robert Bauer, special counsel to Rep.
Ron Dellums, who was sponsoring new legislation against South Africa, argued that
de Klerk was merely a "sophisticated face on the system." Robert Price, professor of
political science at the University of California at Berkeley agreed, "The South
African government under de Klerk will be representing to the outside world a new
face in hopes they can reverse sanctions." Victor Mashabela of the ANC office in New
York also urged the West to continue with sanctions despite the ascension of de Klerk.
"Our own thinking is not to wait but to escalate pressure so de Klerk finds he has no
other way to maneuver." Conservatives, however, continued to insist that black
Africans would suffer more from sanctions. Peter Dunigan, a senior fellow at the
Hoover Institution, claimed that black people would be much better off if they worked
with the South African government. Dunigan called for a system of rewards and
penalties toward South Africa. He argued that the withdrawal of over 100 US
companies had led to a growth in unemployment and frightened off foreign investors
pushing the country further to the right.45
In September South Africa held parliamentary elections that excluded seventy
five percent of the population. This election served as the catalyst for a renewal of
mass protests throughout the country and the world. During the elections, De Klerk
ordered one of the most powerful crackdowns to curry favor with the white electorate.
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Forelgn observers reported the use of tear gas, water hoses, whrps, clubs and bullets to
Asperse peaceful demonstrators. Archbishop Tutu was tear-gassed after persuading a
group of youths not to march on the police station. Tutu was arrested the next day
while protesting the beating of clergymen. Anti-apartheid groups renewed calls for
protests. In a commentary titled "A New Face Shows His True Colors," TransAfrica's
Randall Robmson churned that de Klerk was one of the most conserve members of
Botha's cabinet. •-'Despite his talk about reform and negotiation, the pnority of the
country's new leader, Frederick De Klerk, is the perpetuation ofwhite supremacy.-
In contrast to TransAfrica and the anti-apartheid movement, the Bush
administration congratulated De Klerk on his victory calling the vote a mandate for
"real change." The State Department also issued a statement that offered US support
while calling on de Kerk to deliver reforms. The statement listed a number of
conditions including release of all political prisoners including Nelson Mandela, the
return of political exiles, the lifting of the state of emergency and the unbanning of
Black Nationalist organizations and individuals. Meanwhile the chairman of the House
subcommittee on Africa, Harold Wolpe (D-Mich.), predicted that Congress would
pass stronger sanctions if de Klerk did not "dismantle apartheid by early 1990." Wolpe
said Congress was watching de Klerk and talking with the White House about
appropriate legislative actions if de Klerk did not move quickly to institute reforms.
The state department also said it was working with Congress "to develop a bipartisan
approach toward South Africa."47
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In October, the expected prisoner releases began with the announcement that
President de Klerk had freed eight promment political pnsoners mcludmg Walter
Sisulu and four other nationalists sentenced to death at the infamous Rivonia Trail of
1964. Nelson Mandela was not on the list of those released in October. Medla reports
quoted Rev. Frank Chicane saying that "Mandela does not believe his release is the
critical thmg. His release without a package to end apartheid system would be
meanmgles, I understand him to be saying that Ms release cannot be a substitute for
the freedom of the people." The announcement was seen as an effort to preempt the
expected imposition of stronger sanctions by the Commonwealth at its annual meeting
in October. Archbishop Desmond Tutu said de Klerk was "forced" to release the
prisoners. "We are pleased our leaders are out, but not satisfied, as many others remain
behind locked doors. What is the use of releasing them when we still have a state of
emergency and when our organizations are still banned?"
De Klerk said he hoped the releases would increase the "spirit of
reconciliation, which is currently evident in our country." The South African Council
of Churches warned that if de Klerk did not meet all the demands of black
organizations they would press for more sanctions. "The oppressed people need an
unequivocal indication from the government that it is willing to enter into genuine
negotiations aimed at ending apartheid immediately." The United Democratic Front
also called the move a "massive victory" for black people. 48 In an editorial on de
Klerk's actions The Washington Post argued that "one of his purposes is to head off a
threat of further economic sanctions."49 The Christian Science Monitor also argued
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that the release of pnsoners could "forestall stronger economic sanctions
... and open
the door for eventual black-white negotiations."50 The New York Times editorial called
on the United States and other western countries to "help by holding off further action
at this time." Nevertheless, even the New York Times admitted that the new eagerness
of the South African government to talk "no doubt owes much to existing sanctions,
like a ban on imports of South African textiles, agricultural products and iron and steel
and threatened sanctions like Representative Ronald Dellums's proposed total two-
way trade ban." The Times went on to say that the Bush administration had admitted
that the sanctions imposed in 1986 had "helped promote the new accommodating
atmosphere in Pretoria." 51
The South Africa government won immediate gains from the release of the
prisoners. The Commonwealth meeting on October 22 issued a declaration demanding
accelerated reforms and threatening harsher reprisals but did not vote for stronger
sanctions. Meanwhile Pretoria was able to reschedule $8 billion in short-term debt
closing the door to an international campaign to force a catastrophic immediate
repayment. The key to the negotiation process, however, was Nelson Mandela, who
had released a detailed proposal for negotiations as early as April despite the ANC's
preference for more radical measures.52 Reports at the Commonwealth meeting in
Kaula Lampur indicated that the release ofNelson Mandela was imminent. The
Toronto Star reported on 1 8 October that an ANC official in Malaysia for the
Commonwealth conference had said that there were plans for a meeting between F.W.
De Klerk and Mandela.
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CHAPTER 10
DISMANTLING APARTHEID
We not only regard Congressman Bill Gray, Ron Dellums and
TransAfrica's Randall Robinson as friends, but as brothers who have
done everything expected of them to help us sustain our struggle
against South Africa. ... But it is important to say that their legislative
work is not finished. The message of the ANC is that sanctions must
continue against the South African government. They must continue
not because we want conflict, but we believe that maintaining sanctions
is the best way to force the government to dismantle all remaining
pillars of apartheid.
Nelson Mandela, interview with Ebony May 1990
"Who is this man Mandela?" The U.S News & World Report asked in January
1990 and could only come up with three short paragraphs about the ANC leader. The
sketch of Mandela's life seemed to be drawn from a Who's Who collection detailing
his early education, legal practice and arrest by South African authorities in August
1962. Referring to him a as a "living legend" a "martyr" and "saint" the article
nevertheless concludes that "Mandela has not been photographed or quoted directly
since his final statement from the dock."
1
Nobody knew what Mandela looked like after 27 years. Yet the effort to ban
his image and words backfired. Instead he acquired a near messianic aura. The "Free
Mandela Campaign" launched after he was charged with sabotage at the "Rivonia
Trial" in 1963, became one of the most visible international human rights movements
of the 20th century. The United Nations General Assembly repeatedly called for his
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unconditional-release. Trade unions, political parties and student groups around the
world joined the campaign to free the leaders of the ANC. In 1984, both Houses of the
US Congress adopted a "Mandela freedom resolution." Mayor Eugene Gus Newport
of Berkeley, California, proclaimed 9 June 1984, "Nelson and Winnie Mandela Day."
Detroit's City Council adopted a resolution on 10 September 1984 calling for the
freedom ofNelson and Winnie Mandela. On 1 1 October 1984 anti-apartheid
organizations in the US presented the United Nations with petitions for the release of
Nelson Mandela signed by over 34,000 people. In 1986 the Commonwealth's Eminent
Persons Group described Mandela as a "living legend."
While in prison, Mandela had received thousands of honors and awards
including the Simon Bolivar International Prize, the Third World Foundation Prize,
national awards from Cuba and the German Democratic Republic; freedom of the
cities of Rome, Florence, Olympia, Sydney, Birmingham, Greenwich; honorary
degrees from City College in New York, University of Lancaster, Free University of
Brussels, Amhadu Bello University, and the University of Havana. Numerous
buildings and streets around the world are named after him and he has been elected
honorary member of trade unions and other organizations.
The imminent release of what the London Times called "the colossus of
African nationalism in South Africa" sent media around the world into a frenzy.
"Waiting for Mandela" became the standard headline. In an article titled "Awaiting
Mandela" The Economist wrote: "the man jailed a quarter of a century ago on>sabotage
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charges now holds the key to peaceful resolution of his country's racial conflict."
Nevertheless, the magazine managed to spend most of the editorial giving credit to de
Klerk for his "reforms." Returning to Mandela at the end, the editor observed:
"Prestige apart, this is true: when arrested 25 years ago, Mr. Mandela was merely one
of the party's four provincial leaders." 2
"Nightline makes history," Ted Koppel declared from Cape Town where he
had relocated to cover Mandela's release live. Koppel hosted a "town meeting" before
the event where de Klerk's henchmen were given an opportunity to promote the new,
"reasonable" face of apartheid. From the beginning, however, it was clear that the US
media were out of their depth. The Mandela story did not fit into the neat news
routines of the United States. First, the release was delayed by several hours, throwing
everybody's deadlines off. Then, organizers allowed members of the South African
Communist Party to hang the red flag on the podium and make "radical" speeches.
Finally, Mandela's first speech in 27 years began with fifteen minutes of salutations to
all the dignitaries assembled and freedom fighters past and present who had made that
moment possible.
Soon after Mandela's release, media reports turned to the growing threat of
"black-on-black violence." In a diabolical attempt at agenda setting, the South African
government shifted the focus from apartheid to "tribal animosities" by orchestrating
massacres to provoke violence between the UDF and the Inkatha. As the South
African Truth Commission has now revealed, the government orchestrated a campaign
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^lack-on-black'Widen^ to discredit Mandela and the ANC and hold the township
violence as a trump card in negotiations over power sharinga^anctions. The
strategy worked in the United States where President Bush immediately began a
campaign to "reward" South Africa for its "reforms." As soon as the government of
South Africa announced that Mandela was about to be released President George
Bush, who had opposed the CAAA of 1986, announced that he would be reviewing
the sanctions legislation. 3 After Mandela's release Bush expressed "delight" at the
news and issued an invitationt^^ The invitation
rais<^^^ Randall Robinson called
the move a "serious mistake" and charged that Bush was assisting South Africa in its
quest for respectability in the international community. Robinson suggested that de
Klerk should meet lower level officials such as Secretary of State James Baker. "To
open it (the White House) to a regime of this ilk, is a major slap in the face,
particularly of black Americans, but for all people who cherish freedom everywhere. I
think the administration is resistant to majority rule in South Africa." 5 Robinson also
argued that Bush had rushed to embrace Polish labor leader Lech Walesa and
Congress pledged $900 million for Poland and Hungary while President Bush had to
be forced to meet with Archbishop Desmond Tutu. In March TransAfrica urged
Secretary of State James Baker to provide $20 million to the ANC to support its
transformation from a liberation movement to a political party "in the same way we
funded the Solidarity Movement and opposition parties in Nicaragua." 6
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By April, The U.S. News & World Report was announcing (hat "Nelson
Mandela, honeymoon is over,' The editorial e.aimed ,ha, "high hopes engendered by
Mandela's release from pnson are fading into fears of ehaos." It blamed "unrealisnc
expectations" from bom Macks and whites for Mandela, predtcament and concluded:
"For the moment, South Africans arc left to wonder why they imagmcd one man could
undo a century of snffermg and dtstrust." To counter the negative publicity
engendered by the vtolence, Mandela embarked on a 13-nation tour of theWe^
persuade governments no. to relax sanchons against the South African regime untd a„
•he ptllars of apartheid had been dismantled. Jus, as Mandela started h.s trip through
Europe, de Klerk enounced that the four-year-dd state of emergency had been lifted
in threeof Som Affica's
.four provinces. Thts move was clearly designed to undercut
Mande.a's positton in Western capitals. Despite this undercurrent, Mandela told
reporters m Paris that the move was "a victory for the people of South Africa"
although he expressed disappointment over the retention of the sate of emergency in
Natal.
Nelson and Winnie Mandela arnved to a tremendous reception at John F.
Kennedy International Airport on 20 June 1990. 750,000 New Yorkers lined
Broadway for a "ticker-tape" parade usually reserved for returning war heroes and
sports teams. Mandela was riding through New York in a specially built bullet-proof
vehicle nicknamed the "Mandelamobile" by New York police. That night 100,000
jammed Harlem's Africa Square to hear Mandela speak at the same podium where
Malcolm X had called on the South African government to release Mandela two
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decades before. New York a.so honored ,he ANC leader wift a rally of 80,000 a,
Yankee staftum complete wift a roek concert and vendors selHng Mande,a T-shirts
Ma„de,a flags and Ma„de,a eaps. fttroducing Mandela, ,he equally 1ege„dary Harry
Belafonte said
.here had never been a voiee more
.dentified with freedom. Msing to
the momen., Mandela domred a YarAees eap and broke into an impr„mptu rendition
of them toyi a South Afrlca„ yictoiy dmce ^^ attended a ster^
$2,500-a-.icke« firnd-ra.ser hos.ed by Eddre Mnrphy, Spike Lee and Robert De Mro.
The fianchon reportediy raised $500,000 from celebrities hke John Woodward, PanI
Newman and Mike Tyson. Mandela and his entourage men left for another fi.nc.ion a,
•he Park Avenue home of Democratic Party fimd-raisers Arthnr and Matiide Krtm
where they picked np another $500,000. Time editors, astonished a, the reception,
titled the next issue "A Hero in America."9
During h,s eleven days in ,he United States, he vis.ted e.gh. cities (six of them
led by black mayors), made 26 televised speeches, attended 21 meetings and lund-
raisers and addressed five news conferences. Questions a, rhese news conferences
ranged from Dan Rafter's sophomoric: "What was .he worst thing fta, happened t0
you in prtson?" followed by .he inane, "Wha. was .he bes, fti„g?» ABC's Ted Koppel
did a little better wift his question: "How does it feel to be admired by millions of
people around the world?"
The interviews also produced dramatic confrontations. In a pointed exchange
with Koppel during a nationally televised "town meeting" at City College ofNew
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York, M-e,a defended Us ngh, «„ meet with leaders rf^^^^
Ma„de.a ,o,d Koppe, and deeded ,o lecture h,m on grafitude and self-
ead a nation." Koppe, was«,^ . protracted^^
laughed, askmg , dotft know lf , have^ yQu?„ a^^^
Congress a, the "town meeting" argued *a« Mandela, snppor, for the PLO was
unacceptable but qu,ckly added te« they approved Mandela, statement tha, no
supported
,sraefs right t0 exist" After Mandela, comments on the PL0 Koppe
,
o backlash atnong powerful American mterest gronps. "No, Boren repiied. »I think
he Amencan peopie understand what ,s going on in South Africa. We know many
fannlies are d,vided because they have been ciassified according to race. We know
«ha, peopic are denied the righ, ,„ vote because of race. We know that peopie are
party ofposition or other issues, arc no, about to reheve the pressure unti, ,he sys.cn,
is changed." 11
The Castro issue was less amenable ,o Mandela's charm. On June 28 the
Cuban-American mayors ofMiami and surrounding cities refused to meet with
Mandela because of his statements about fidel Castro. The airwaves of Spanish-
language rad.o in Miami were filled with attacks on Mandela for his comments.
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Outside Miami Beach Convention center, African-American activists faced off with
Cuban-Americans during an appearance by Mandela attended by some 5,000 cheering
admirers.
12
This snub from Miami's Cuban-American community led to a three-year
boycott of Miami's tourism industry by African Americans organized by Boycott
Miami: Coalition for Progress which announced in 1993 that Miami had lost over $50
million in revenues from cancellations by black businesses. The boycott ended in
August 1993 after an agreement that called on Miami's business community to commit
to black empowerment through providing loans, bonding, insurance and contracting
opportunities. The agreement also included commitments by the $7 billion tourism
industry to provide jobs, scholarships, internships and job training for black students
seeking careers in tourism. The Knight Foundation also donated $250,000 for 125
scholarships to train black students and to deposit $2.5 million in the Peoples Bank of
Commerce the only black-owned bank in Florida. 13
Meanwhile Mandela was getting a hero's welcome in black-led cities. In
Detroit Governor James Blanchard, Mayor Coleman Young and Owen Beiber,
president of the United AutoWorkers met him. He attended several fund-raisers,
visited a Ford Motor Co. plant and made an appearance at a rally at Tiger Stadium
where he quoted Marvin Gaye's "What's Goin On" and partied with a throng of
70,000. In Boston, 300,000 turned up at the Esplanade to hear Mandela thank anti-
apartheid activists for their part in the anti-apartheid struggle. "We knew that our
cause would triumph," he told supporters. "We found great comfort in the knowledge
that you were with us. Not for a single day did you forget us, not for a single hour."
1
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Mandela also attended a $5,000 a couple of fund-raisers in Boston and landed a
$200,000 donation from the National Council of Churches.
In Washington, his schedule included meetings with the President George
Bush in the White House and a rare nationally televised address by a foreigner to a
joint session of both Houses of Congress. During this address, Mandela called on the
United States to maintain sanctions until apartheid had been dismantled. He also
linked the anti-apartheid struggle to that of American freedom fighters like John
Brown, Sojourner Truth, Frederick Douglass and Paul Robeson. In Atlanta, he paid
tribute to the leaders of the civil rights movement and laid a wreath on the tomb of
Martin Luther King Jr. Mandela made a powerful plea to Congress to "cede the
prerogative to the people of South Africa" of determining when to lift economic
sanctions. He outlined a five-stage process: (1) the removal of obstacles to
negotiations; (2) negotiating a mechanism to draw up a new constitution; (3) forming
the said constitution-writing body; (4) writing the constitution; and (5) holding
elections.
15
Mandela's position sparked a new debate about sanctions because the
conditions he proposed went beyond the provisions of the Comprehensive Anti-
Apartheid Act of 1986. The CAAA had only called for the release of political
prisoners, repealing of the state of emergency, unbanning of black political parties,
repealing of the Group Areas and Population Registration acts and a "commitment to
enter into negotiations" before sanctions could be terminated. President Bush refused
to accept Mandela's conditions maintaining that the United States would terminate
sanctions according to US law. In Congress, however, the Black Caucus and its allies
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were willing to cede the initiative to the South Africans. Ron Dellums, who had
nursed sanctions legislation through Congress for over two decades, argued that
"Sanctions should be lifted only when the oppressed people of South Africa say they
should be lifted." Later in a meeting with President F.W. De Klerk, Dellums said that
he would be willing to rethink sanctions if the South Africa government could
demonstrate in "word and deed" their commitment to an early total dismantling of the
apartheid system. But I also stated unequivocally my view that the current sanctions
must be kept in place until the major conditions of the 1986 sanctions law passed by
Congress had been met and a process established to achieve that transition to a
democratic, nonracist society."
16
The standing ovation bestowed on Mandela by the US Congress sparked angry
editorials in both the liberal and conservative white press in South Africa. In a June 28
editorial titled "Amazing" The Citizen complained that Mandela did not deserve this
"godlike" status:
Mr. Mandela is not a Martin Luther King who preached nonviolence; he was a
black revolutionary. ... That the American legislators can give Mr. Mandela an
ovation suggests that they either do not know his or the ANC's background, or
that it doesn't matter ... they have turned him into a Hollywood star. Mr.
Mandela has won the battle for sanctions, in Europe and the US, (but) when
the heady days of hero worship are over Mr. Mandela will have to get down to
the less exultant process of negotiating, with others, the future of South Africa.
And there is nothing godlike about that.
Mandela's final stop in the United States was in Oakland, California, Ron
Dellums's district and widely known as the "cradle of the divestiture movement."
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Dellums was ecstatic about the visit. "I was elated when he agreed to come to Oakland
to attend a rally in our municipal stadium. With tens of thousands of community
activists filling the ballfield and the stands, Mandela was greeted with thunderous
cheers. Being able to bring Mandela home to my community and introduce him to my
people brought to my mind the words of a popular rap rune "Can't touch this." 17
Nowhere had the anti-apartheid movement taken hold like in the San Francisco Bay
Area. In the mid-1980s longshoremen refused to unload South African cargo at Bay
Area ports. Cities like Oakland adopted some of the toughest divestment laws in the
country. In Berkeley, students boycotted classes, built shanties, occupied buildings
and were arrested in efforts to get the university to divest. In 1986 Gov. George
Deukmejian signed legislation proposed by Congresswoman Maxine Waters (D-Los
Angeles) allowing the state's pension fund to divest its $13 billion in assets. A flood of
withdrawals followed this action by California from South Africa by over 100 US
companies including IBM and Coca Cola. 18
Mandela's historic tour ended with his most difficult challenge, a meeting with
British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, a rabid opponent of sanctions who, in a
1988 debate on sanctions, had referred to the ANC as "a typical terrorist organization."
After meeting with Thatcher for three hours, Mandela said he was "encouraged"
although it was clear that Thatcher had maintained her position that the EEC should
repeal sanctions to reward de Klerk. 19 Despite Thatcher's opposition, the EEC voted to
maintain sanctions by 177 votes to 47 after the group's leaders met with Mandela in
Strasbourg. Mandela claimed that his historic mission to preserve sanctions against the
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South African government
"Succeeded beyond our wildest dreams. We go back to our
country feeling we have the full support of the international community," Mandela
sald
,
insisting that the tour would enhance his position in negotiations with the de
Klerk government. 20
Like Thatcher, American conservatives maintained a hard-line against
Mandela and his "mamtain sanctions" campaign. President Bush and his aides in the
State Department used every opportunity to praise F.W. de Klerk. During Mandela's
visit, Bush took time to discuss his warm regard for de Klerk even though the
questioner had not asked about him. The White House had also tried to invite de Klerk
for a state visit several times only to reverse itself because of popular opposition.
According to The Washington Post, "Mr. de Klerk can depend on a warm center of
support in the White House. While Mr. Mandela has been a hero to the masses, Mr. de
Klerk is officialdom's champion."21 The Post argued that Bush's regard for de Klerk
was based on a "habit" of supporting South African whites. Summing up Bush's
position, The Post concludes: "Although American officials admire Mr. Mandela, they
believe Mr. de Klerk is more important, and his departure from the scene would most
upset prospects for peaceful change."
National Review's editor Samuel Barber agreed with Bush but went further to
raise questions about Mandela's character and whether he was "exploiting the
uncritical reverence of his foreign worshippers to strengthen the organization's hand in
the pursuit of sole power?"22 Barber, who begins his story by comparing Mandela to
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Stalin and Ceausescu, blamed reporters for not questioning Mandela closely about his
ties to communists and his refusal to renounce armed struggle. Apparently privy to
inside information, Barber claimed George Bush and his Secretary of State James
Baker found Mandela "arrogant,
'dogmatic' and 'too liberation struggle minded.'"
Barber went on to lecture Mandela about how "the ANC's old friends and their
ideologies were now irrelevant, that Western democracy as embedded in the US was
the only game on the planet, and that he would henceforth have to play by its rules if
he wanted its help." He claimed the ANC was an extremist organization that sent its
members to "gulags" and eliminated competition. He also blamed the ANC for the
"tribal" violence in South Africa.
Forbes also joined the bash-Mandela club with an article by Michael Novak
titled "No hard Questions Please, Nelson Mandela and the US Media." Novak accused
reporters of "racism" and "double standards" for supposedly placing Mandela above
criticism. "If Mandela were white -if he were Margaret Thatcher, Helmut Kohl, Fidel
Castro or even Mikhail Gorbachev-his substantive views would certainly have been
subjected to criticism." Ironically, Novak then contradicts himself by referring to
Mandela's spirited answer to questions about his relations with the PLO, Gadaffi and
Castro on ABC's Nightline and the McNeal-Lehrer Newshour on PBS. Novak also
claimed Mandela was merely a pleasant face of a "secretive and extremist
organization" that "maintains a close alliance with the Communist Party." "Recent
African precedents are not reassuring," Novak wrote, pointing to the experience of
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other countries in the region. "IfNelson Mandela is leading his people into socialist
light, then he is no liberator. And his name will eventually live not in glory but in
infamy. It behooves those who would be his friends to question him closely ... and
direct his attention to the disasters that have befallen socialist regimes during the 27
years he was in prison."23
In an assessment of the impact of Mandela's tour on blacks and whites in the
United States, the U.S. New & World Report argued that the visit was "an unalloyed
triumph within black America." While admitting that some whites rallied to Mandela's
side, the U.S. News pointed out that other whites were put offby his embrace of
Arafat, Gadhafi and Castro. "More striking were signs that despite enormous media
coverage, much of white America wasn't paying serious attention. A riveting interview
with Ted Koppel on ABC, broadcast during prime time, drew a meager 9 percent
share of the television audience. ... Mandela discovered the same lesson as Gorbachev
on his last visit: It's hard for any foreign visitor to fire the American imagination these
days."
24
This conservative backlash continued during the rest of the year as reports of
"black on black violence" clouded debates over sanctions and the constitutional
process. In August, the ANC blamed South Africa's security forces for the violence
that had taken 183 lives in the country's black townships in one month. "Elements of
the state's security services are employing tactics ... in order to bring about insecurity,
fear and a willingness to submit to draconian measures," the ANC's statement
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declared, calling on the international community to condemn the South African
government for its actions. Despite the increase m violence, the number of strikes,
protests, boycotts and marches against the white minority government continued to
escalate. At a rally of more than 100,000 pro-ANC Zulus, for instance, Mandela called
on activists to throw their guns, pangas and knives into the sea. 25
Although leaders of the Organization of African Unity and South Africans
themselves had blamed the government for fomenting the violence, US media
generally framed the violence as "tribal." The Seattle Times, for instance, argued in an
editorial titled "Black on Black
-South Africa Convulses with Tribal Violence" that
ancient tribal feuds were likely to plunge South Africa into civil war as soon as
apartheid was dismantled. "After years of focusing on the abuses of white-minority
rule in South Africa, the global community has been shocked by the ferocity of black-
on black violence," the editorial observed. "Bloody clashes between two large South
African tribes put a harrowing and puzzling damper on the good news of progress
toward the end of apartheid." These doubts were exactly what the South African
government was hoping for in its escalation of surrogate violence against innocent
civilians.
26
On 3 September leaders of the seven front-line states meeting in Lusaka at a
summit chaired by President Kenneth Kaunda blamed the South African government
for the violence. "The summit sent a message to President de Klerk of South Africa to
stop the carnage," President Kaunda told reporters after the summit. 27 Later that month
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South African "liberal" Alistair Sparks wrote in The Washington Post that
massacre of passengers in rush-hour traffic "bore the stamp of careful planning and
precise execution, factors that support a view here that there is an organizing hand
behind the violence in South Africa's black townships." For weeks de Klerk had
rejected claims that a "third force" was fomenting violence to derail the negotiations
taking place between the government and the ANC. Eyewitnesses in Soweto claimed
they saw whites in black-face and ski-masks participating in the killing and driving the
getaway vehicles. After the rush-hour massacre de Klerk admitted that there may be a
"third force" and appointed a commission to study the issue. Although media reports
in South Africa identified the source of the violence in the South African security
forces and provided details of training camps for terrorist gangs, the de Klerk
government was unable or unwilling to do anything about the extremists in its forces.
Mandela and the ANC had repeatedly called on de Klerk to control the violence.
According to Mandela: "De Klerk's inability to take decisive steps to stop this violence
arises from the fact that some highly skilled, professional death squads are linked with
the security forces in this country."28
In October de Klerk made his long-awaited trip to the Untied States where he
managed to convince conservatives that "black on black violence" was the main
obstacle to reform and that sanctions should be lifted. In a column published in the St
Louis Post Dispatch, for instance, Cal Thomas spoke for conservatives when he called
on Bush to repeal sanctions as soon as possible. Thomas heaped praise on de Klerk for
reforming apartheid and declared "someone should nominate him for the Nobel Peace
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Prize." Randall Robinson denounced the meeting as "A superficial photo
opportunity, staged with the assistance of President Bush, to put a smiling face on a
sad and tragic situation. George Bush is an accomplice to a colossal public relations
fraud which attempt to portray F.W. de Klerk as a moderate reformer. The American
public and U.S. policy makers must be reminded that the major pillars of apartheid
remain firmly in place in South Africa."30
In a meeting between Mandela and de Klerk later that month, de Klerk
cynically refused to accept evidence that a "third force" was causing the violence in
the townships. Instead he claimed that black violence was the main obstacle to peace
talks. De Klerk's dirty tricks worked. In an editorial titled "Scrap Sanctions Now" The
Economist argued that "Mr. de Klerk has embraced change more than the ANC has. ...
perhaps it is Mr. Mandela who now needs the goading." The editorial claimed that the
road to negotiations "has been blocked by township slaughter." It claimed Mandela's
demand that the government allow peaceful demonstrations was "not persuasive"
because "Peace demonstrations are a normal democratic right but in abnormal South
Africa they often turn lethal." Thus peaceful marchers were to blame when police
opened fire on them. 31 In another article a week later The Economist claimed the black
nationalist movements in South Africa were "still crawling."
In January Mandela was featured in Time magazine's Men of the Year section.
The magazine credited Mandela with initiating the negotiation process and moving
South Africa toward reconciliation. The tribute noted, however, that Mandela had
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been "unable to statnp his authority My „„ h,s organization and its restless
following." Citing the "bitter flgh,in8 between the ANC and the Zulu-based Inkatha
movement" the arfcle laments that Mandela had refused to hold peace talks with
hkatha. Nevertheless Time argued that without Mandela the country would have
been worse off.
In mid-June South Africa announced that it would scrap the Population
Relation Act, one of the pillars of apartheid. The White House promptly let it be
known that it was reconsidering sanctions in light of South Africa's "reforms."
Officials told the rneda that South Africa had met all but one of the conditions
estabhshed by the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986. Under the sanctions
law South Africa was required to comply with five conditions before restrictions could
be removed: ending the state of emergency; unbanning the ANC, PAC and other
liberation movements; beginning negotiations with representatives of the black
majority; repealing apartheid laws and releasing all political prisoners. Administration
officials claimed the first four conditions had been met and that South Africa had
Pledged to release 300 political prisoners left in the country despite the fact that the
United Nations and human rights groups put the number at 2,000. Under the sanctions
law, the president had to certify to Congress that the conditions had been met after
which the Congress had 30 days to pass a joint resolution to block the measure. A
likely scenario given the CBC's implacable opposition to lifting sanctions. CBC
members argued that the CAAAs conditions had not been met because only
multiracial elections would insure the full integration of the liberation movements in
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.he governor, They a,so argued that South A«ea would have » re.ease ah 2,000
politiea! prisouers and no, the 300 that the Bush admmistration was wilhng to
accept. 32
On June 26 members of the Congressional Black Caucus met Bush to urge him
to mamtam sanctions against South Africa. In a 90-mmute meeting the present told
skeptical lawmakers that he was compelled by law to lift sanctions against South
Africa because it had fulfilled most of the conditions set forth m the Comprehensive
Anti-apartheid Act of 1 986. "I don't have much flexibility," Bush told the black
lawmakers. Dellums criticized Bush for taking a "narrow definition of his role" and
insisted that South Africa had only complied with two conditions: ending the state of
emergency and beginning negotiations with the black majority. Rep. John Lewis (D-
Ga.) charged the president with "sowing seeds of discontent and the seeds of
frustration" by calling the civil rights bill a "quota bill." On sanctions Lewis said his
gut feeling was that the administration had already decided to lift sanctions against
South Africa. Even the New York Times urged the president to "go slow" on sanctions.
"For Mr. Bush to lift sanctions before reasonable doubts are resolved would be
indefensible as stretching the law's language to prolong sanctions." 33
Bush, however, remained unmoved by appeals from church leaders, member of
Congress, civil-rights groups and human rights organizations around the world. On
July 10 he signed an executive order lifting economic sanctions against South Africa.
"We've seen a profound transformation of the situation in South Africa," Bush
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declared at a White House news conference. He praised de Klerk's "forward looking"
leadership for this transformation. In South Africa de Klerk hailed the move and
predicted it would boost the country's battered economy. The ANC, however, deplored
the action, calling it premature. In the US, anti-apartheid activists were outraged.
TransAfrica's Randall Robinson called Bush a "disgrace" charging that Bush was "a
president who never wanted sanctions now has taken an opportunity to distort and
violate American law to lift those sanctions." Robinson argued that South Africa had
hardly met one of the conditions and that lifting sanctions was a travesty. Senator
Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.) accused Bush of being "irresponsible" and "disobeying
the law." The Congressional Black Caucus called the move "utter hypocrisy." CBC
members argued that by lifting sanctions the president was responding to the argument
of corporations and conservatives in the State Department who had opposed sanctions
from the outset. President Bush was also accused of being insensitive to the needs of
people of color in general. The lifting of sanctions, for instance, came on the heels of
several unpopular decisions including his threat to veto a civil rights bill and the
controversial nomination of conservative Judge Clarence Thomas to replace Thurgood
Marshall on the Supreme Court. According to John Conyers "Taken together, these
steps show a profound and growing disinterest in the aspiration of Africans and
African-Americans for fundamental fairness and progress."34
President Bush's announcement went a long way toward ending the isolation of
South Africa in the international community. It came after the International Olympic
Committee ended a 21 -year ban on South African participation in the Olympic Games.
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The European Community had also hfted sanations in April 1991. Despite this ,haw in
South African isolatton, several other separate sanctions remained in effect. These
included the limitations in IMF and Export-rmpor, Bank .ending, a han on m exports
.0 South Africa's mtlitary and police, a mandatory United Nations arms embargo and a
ban on all intelligence sharing. In addttiou, 28 states and 92 cities enacted some
sanctions that would remain in effect.
Despite these drawbacks, South Africa moved inexorably toward majority rule.
Between 1989 and 1993, the government had freed Nelson Mandela and other political
Prisoners; legahzed opposition partes and political organizing for all races; repealed
the Group Areas Act and population Registration Act; and agreed to enter into
negotiations with black liberation movements without preconditions. The ANC and
other liberation movement called on the global community to maintain pressure on de
Klerk until apartheid was totally dismantled. The state and local sanctions still in place
in the United States remained in place until the summer of 1993 when the ANC
formally called for the end of sanctions and essentially the end of the anti-apartheid
movement.
In early July 1993 Mandela embarked on a coast-to-coast tour of the United
States that was described as "the first campaign swing of the 1994 South African
elections." Sponsored in part by Coca-Cola and several other U.S. companies,
Mandela's 1993 tour was aimed at raising funds from corporations unlike his historic
1991 swing through that mobilized popular support. This time Mandela accepted the
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sponsorship of corporate executives to raise a $20 million election fund for the ANC
and called for the infusion of foreign investment to create jobs and ease the transition
to majority rule. The ANC also encouraged support for a new US group called the
South Africa Free Election Fund formed to raise $10 million for the electoral process.
The group was chaired by the president of H.J. Heinz & Co. Anthony J.F. Reilly and
included prominent African Americans in its board like A. Leon Higginbotham Jr. a
former appeals court judge and Theodore C. Sorensen, a former advisor to President
John F. Kennedy. The ANC and anti-apartheid activists justified Mandela's fund-
raising among US corporations because of the magnitude of the challenge facing the
ANC and the need to mobilize 22 million first time black voters in eight months.
TransAfrica's Randall Robinson argued that "to raise money fast and create some
semblance of a level playing field over the next eight months will take a quick
turnaround in giving. That means corporate and foundation gifts. Ifyou can possibly
imagine any other alternative to the campaign among corporations and foundations,
Mr. Mandela would be glad to hear it." 35
Although Mandela did not officially call for the end of sanctions during his
two-week tour of the US, he did urge US corporations to prepare for a return to South
Africa as soon as democratic elections were held. According to the Investor
Responsibility Center 27 US companies had reopened offices since President Bush
lifted government sanctions against South Africa in July 1991. Because some
companies never left, there were 132 US companies in South Africa with direct
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investments and employees in South Africa and 405 companies, including Coca-Cola,
with licensing and distribution agreements. 36
The institutionalization of the South African liberation movements as political
parties was paralleled by the institutionalization of TransAfrica as the premier black
foreign policy lobby in the United States. This evolution from a movement to a formal
foreign policy lobby or "think tank" was reflected in a campaign to the purchase a $3.5
million headquarters for the organization in a renovated Dupont Circle mansion that
once housed the German Embassy. The new headquarters was inaugurated on 4 June
1993 as the Arthur Ashe Foreign Policy Library and Resource Center at a black-tie
reception featuring Haitian President Jean-Betrand Aristide, Virginia Governor L.
Douglas Wilder, Dorothy Height, Agriculture Secretary Mike Espy and news anchors
Bryant Gumbel, Ted Koppel and Bernard Shaw. The institute's new five-story
headquarters included a 6,000-volume library, a computer center, a public reading
room and space for meetings, administrative work and scholars' advisory council. In
16 years the organization had grown to a staff of 15, boasted 20,000 members in 12
chapters and many prominent black leaders on its board. It attracted high profile and
impressive corporate support: Reebok gave $375,000 for the building, Coca-Cola
$150,000, Philip Morris $200,000, and Time Warner and Anheuser-Busch $100,000
each. Celebrities also pitched in; Bill Cosby raised $430,000 at two dinners while
Sugar Ray Leonard wrote a personal check for $250,000. 37 Robinson told reporters
that the plan was to build a foreign policy "think tank" that could influence policy in
the interest of Africa and the Caribbean. "We have never competed institutionally in
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the area of foreign affairs. That's why we wanted a fully fleshed out think tank to gnnd
out the analysis that represents the interests of our community."
The ANC waited until September and the formation of a multi-racial
Transitional Executive Council to oversee South Africa's first democratic elections set
for 27 April 1994 before calling on the world community to lift non-military sanctions
that had cost South Africa an estimated $50 billion. The White House immediately
hailed the move and announced that the US would "soon move ahead on measures to
engage resources of the American private sector and the international financial and
donor community to assist South Africa." Hundreds of African-Americans, many of
them veterans of the voting rights campaign of the 1960s in the southern states of the
US volunteered to help rural South Africans exercise the franchise. The NAACP
donated $50,000 to the election effort; the Martin Luther King Center for Nonviolent
Social Change sent experts to South Africa to conduct voter-education seminars;
traditionally black Howard University and Clark Atlanta University were among
institutions sending observers. It was estimated that 5,000 international observers
witnessed the emergence of the new South Africa. The South African government had
accredited 26 local and 77 international NGOs ranging from the Association of West
European Parliamentarians to the Central Electoral Commission of the Russian
Federation; from the Pan Africanist Poll Watch Africa, to the Lawyers Committee for
Civil Rights Under Law. The international presence included technical advisers and
consultants connected to the IEC. The heavy presence of technical expertise from the
North was balanced by the presence of hundreds of volunteers from African, Asian
332
and Latin American countries who were placed on the front lines of the voter
registration campaign to counter charges ofNorthern arrogance. The foreign presence
was so pervasive that some South Africans wondered whether it was their election.38
By May 2 incomplete tallies of the voting showed that the ANC had 63.6
percent of the vote compared to 30.2 percent for the national Party and 5.9 percent for
Buthelezi's Inkatha Freedom Party. Although the tally was not complete, F.W. de
Klerk conceded defeat, saying Mandela had "walked a long road and now stands at the
top of the hill. A traveler would sit down and enjoy the view but a man of destiny
knows that beyond this hill lies another and another ... As he contemplates the future I
hold out my hand in friendship and cooperation." Hours later Mandela claimed victory
at a Johannesburg hotel. In a gracious speech, Mandela congratulated de Klerk and the
people of South Africa, calling the moment "A joyous night for the human spirit." On
Friday May 6 the Independent Electoral Commission announced its final vote tally
62.6 percent for the ANC, 20.3 for de Klerk's National Party, and 10.5 percent for
Inkatha. On May 8 planes approached South Africa from all corners of the earth
bearing the largest gathering of black heads of state ever. Three of these planes carried
the 44-member official US delegation led by Vice President Al Gore and his wife
Tipper, Hillary Rodham Clinton, and a Congressional Delegation. The
overwhelmingly black delegation marked an historic stage for African-American
participation in US foreign policy.
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Vice President Al Gore emphasized the African-American connection in his
official remarks generally ignored by the mainstream US press. "The history we are
present to witness marks a transition in the history of the world. We have a delegation
of Americans that includes many who have participated in a highly personal way, for a
long period of time, in assisting the peaceful negotiated revolution here in South
Africa. The transition here and the Civil Rights Movement in the United States have
been closely intertwined longer than many realize. The lessons of the spirit which
came out of America's civil rights movement have been vigorously exported to South
Africa and have, in turn, been taken to the United States." The ceremony was followed
by an African and African-American healing ceremony at Johannesburg's integrated
Marker Theatre where poet Maya Angelo and South African artists raised up the
names of the ancestors who had made the moment possible. Al Gore raised up the
names ofDu Bois and the African Methodist Episcopal Church and other African
American activists who had participated in the struggle. "To the United States, this
transformation has special significance. After all, for years Americans agonized over
the horrors of our own apartheid. And the struggle for justice in South Africa and in
the United States has in many ways been one struggle."39
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CHAPTER 11
CONCLUSION
This study traced the role of African American activists in the international
anti-apartheid movement from its inception in the late 1940s to the attainment of
majority rule in South Africa in the elections 1994. It begins with the forgotten years
of the movement between 1946 and 1955 when the Council on African Affairs
organized famine relief campaigns, legal defense funds, sit-ins and demonstrations at
South African embassies and petitioned the United Nations to impose international
sanctions. In 1946 CAA members Alphaeus Hunton and Eslanda Robeson worked
with India's representative Vijaya Pandit to block South Africa's attempt to annex
South West Africa and to impose sanctions on the regime for discriminating against
people of Indian descent. In addition to the rally, the CAA also organized a picket at
the South African embassy on November 21, 1946. To the surprise of South Africa,
the Council's view prevailed and the UN rejected South Africa's attempt to annex
South West Africa.
While the efforts to pass sanctions against South Africa was vetoed by the
United States and the United Kingdom, the campaign to raise the world's awareness of
the plight of nonwhites in South Africa was a resounding success. It set in motion the
sanctions movement that would eventually succeed in isolating South Africa and
expelling it from the United Nations. As more African and Asian countries joined the
United Nations in the 1950s and 1960s, the body moved inexorably toward sanctions.
These efforts paid off on 6 November 1962 when member states voted in the General
Assembly to sever diplomatic, transportation and economic relations with South
337
Africa. Although this resolution was non-binding, it was a major victory for the
external anti-apartheid movement. To be effective, however, the movement needed the
support of the Security Council where the UK and the US continued to block
mandatory sanctions.
The study examines the United States government's role in suppressing radical
anti-colonial organizations and financing the establishment of cold war alternatives
like the African American Institute and the American Society of African Culture.
These organizations were ostensibly created by African-American liberals to establish
ties between African nationalists and African-Americans but were really designed to
influence African students in the United States by steering them away from "radicals"
like Paul Robeson and W.E.B. Du Bois. These official and unofficial interests in
Africa's minerals and anti-communism also led to the establishment of African studies
as a legitimate field of study in the United States. The early African studies programs
were funded by the CIA and Pentagon, which encouraged scholars to produce reports
about the emergence of African nationalism. The African studies programs established
had a distinctive cold war ideology and orientation. They were the academic arm of
US imperialism in Africa. They provided the data that were used to make decisions
about the importance of the Congo and South Africa to the United States. By the
1960s, these cold war organs were discredited and their journals considered anti-black
and neocolonialist. Both AMSAC and ANLCA folded after revelations of CIA
funding. The AAI continued to exist as a predominately white organization. These
new tensions were demonstrated in the withdrawal of African Americans and Africans
from the African Studies Association in 1969 because of differences over involvement
in political actions like the anti-apartheid movement and the lack of representation of
people of African descent in the board of directors. These black scholars then formed
the African Heritage Studies Association with a political action committee that
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included many of the veteran anti-apartheid activists who would work behind the
scenes m the formation of TransAfnca and the Free South Africa Movement. Among
the members of this committee were Hershelle Challanor, Willard Johnson and Ronald
Walters who would all become members of the board of TransAfnca and TransAfrica
Forum in the 1980s. It is this group that brought in Randall Robinson to lead
TransAfrica after the organizing conference in 1976.
The study argues that radicals played an important role in pushing the
movement to support the national liberation struggles in southern Africa. In the 1970s,
radical groups espousing ideologies ranging from Black Nationalism to Maoism to
Marxist Leninism played an important role in pushing the movement to support armed
struggle. This was demonstrated in the 30,000-strong crowd that attended the Africa
Liberation Day march in Washington D.C. in 1972 and the large crowds that returned
for ALD activities throughout the 1970s. These groups reflected a revival of pan-
Africanist sentiment that created the conditions for the emergence of an anti-apartheid
culture in the United States. Like the civil rights movement of the 1960s, the anti-
apartheid movement introduced a new language and culture with its own language,
values and heroes to the United States. A specific discourse on sanctions, divestment,
divestiture, disinvestment and krugerrands was clearly associated with the movement.
Images of Nelson Mandela, Robben Island, Soweto and Sharpeville became tools for
galvanizing outrage against the racist regime. SNCC and the Black Panthers evolved
into anti-imperialist and Third Worldist organizations. SNCC formed an international
affairs desk under James Forman in 1966 and organized sit-ins at the South African
Embassy in Washington D.C. Forman attended the International Conference on
Apartheid, Racial Discrimination and Colonialism in Southern Africa in 1967 where
he presented SNCC's position paper on apartheid. By its demise in 1970, SNCC had
taken on a strong Pan Africanist orientation although it was split between the "back to
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Africa" emigrationists and those who saw their future in the United States. This latter
group became very important in moving the anti-apartheid movement from a pacifist
orientation to unequivocal support for the armed struggle.
It was also this upsurge in popular anti-apartheid sentiment in the African
American community that led the CBC to take up the issue of apartheid. Ron Dellums
drafted the first sanctions bill introduced in the US Congress in response to a petition
from the Polaroid Revolutionary Workers Union. It is this bill that becomes the basis
for US sanctions against South Africa thirteen years later when Congress passes the
Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act over President Reagan's veto. The PRWM's
access to Congress demonstrates how the black freedom movement in the United
States created the conditions for the success of the anti-apartheid movement. It is the
passage of the Voting Rights Act in 1965 and the election of African American
legislators that led to a key turning point in the U.S. anti-apartheid movement. Before
the election of African Americans to Congress, anti-apartheid activists were outsiders
with no access to the decision-making process. It is the establishment of the
Congressional Black Caucus in 1969 that made the institution of a black lobby
(TransAfrica) possible in 1977. The CBC included South Africa in its legislative
agenda from the outset. The Black Caucus was also the source of the Comprehensive
Antiapartheid Act of 1986 that transformed U.S. policy toward South Africa.
This collaboration between congressional leaders and human rights activists
was reflected in the Free South Africa Movement, which organized the arrests of
thousands of demonstrators outside the South African Embassy in Washington D.C. in
the early 1980s. During the demonstrations numerous African American Congressmen
were arrested along with ordinary citizens and celebrities in the sit-ins outside the
South African Embassy. The study examines the complex process through which this
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loose coalition of politicians, activists, scholars, students, ministers and journalists was
established to implement on of the most remarkable examples of grass-roots human
rights groups influencing the foreign policy of a major superpower. The movement
forced the pro-apartheid Reagan administration to change its foreign policy and
debunked the myth that foreign policy is the preserve of national elites.
Prior to the emergence of the CBC, anti-apartheid organizations were limited
to disseminating information to the media and the public without having any impact
on the Congress where decisions were being made. With the election of African-
American legislators following the Voting Rights Act of 1965, however, the anti-
apartheid movement acquired important allies in Congress and moved to a different
level. The CBC itself also recognized the need for a partnership between black
legislators and activists in the effort to change domestic and foreign policies. This
need stemmed from the fact that CBC initiatives like sanctions against South Africa
were not likely to be sponsored by corporations or the traditional lobby groups that
control interest group politics in Washington. Thus the CBC was involved in the
formation of advocacy organizations like TransAfrica and the Free South Africa
Movement as an alternative source of influence and power. This collaboration
between legislators and activists was the key to the transformation of U.S. foreign
policy toward South Africa. This partnership also points to the weaknesses of the
"interest group politics" theories of the political scientists that fail to account for the
role of racism in U.S. foreign policy. Classical political science theories consider
foreign policy the preserve of a small elite usually working in close contact with
Congress and the president. The focus is usually on the influence of "interest groups"
formed by corporations and other powerful elites who have investments abroad and,
therefore, a stake in U.S. policies. There is no place for Blacks, Native Americans,
Hispanics or community-based organizations in this theory as they have no
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investments abroad and do not finance elections. As we have seen, most studies of the
anti-apartheid movement fail to deal with the issue of racism in U.S. policies and the
impact of black organizations in the antiapartheid movement. The role of the CBC,
TransAfrica and FSAM in the transformation of U.S. policies toward South Africa,
however, can only be understood through an examination of the links between racism
and U.S. foreign policy and the roots of the anti-apartheid movement in the black
freedom movement of the 1940s.
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